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THE HISTORY OF THE SEVEN YEARS WAR.

PART I.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH

BY

THOMAS HOLCROFT.

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PREFACE.

I HAVE before written a narrative of the two wars which Pruſſia made on Sileſia and Bohemia. This narrative was the work of a young man, and the conſequence of that frenzy for writing which, in Europe, is become a kind of epidemic diſeaſe. After the peace of 1746 I renounced hiſtory, becauſe that political intrigues, when they are unproductive, do not merit more conſideration than do the cabals of private ſociety; and becauſe that the interior adminiſtration of a ſtate does not furniſh ſufficient materials for hiſtory. The war which happened in 1756 occaſioned me to change my opinion. It had been preceded by ſo much artifice, and the number of our enemies was ſo ſuperior to the forces of Pruſſia, that a hiſtory on ſubjects of ſuch importance appeared to

me not unworthy of being tranſmitted to poſterity. For this purpoſe, at the concluſion of each campaign, I wrote memoirs on the events it had produced, and while the memory of them was recent. But, theſe facts being ſtrongly connected with political affairs, I was obliged to make the latter a part of my plan. In this work I have had two principal objects in view: the firſt was to demonſtrate to poſterity that the avoiding of this war did not depend upon me, and that the honour and the welfare of the ſtate prevented my conſenting to peace under other conditions than thoſe ſtipulated when peace was concluded; and the ſecond to relate all military operations, as clearly and with as much preciſion as was poſſible, that I might leave an authentic collection of the advantageous and diſadvantageous ſituations, as they occurred in the provinces and kingdoms where war was made, for the inſtruction of the houſe of Brandenbourg, whenever it may again have to contend with the houſe of Auſtria.

The ſucceſs of any war depends greatly on the capacity of the general; on a knowledge of the places he occupies, and on the art with which he may derive advantage from his ſituation; either in preventing the enemy from taking ſuch poſts as might favour his purpoſe, or in chooſing himſelf thoſe moſt conducive to ſucceſs. Numerous examples in proof of this aſſertion will be found in theſe memoirs. Little attention will be requiſite to ſhow the effect with which the Auſtrians took certain poſitions, and that with which the Pruſſians aſſumed certain others. May God grant that no ſecond war, equally complicated and difficult with that we have lately terminated, ſhould ever be ſeen! It is not probable that any ſimilar chain of cauſes ſhould, in a ſhort time, produce the ſame circumſtances as thoſe under which we were. When Pruſſia ſhall not have to oppoſe ſo many powers, ſhe may always cover Sileſia and the electorate of Brandenbourg, by immediately penetrating with her army into Bohemia. On an occaſion

ſion like this, the camps of Saxony and Bohemia, concerning which I have ſpoken ſo particularly, may be uſeful; and will abridge the labour of thoſe who ſhall conduct the war, in which one of the things moſt difficult is, when war is to be carried on in a country but little known, to be well aware of which is the beſt road firſt to march. Poſitions are frequently obliged to be taken at a venture, for want of knowing which is good; and which are perhaps in the vicinity. Timidity is the conſequence; and a camp ill choſen is expoſed to the utmoſt peril: inſtead of which, when camps are by experience found to be good, every ſtep is more deciſive and more methodical. I muſt however obſerve, that camps are good or bad according to circumſtances; as, for example, that of Torgau is admirable, when it can be filled with ſeventy thouſand men; but defective when thirty thouſand muſt be oppoſed to ſixty thouſand, becauſe they will be too much diſperſed, conſequently weakened; and the enemy, if he

pleaſe,

pleaſe, may force it on that ſide where it ſhall be the moſt feeble. A camp is like a garment, that ought neither to be too large nor too ſmall for the wearer. If a choice muſt be made, however, it is better to have too many men than too few. There are other camps which cover a part of the ground, but which become defective if the enemy by his motions ſhall change his poſition: the camp of Landſhut, admirable as it is for the covering of Lower Sileſia, becomes bad and incapable of defence ſo ſoon as the Imperialiſts ſhall poſſeſs Glatz and Wartha, becauſe that it will then be totally turned. In ſimilar caſes the judgment ought to dictate the part that ſhould be taken. It ought particularly to be guarded againſt ſervile imitation, which is wrong. And wherefore? Becauſe that generals never are placed in exactly ſimilar ſituations. There may be ſomething relative in their poſitions I allow; but examine them well, and infinite varieties will be found; becauſe that nature, in every ſenſe fruitful, neither creates the ſame appearances

pearances nor repeats the ſame incidents. It would therefore be bad reaſoning to ſay marſhal Luxemburg was exactly ſituated as I am; he acted in ſuch a manner; I will act the ſame. Paſt facts are good to ſtore the imagination, and the memory; they furniſh a repoſitory of ideas, whence a ſupply of materials may be obtained; but which ought to be purified by paſſing through the ſtrainer of the judgment. I therefore repeat, the details of the laſt war ought only to be employed as an augmentation of the magazine of military ideas; and to prove the value of ſome principal poſitions, which will remain determinate ſo long as the country ſhall not change its face, and nature ſhall not be overwhelmed. It is exceedingly probable the Auſtrian generals will not depart from the method of marſhal Daun, which is good paſt contradiction; and that, in ſucceeding wars, they will be equally attentive to poſt themſelves properly as they were in the laſt. This obliges me to obſerve that, a general would be wrong ſhould he be

be in haſte to attack the enemy in hilly poſts, or on broken ground. I have ſometimes, by neceſſity, been forced to this extremity; but, when war is made with equal powers, advantages more certain may be procured by ſtratagem and addreſs, and without expoſing an army to equal danger. The ſum of many ſmall advantages will be great. The attack of a well-defended poſt is beſide a bone of hard digeſtion, and the aſſailant is liable to be repulſed and beaten. It is only to be carried by the ſacrifice of from fifteen to twenty thouſand men, which makes a wide breach in an army. Recruits, ſuppoſing they are to be plentifully obtained, will fill up numbers, but will not ſupply the qualities of the ſoldiers that have been loſt. The kingdom becomes depopulated by renewing the army; the troops degenerate; and, if the war is long, the general will find himſelf at the head of ill-diſciplined peaſants, with whom he ſcarcely dares appear in face of the enemy. In any violent conjuncture, I grant, it is neceſſary

to

to depart from rules, and to have recourſe to deſperate remedies; as poiſon is given to the ſick, when there are no other means of cure. But, ſuch caſes excepted, it is requiſite, in my opinion, to proceed with more caution; to weigh and to meaſure; becauſe that the general who allows the leaſt to chance is the moſt able.

I have but another word, which relates to the ſtyle that I have adopted. I was ſo much offended by the words *I* and *me*, that I determined to ſpeak of ſubjects that related to myſelf in the third perſon. In ſo long a work it would have been inſupportable to have ſpoken continually in my own name. I made it a law to adhere ſcrupulouſly to the truth, and to be impartial; becauſe that the hatred and animoſity of an author inſtructs no man; and becauſe that it would be weakneſs, even to puſillanimity, not to ſpeak well of an enemy, and not to render him the juſtice he deſerves. If in my own deſpite I have departed from this rule, poſterity muſt pardon me, and correct me where I

deſerve

deſerve correction. To add any thing more would be ſuperfluous; and perhaps a work like this, meant only to be read by a few perſons, ſtands in no need of a Preface.

Potſdam, March 3, 1764.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE

SEVEN YEARS WAR.

CHAP. I.

Internal Negotiations of Pruſſia and Auſtria, during the Peace.

THE peace enjoyed by Europe permitted the various powers to turn their attention to internal government. The king began by reforming thoſe abuſes which had been introduced into the general police. He laboured, by the aid of new eſtabliſhments, to augment his finances; he applied himſelf to reſtore military diſcipline; to render the fortreſſes as perfect as poſſible; and to collect all kinds of

accoutrements, ſtores, and arms, the conſumption of which while the war continued had been ſo prodigious.

Juſtice, ill adminiſtered during the preceding reign, and become the reverſe of juſt, deſerved particular cares and attention. People were accuſtomed to elude the laws. Attornies made a ſhameful traffic of confidence: to be rich or poor was ſufficient to gain or loſe a cauſe. Such abuſes, becoming daily more intolerable, called loudly for reform; as well in the perſons of the judges, advocates, and attornies, as in the laws themſelves; which it was neceſſary to render more clear, and the formalities of which, not relating to the real queſtion, and prolonging the ſuit, it was alſo neceſſary to retrench.

The king committed this labour to his great chancellor Cocceji, a man of integrity, whoſe virtue and probity were worthy of the noble ages of the Roman republic. Learned and enlightened, he ſeemed like Tribonianus, born for legiſlation, and the good of mankind. This ſage of the laws undertook the painful and delicate work with ſo much zeal that, after one year's aſſiduous induſtry, the ſovereign courts of juſtice, purged of thoſe men by whom they had been diſgraced, were ſupplied with virtuous magiſtrates; a new code of laws, for all the

provinces under the Pruſſian dominion, was finiſhed; and, after it had been approved by the ſtates, promulgated. The proſpect was extended to futurity; and, as experience teaches us that the beſt inſtitutions decline, or become uſeleſs, if they are left in neglect, and if not reſtored to thoſe firſt principles on which they were founded, a rule was made that there ſhould be a general viſitation, of the ſovereign courts of juſtice, once in three years; that obſervation of the new laws might be enforced, and ſuch officers of juſtice as were diſcovered to have been guilty of prevarication puniſhed. This new order, introduced in the adminiſtration of juſtice, enforced the happineſs of the people; and ſecured to each family its poſſeſſions. Every individual lived under the ſafeguard of the laws, for they were abſolute.

However great the cares of the late king in regulating and arranging the finances had been, he had not effected all it was poſſible to effect. He had neither the time nor the means for concluding a work ſo great; and the improvements that ſtill might be made were immenſe; as well reſpecting lands that were to be cleared as the eſtabliſhment of manufactories, the extending of trade, and the encouraging of induſtry. The firſt years of the king's reign

were appropriated to war; nor could he turn his attention to interior government, till he had firſt inſured tranquillity. Along the Oder, from Swinemunde to Kuſtrin, were vaſt marſhes; which perhaps had, in all ages, lain uncultivated. A plan for clearing this country was formed. A canal was dug, from Kuſtrin to Wrietzen, by which theſe marſhy lands were drained, and two thouſand families were there ſettled. Theſe ſettlements were continued from Schwedt to beyond Stettin, where twelve hundred additional families found eaſe and plenty. Thus was a ſmall province gained, by induſtry, from ignorance and idleneſs.

The woollen manufactory, which was rather conſiderable, was in want of ſpinners. Theſe were brought out of foreign countries, and were ſettled in different villages of two hundred families each. It had been a cuſtom, time immemorial, in the dutchy of Magdebourg, for the inhabitants of Vogtland to come and gather in the harveſt; after which they returned home. The king gave theſe people ſettlements in the dutchy; and thus procured the ſtate a number of theſe foreigners.

By ſuch various operations, the kingdom, during peace, acquired two hundred and eighty new villages. Nor did the care of the country occaſion

occaſion the towns to be neglected. A new town was built on the Swine, after which it was called Swinemunde, and was at the ſame time made a port, by digging the channel deeper, and cleanſing the baſon at the mouth of the Oder. The city of Stettin thus gained the tolls that had formerly been paid to the Swedes, in paſſing to Wolgaſt down the Peene, which greatly contributed to render its trade flouriſhing, and to attract foreigners. New manufactories were eſtabliſhed in all the towns. Thoſe for rich ſtuffs and velvets were found moſt ſuitable to the city of Berlin. Light velvets and plain ſtuffs were made at Potſdam. Splittgerber ſupplied all the provinces with the ſugar which he refined at Berlin. A dimity manufactory rendered the city of Brandenbourg flouriſhing. Ruſſian leather was dreſſed at Frankfort, on the Oder. Silk ſtockings and handkerchiefs were made at Berlin, Magdebourg, and Potſdam. The Wegely manufactory was doubled. The planting of mulberry trees was encouraged throughout all the provinces. The clergy gave an example to the huſbandmen, and taught them to rear that precious inſect which originally comes from the Indies, and from the down of which ſilk is obtained. In places where wood was plentiful, but whence it could not be tranſported for the

want of navigable rivers, iron-founderies were eſtabliſhed, which ſoon ſupplied the fortreſſes and the army with caſt cannon, bullets, and bombs. In the principality of Minden and the county of Marck, new ſalt pits were diſcovered, and the ſalt was refined. The pits of Halle were brought to perfection, by the conſtruction of buildings for the gradation of the ſalt, which ſaved wood. In a word, induſtry was encouraged in the capital and the kingdom.

The king enforced the right of market tolls, which the Saxons had diſputed with the town of Magdebourg; and, by the means of duties eſtabliſhed on the frontiers, the trade of the Pruſſian provinces was almoſt on a par with that of Saxony. The Embden company eſtabliſhed an important trade with China. By diminiſhing the exportation duties at Stettin, Königſberg, and Colberg, the revenues of theſe places were almoſt doubled. The reſult of theſe various operations of finance was, without including the revenues of Sileſia and Eaſt Friſeland, or loading the people with any new tax whatever, that the crown had acquired an increaſe of revenue, in 1756, of twelve hundred thouſand crowns; and, after the inhabitants of all the provinces had been numbered, the ſum total was found to amount to five millions of ſouls.

Thus,

Thus, ſince the riches of a ſtate conſiſt in the number of its inhabitants, Pruſſia might be eſtimated twice as powerful as it had been, during the latter part of the reign of Frederic William, the father of the king.

The laws and the finances did not wholly abſorb the attention of the king; the army, that inſtrument of fame and preſervation, was not neglected. The king was particularly watchful that diſcipline and ſubordination ſhould be maintained, in each province. The troops were regularly aſſembled every year; and in the fields of peace were taught the grand evolutions and manœuvres of war. The infantry was exerciſed in various motions; and taught to form; to attack in plains and on heights; to defend villages and intrenchments; paſs rivers; cover marches with reverſed columns; to retreat, and, in fine, to perform every movement which was neceſſary to be made in the face of an enemy.

The cavalry was exerciſed in different attacks, cloſe and open; was taught to reconnoitre; to ſearch for forage, green and dry; and to form, and take points of ſight on preſcribed lines. In thoſe cantons that were the moſt populous, the ſupernumeraries amounted to thirty-ſix men for each company, and in the

leaſt to twenty-four; ſo that, though there were no new levies, the total number of theſe ſupernumeraries amounted to ten thouſand men. Each battalion, each regiment of cavalry, was headed by old commanders; approved officers, brave and meritorious. The corps of captains conſiſted of experienced men; men of ſound underſtanding; men of valour. The ſubalterns were ſelect; ſeveral of them poſſeſſed great capacity, and were worthy of riſing to ſuperior ſtations. In a word, the induſtry and emulation which reigned throughout the army were admirable.

Among the generals it was not the ſame: although there were ſome who poſſeſſed real merit, the majority had much valour, but much indolence. It was the cuſtom that rank muſt be obtained by ſeniority, and not by abilities. This was an ancient abuſe, which had been of no prejudice in the preceding wars; becauſe that the king, acting only with one army, had no need of many detachments; and becauſe that the troops and generals of the Auſtrians, whom he oppoſed, were not above mediocrity, and had entirely neglected tactics. The king attracted marſhal Keith from the Ruſſian ſervice; and this was an excellent acquiſition. He was a man of mild and virtuous manners;

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an able officer, poſſeſſed of the greateſt politeneſs, and of heroic valour in the day of battle.

The corps of artillery had been augmented: the king increaſed it to three battalions; the laſt of which was deſtined for garriſon towns. It was well exerciſed, and in good condition; but not ſufficiently numerous, for that profuſion and various ſpecies of artillery which faſhion ſoon after introduced into armies. The number ought to have been double; but, as ſuch had not been the cuſtom in preceding wars, and as theſe two battalions would formerly have been ſufficient for ſervice, augmentation was not at firſt thought of.

The works of Schweidnitz were built during the peace; and thoſe of Neiſs, Coſel, Glatz, and Glogau, improved. Schweidnitz was intended as a depoſit for the army, ſhould the war be carried into Bohemia on that ſide; and, as the Auſtrians had ſhewn but little capacity, during the laſt war, for the attack and defence of fortreſſes, the works were but lightly conſtructed. This in reality was very ill reaſoning; for fortreſſes are not built for a day, but for duration. And who might warrant that the empreſs queen ſhould not hereafter acquire an able engineer, who ſhould introduce an art in which

which the Auſtrian army was deficient, and render that art common? Thus were faults committed; repentance was the conſequence. To reaſon more ſolidly was learned from experience.

On the other part, it was foreſeen that a well conditioned well maintained army was not alone ſufficient for war; but that ſtores, proviſions, arms, and clothing, in reſerve were neceſſary. This was the cauſe that ſtores of all ſorts, furniture, ſaddles, ſtirrups, bits, boots, cartouch-boxes, belts and the like were amaſſed. The arſenal contained fifty thouſand muſkets, twenty thouſand ſabres, twelve thouſand ſwords, as many piſtols, carbines, and bandeleers, and in a word whatever was neceſſary for periodical ſupply, and which cannot always be obtained in time of need, with ſufficient promptitude. A train of heavy artillery had been caſt, conſiſting of eighty battering pieces and twenty mortars, and depoſited in the fortreſs of Neiſs. The gunpowder collected amounted to fifty-ſix thouſand quintals, which were diſtributed through the different fortreſſes of the kingdom. The magazines of proviſions contained thirty-ſix thouſand winſpels of flour, and twelve thouſand of oats; ſo that, by taking theſe previous meaſures, every thing was prepared for the foreboded

foreboded war, which ſeemed at no great diſtance. The king even made an augmentation in the garriſon regiments, in 1755; thoſe of Sileſia were increaſed to eight battalions, thoſe of Pruſſia to three, and thoſe of the electoral marche to two; in the whole thirteen battalions.

In a poor country, the ſovereign finds no reſource in the purſe of his ſubjects; and his duty is, by prudence and good œconomy, to ſet apart ſupplies for thoſe extraordinary expences which will become indiſpenſable. The ant amaſſes in ſummer what it conſumes in winter; and a king ought to provide during peace for the expenditures of war. This article, which unfortunately was of ſuch importance, was not forgotten; and Pruſſia was, of itſelf, capable of making ſome campaigns. In a word, ſhe was ready to appear in the liſts on the firſt ſignal, and to break a lance with her opponents. How uſeful this precaution was will be ſeen hereafter; as will the neceſſity of the king of Pruſſia, from the odd ſituation of his provinces, to continue armed and prepared for every event, that he might not become the ſport of his neighbours and his foes. He ought indeed to have made greater preparations, had the ſtate been capable of ſuch; for, in the

perſon

perſon of the empreſs queen, the king found an ambitious and vindictive enemy, who was the more dangerous becauſe ſhe was a woman, headlong in her opinions, and implacable.

Too true it was that ſhe had long been ſecretly preparing thoſe grand projects in her cabinet which were afterward to be put in act. Devoured by ambition, ſhe ſought for fame in every path. She imparted an order to her revenues which had been unknown among her anceſtors; and, by excellent arrangements, not only repaired what ſhe had loſt in the provinces ceded to the king of Pruſſia and the king of Sardinia, but, had even conſiderably augmented her wealth. Count Haugwitz was made comptroller general of the finances. Under his adminiſtration, the revenues of the empreſs queen amounted to thirty-ſix millions of florins; or twenty-four millions of crowns. The emperor Charles VI. her father, though poſſeſſed of the kingdom of Naples, of Servia, and of Sileſia, had not ſo much.

The emperor her huſband, not daring to interfere with ſtate affairs, undertook thoſe of trade. He annually collected large ſums from his Tuſcan dominions; which he turned to good account in commerce. He eſtabliſhed manufactures, and lent on intereſt. He contracted

tracted for the army-clothing, horſes, arms, and uniforms of the whole Imperial army. In partnerſhip with one count Boltza and a merchant of the name of Schimmelmann, he farmed the cuſtom-duties of Saxony; and, in the year 1756, he even ſold forage and flour to the army of the king, then at war with the queen his wife. During the war, he advanced very conſiderable ſums to this princeſs, on good ſecurity. In a word he was banker to the court.

In the preceding wars, the empreſs queen had felt the neceſſity of better diſcipline; for which purpoſe ſhe choſe active generals, capable of introducing it among her troops. Thoſe old officers who were ill-fitted for the command were diſmiſſed, with penſions, and replaced by young men of family, full of ardour, and the love of military renown. Camps were annually formed in the provinces, where the troops were exerciſed by commiſſary inſpectors, well verſed in the grand manœuvres of war. The empreſs, at various times, repaired herſelf to the camps of Prague and Olmutz; that ſhe might animate the troops by her preſence, and donations. She, better than any ſovereign, underſtood the value of ſuch-like diſtinctions. She rewarded the officers, who were recommended by her generals; and every where excited emulation,

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the employment of talents, and the desire of pleasing.

A school of artillery was at the same time formed, under the direction of the prince of Lichtenstein. The corps was made to consist of six battalions, and he carried the use of artillery to that unheard-of excess which it has lately attained. His zeal for the empress queen occasioned him to expend, for this purpose, more than a hundred thousand crowns of his own property. That nothing might be neglected which any way related to the army, the empress queen founded a college for the young nobility, near Vienna, where they were instructed in all the arts which have any reference to war. Hither she drew able professors of geometry, fortification, geography, and history, who formed pupils of capacity; and thus the college became a nursery of officers.

By these various cares, the army acquired a degree of perfection before unknown, under the emperors of the house of Austria; and a woman executed plans worthy of a man of genius. This princess, who extended her views to every part of administration, ill satisfied with the manner in which foreign and political affairs had hitherto been managed, chose count Kaunitz, toward the conclusion of the year 1755,

1755, and gave him the patent of prime minister, that every branch of government might be under the inspection of one man. We shall, in its place, have occasion to bring the reader more particularly acquainted with a person who enacted so great a part. He partook of all the sentiments of his sovereign; and had the art to flatter her passions and gain her confidence. When he became minister, he laboured to form alliances, and to exclude the king of Prussia, that he might prepare for the plan, which she had so much at heart, of recovering Silesia, and of humbling this sovereign. But, as this properly belongs to the following chapter, we shall here drop the subject.

Thus were two powers during peace preparing for war; like two gladiators, who impatiently burn to employ the swords they are sharpening.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of War and Politics; from the Year 1746 *to the Year* 1756.

1746. THE peace of Dreſden, like moſt treaties which are made between ſovereigns, ſuſpended hoſtilities without deſtroying the ſeeds of diſcord, which exiſted between Auſtria and Pruſſia. Whatever diſſimulation the court of Vienna might employ, the loſs of Sileſia dwelt too ſorely on the memory to permit animoſity and hatred to be ſmothered, or that they ſhould not at length flame forth. Properly ſpeaking, the war between theſe two powers was not ended; it did but change its appearance; and, though armies were no longer combating in the field, the Auſtrians in their cabinet continued hoſtilities. Stratagem, intrigue, artifice, were the arms they employed to embroil Pruſſia with every court of Europe; and, if poſſible, to raiſe her up enemies even to the very ends of the earth. Of this we ſhall bring ſufficient teſtimony. But, that we may employ order and perſpicuity in what we ſhall ſay, we firſt will take a retroſpective view of particular events, which happened in

the various courts of Europe. As, after the peace of Dreſden, war was ſtill carried on, between the courts of Vienna and London on one part, and Paris and Madrid on the other, we find ourſelves obliged to give a ſketch of this war, that we may omit nothing which may conduce to the better underſtanding of this hiſtory.

The Imperial and allied armies did not proſper in Flanders, where they were oppoſed by marſhal Saxe. Toward the end of the year 1746, the marſhal gained the battle of Rocoux. The loſs of this battle was in part attributed to the prince of Waldeck, who was ill poſted, and in part to the Auſtrians, who did not ſuſtain the Dutch. Prince Charles of Lorraine, after having been a ſpectator of the defeat of the latter, ſent prince Louis of Brunſwic to cover their retreat; which he did ſo effectually that the allies gained Maeſtricht, without the French, who purſued them, being able to come up.

1747. Marſhal Saxe opened the next campaign by taking moſt of the towns of Dutch Flanders. Louis XV. headed the army in perſon. The preſence of the king and his miniſters did but increaſe the embarraſſment of marſhal Saxe, and the expence of the army.

The courtiers filled the camp with their cabals, and counteracted the general. A court ſo numerous daily demanded ten thouſand ratios for the coach-horſes. But neither the court of Verſailles nor the enemies of France could prevent marſhal Saxe from preſerving his ſuperiority during that campaign. His firſt project was to beſiege Maeſtricht; and, that he might deceive the enemy, he feigned an attempt on Bergen op-zoom. The ſtratagem was underſtood by the duke of Cumberland, who haſtily marched into the neighbourhood of Maeſtricht. The marſhal ſeeing himſelf anticipated, as haſtily quitted his camp at Malines, and marched beyond St. Tron to the heights of Henderen. The allies, who on the eve were at the commandery of Yons, neglected to occupy that important height. Undecided in their choice of the field of battle, and wavering in their reſolutions, they ſet fire to villages and extinguiſhed it; placed troops in theſe villages and withdrew them; and, on the morning of the action, after having ſet the village of Lafeld on fire, they quenched the flames, and placed men in it, though at the diſtance of two thouſand paces in the front of their army. At this village the battle began. Marſhal Saxe, a witneſs of the inconſiſtent motions of the allies, imagined

imagined Lafeld was deſtitute of troops, propoſed to ſeize it, and found his miſtake. The attack was made immediately; and, by perſiſting and ſacrificing their men, the French carried the village, which decided the victory.

The allies retired to Maeſtricht, without being purſued by marſhal Saxe; becauſe that the count de Clermont Tonnerre did not think proper to charge the enemy with his cavalry, notwithſtanding the reiterated orders he received. His diſobedience to his general procured him the dignity of marſhal of France. Louis XV. therefore properly ſpeaking only gained, by his victory, the barren advantage of remaining on the field: and the duke of Cumberland, though vanquiſhed, preſerved Maeſtricht from a ſiege.

That he might not ſtill let the campaign paſs uſeleſsly away, Saxe returned toward Bergen op-zoom, the ſiege of which he committed to marſhal Löwendahl. The excellent works of Cöhorn, and the admirable wit with which he had conſtructed the mines, were alone almoſt ſufficient for defence. Cronſtrom was the governor. He was ninety years of age, and his mind and his body were alike infirm. The garriſon was none of the beſt, and the officers, wanting experience, knew not whether they

ought to defend themſelves by their mines or by inundation. They reſembled the famous aſs of the ſchools, that is ſaid to have died between two bundles of hay, unable to determine on which to feed. The French made an aſſault, and carried the place almoſt without reſiſtance. The governor ſcarcely had time to eſcape, in his nightcap and gown. This exploit terminated the ſucceſs of the French, for the preſent year, in Flanders.

Fortune was more favourable to the Imperialiſts in Italy, and Provence. It is true that the revolution of Genoa occaſioned the expedition of count Braun* on Toulon to fail. This revolution was the effect of chance. The Auſtrians ill-treated ſome citizens, who were at work in embarking artillery for Antibes. The people aſſembled, took the part of the inſulted citizens, and, in their firſt fury, drove the marquis of Botta and the whole Auſtrian garriſon out of Genoa. This was the cauſe that the army of Auſtria was in want of proviſions and ammunition; and that count Braun quitted Provence. On his return, he laid ſiege to Genoa; but did not take the city. France ſent ſuccours thither, under de Boufflers; and

* A different ſpelling for Brown. T.

afterward

afterward under the duke de Richlieu; who both took ſuch proper meaſures that they rendered the efforts of the Auſtrians abortive.

The French and Spaniſh troops, headed by the chevalier de Belleiſle, wiſhed to open a road into Italy after the retreat of count Braun. The French firſt approached the paſs of Exilles. De Belleiſle, finding this poſt ill defended, thought it might ſafely be inſulted. He ſent to the Spaniards that, with the French, they might attack it with their united forces; but they deferred joining him for three days. This gave time to the king of Sardinia to reinforce thoſe who defended the paſs; and the defence of which was ſo important. The Spaniards came up; and, though circumſtances were altered ſince de Belleiſle had ſent for this reinforcement, he would not be thought in an error: he therefore attacked the Sardinians vigorouſly; and, after having employed every means which daring courage could inſpire, he was killed while he was, with his own hands, tearing up a palliſado of the enemy's intrenchment. Unable to ſurmount obſtacles which nature and art had raiſed, theſe efforts only ſerved to augment the loſs of the French and Spaniards, who were every where repulſed; and the number of officers of condition, and of the firſt families, who

ſell there, put all France in mourning. The public, often unjuſt and full of prejudices, apparently ill informed, pronounced this enterprize raſh: it was only bold, and could not have failed, if de Belleiſle could have executed his project when it was firſt conceived; and had not the tardineſs of the Spaniards occaſioned him to loſe the laurels he was ſo near gathering.

1748. The French indemnified themſelves in Flanders, for their ill ſucceſs in the neighbourhood of the Alps. The genius of marſhal Saxe had gained an aſcendancy over the foes of France. He opened the campaign by marching his army in ſeveral columns; one of which menaced Luxembourg; another Bois le Duc; and a third Venlo. Their motions led them collectively to Maeſtricht, which they inveſted and began the ſiege. But, however brilliant were the ſucceſſes of marſhal Saxe, his very triumphs became burdenſome to France. This was the eighth campaign, and the continuance of a war the commencement of which had been ſo fatal exhauſted the nation. All the belligerent powers were, in like manner, weary. The cauſe of quarrel had ſo often changed that they at length found they had none. The frenzy had ſubſided; they thought

thought ſeriouſly of peace, and began a negotiation. Each power felt its ſecret wounds; for the cure of which tranquillity was neceſſary. The Engliſh feared to increaſe their national debt; that maſter-piece of ideal wealth, the abuſe of which prognoſticated bankruptcy. The Imperial court, ſupported by the ſubſidies of England, would indeed have continued the war, ſo long as her allies would have ſupplied the means. She however conſented to peace, in order to turn the reſources ſhe poſſeſſed to the execution of a project ſhe had more at heart than the war of Flanders. France ſenſibly felt her great expences; and ſhe had the more to fear becauſe of the famine in her ſouthern provinces; the ports of which were blockaded by the fleets of England.

To thoſe reaſons of ſtate, which the miniſtry of Verſailles publicly alleged, there were others to be added, more ſecret and ſtill more powerful. Madame de Pompadour had lately become miſtreſs to the king; and ſhe dreaded leſt a continuation of the war ſhould engage Louis XV. to head his army every year. There is danger in abſence for favourites and miſtreſſes. She well underſtood that, to fix the heart of her lover, it was neceſſary to remove every pretext by which they might be ſeparated;

in a word it was neceſſary to make peace, to effect which ſhe employed all her power. When St. Severin departed from Verſailles for Aix la Chapelle, in quality of plenipotentiary, ſhe ſaid to him—"Remember, Sir, not to return "without peace; for this the king will have, "at any price."

A congreſs was held at Aix la Chapelle. Maeſtricht ſurrendered, and peace was proclaimed. By this treaty, France reſtored all her conqueſts, in Flanders and Brabant, to the houſe of Auſtria: in return for which, the empreſs queen ceded the dutchies of Parma and Placenza, to don Philip; but the reverſion of them was ſecured to the houſe of Auſtria; for it was ſtipulated that, when don Carlos ſhould aſcend the throne of Spain, don Philip ſhould ſucceed him in the kingdom of Naples; and it is remarkable that this article, thus conceived, was ratified without either the participation or conſent of the kings of Spain and Naples, or of don Philip. They therefore teſtified their diſcontent, and proteſted againſt every meaſure taken at Aix la Chapelle, as contrary to the independence of their crowns.

The intereſts of France and England were regulated in the ſeventh article; in which England engaged to give up Cape Breton to the French;

French; and the two crowns mutually guarantied their American poſſeſſions, according to the tenor of the treaty of Utrecht. They agreed to name commiſſaries, in order to ſettle ſome diſputes relative to the Canadian limits. The twenty-ſecond article contained the guarantee of Sileſia, by all the powers.

A very ſmall degree of attention will ſhew that this peace, haſtily made, was a precipitate work; and that the various powers ſacrificed their future intereſts to preſent embarraſſment. They extinguiſhed the conflagration which raged through Europe; but they amaſſed combuſtibles, that muſt catch fire on the firſt occaſion. Nothing more was neceſſary than the death of the king of Spain to excite new troubles; and the indeterminate limits of Canada could not fail, at ſome period, to embroil the French and Engliſh. An additional campaign, or reſolution in negotiating, will ſometimes put a long period to the diſputes of ſovereigns. But palliatives are often preferred to ſpecifics; and a truce ſigned by impatience to a permanent peace.

By this war, the court of Vienna had loſt the dutchies of Sileſia, Parma, and Placenza. This diminution of power ſhe could ill endure; and, as ſhe accuſed the Engliſh of being the principal

pal cauſe of this loſs, who ſhe affirmed, and not without reaſon, ſacrificed the intereſts of their allies to their own, ſhe became diſſatisfied with that alliance, and was induced to ſound the ſhore at Verſailles, and to attempt to detach that power from Pruſſia: attempting, alſo, at the ſame time, to find ſome expedient that might conciliate the intereſts of the two courts. Count Kaunitz, to whom this project moſt appertained, being plenipotentiary for the empreſs queen at Aix la Chapelle, did not delay making the firſt overtures to St. Severin, by inſinuating that, ſhould France and Auſtria come to a good underſtanding, arrangements might be made, between the two courts, for their mutual advantage; according to which Flanders and Brabant might become ſubject to the moſt chriſtian king; provided the king of Pruſſia ſhould be obliged to reſtore Sileſia to the empreſs queen. The lure would have been very tempting at Verſailles, had not Louis XV. weary of the war he had lately concluded, dreaded to begin a new war, for the execution of this project; ſo that, advantageous as it might ſeem, it was declined by St. Severin.

Count Kaunitz ſtopt not here. Frivolous in his pleaſures, but profound in his projects, he was ſent as ambaſſador to Paris, where he laboured,

boured, with infinite aſſiduity and addreſs, to eraſe the irreconcileable hatred of the French; which, from the time of Francis I. and Charles V. had ſubſiſted between the houſes of Bourbon and Habſpourg. He frequently repeated, to the miniſtry, that the aggrandizement of Pruſſia was their own work; that they had been repaid by ingratitude; and that they could not derive any advantage from an ally who ſhould act for his own intereſt ſolely. At other times he told them, as if forced by conviction to ſpeak—

"It is time, gentlemen, you ſhould be relieved "from the pupillage in which you are held, "by the kings of Pruſſia, Sardinia, and other "petty princes. Their politics only tend to "ſow diſcord among the great powers; by "which they themſelves may be aggrandized. "We make war for their gain. Did we under-"ſtand each other, we might mutually accede "to propoſals, which would deprive the firſt "powers of Europe of all ſubject for quarrel, "and might ſerve as a baſis to a durable "peace."

Theſe ideas at firſt appeared ſtrange, to a nation that, from habit and a ſucceſſion of wars, had long regarded the Imperial houſe as a perpetual enemy. Though the French miniſtry was flattered by the ſuppoſition that theſe great

powers would give laws to Europe, and render peace perpetual, there were other conſiderations by which they were held in conſtraint. Count Kaunitz however returned continually to the charge; and, by his frequent repetition of the ſame ſentiments, they became familiar to the court of France; which inſenſibly was perſuaded that theſe two great powers were not ſo natively inimical as their forefathers had imagined. Time was neceſſary for this ſhoot to bud and grow. The doctrine of count Kaunitz continually made proſelytes, and occaſioned a coolneſs between the courts of Verſailles and Berlin; which was particularly remarked when lord Tyrconnel was ſent to Berlin. This ambaſſador, very angry at the ſuppoſition of pupillage, which count Kaunitz had mentioned with ſuch contempt, inceſſantly and affectedly ſpoke of the independence of great powers. He one day was imprudent enough to hold diſcourſe, the ſenſe of which was—"Should the "king of Pruſſia diſcover the leaſt tergiverſa- "tion, we ſhall permit his downfal, and he will "be cruſhed."

The French preſerved the appearance of friendſhip and complaiſance to the king, although the court of Verſailles, no longer ſuppoſing an alliance with the empreſs queen impoſſible,

poſſible, no longer felt its former repugnance to that alliance. Such was the ſtate of affairs in France, when the vexations of the Engliſh obliged Louis XV. to have recourſe to arms.

The court of Vienna, not finding all that facility in the court of Verſailles with which ſhe had flattered herſelf, and ever aſſiduous in making good her party, turned toward Peterſburg, where ſhe employed every means to ſtrengthen her union with Ruſſia, and to excite a quarrel between the empreſs Elizabeth and the king of Pruſſia. The Ruſſian miniſter was certain that his hatred to Pruſſia would be rewarded; and the Auſtrians increaſed his ſalary in proportion to his bitterneſs. Thoſe who were at the head of the government, ſeeking therefore only to inflame the courts of Peterſburg and Berlin, found the pretext they ſought in a ſubject which was, in itſelf, very innocent. The neceſſity of eſtabliſhing a balance of power, in the north, had occaſioned France, Pruſſia, and Sweden, to form a triple alliance. Count Beſtuchef at this pretended to take umbrage. He filled the mind of the empreſs with fears, and proceeded to ſuch exceſs that the Ruſſians immediately formed conſiderable camps, in Finland, on the Swediſh frontiers, and in Livonia,

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on the frontiers of Pruſſia. Theſe appearances were afterward annually renewed.

1750. Under theſe critical circumſtances a difference aroſe, between Ruſſia and Sweden, concerning the limits of Finland, which had not been accurately defined, by the treaty of Abo. This unfortunate pretence gave Ruſſia the liberty of beginning a war, whenever ſhe ſhould think proper. The court of Vienna fomented theſe diſſenſions, purpoſely to diſquiet the king of Pruſſia, and induce him to take ſome falſe ſtep, that might involve him in a quarrel with Ruſſia. The empreſs queen however contented herſelf with feeding the diſcontent of the two courts, without raſhly haſtening a rupture. The ſituation of the king was delicate, and embarraſſing; it might have become dangerous, had he not been fortunate enough to gain information of the moſt ſecret deſigns of his enemies, by procuring the whole correſpondence between the miniſters of the courts of Saxony, Vienna, and Peterſburg.

Count * * * felt himſelf humbled by the peace of Dreſden, was jealous of the puiſſance of the king, and laboured, in concert with the courts of Vienna and Peterſburg, to communicate that hatred and envy by which he was devoured. This miniſter breathed nothing

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but war, and flattered himſelf he might profit by the firſt troubles in Europe, to abaſe a neighbour ſo dangerous to Saxony. He well underſtood that electorate would not be ſpared, and that the firſt efforts of the Pruſſians would be on that ſide; yet did he ſuffer the army to moulder away. We will not examine how far his conduct was conſiſtent. He ought not to have been ignorant that every ſtate deceives itſelf which, inſtead of depending on its proper ſtrength, hopes protection from that of its allies.

Thus there were no ſecrets with which the king was not acquainted; and the frequent information he received ſerved him as a compaſs, by which to direct his courſe, amid the rocks be had to avoid; and to prevent him from ſuppoſing mere appearances indicated a deſign againſt him of immediately declaring war. Yet the influence of the court of Vienna, over that of Peterſburg, daily increaſed; which might naturally happen, becauſe the mind of the miniſter was prepared to receive ſuch impreſſions as they might endeavour to inſpire him with, againſt Pruſſia. Count Beſtuchef had ſuſpected the king's ambaſſador, baron Mardefeld, of holding intelligence with the marquis de la Chetardie, to diſpoſſeſs him of his poſt. In order

order to revenge this perſonal affront, he prevailed on the empreſs to conclude an alliance with the courts of Vienna and London. This treaty, made in 1746, was for two reaſons advantageous to Ruſſia: firſt, becauſe the union of the houſe of Auſtria was convenient to Ruſſia, that their powers might jointly oppoſe all attempts of the Porte; and, in the ſecond place, becauſe of the Engliſh ſubſidies, which afterward inundated Peterſburg. Affairs being in this ſituation, it was not difficult for the empreſs queen to break off all correſpondence between Pruſſia and Ruſſia. Not all the cautions which the king could take, under ſuch dangerous circumſtances, nor the continual propriety of his conduct toward the court of Peterſburg, could prevent matters coming to a criſis.

1753. A man of obſcure birth, inveſted with the character of Ruſſian ambaſſador, was employed by count Beſtuchef to effect this purpoſe. This ambaſſador, ordered to ſeize the firſt occaſion of coming to a rupture, obeyed theſe orders, that he might fulfil the intentions of his court. The king held a feſtival at Charlottenburg, on occaſion of the marriage of prince Henry with the princeſs of Heſſe. Hither the foreign miniſters came. The proper

officer had orders to invite them all to ſupper. He acquitted himſelf of his commiſſion; but could not find the Ruſſian ambaſſador, who had departed purpoſely half an hour before the others. On the morrow, this ambaſſador declared he could no more appear at court, after the inſult given to the empreſs in his perſon; and that he ſhould wait the return of his courier from Peterſburg, ultimately to regulate his conduct according to the orders he ſhould receive. The courier arrived; and the Ruſſian ambaſſador immediately left Berlin clandeſtinely, eſcorted as he paſſed through the city by the ſecretaries of the Auſtrian and Engliſh embaſſies.

His departure obliged the king in like manner to recal his ambaſſador from Peterſburg. No ſooner were the Auſtrians freed in Ruſſia from the Pruſſian ambaſſador, who was a curb upon them, than they gave the rein to their ill-will, and bluſhed not to propagate falſehoods and calumnies the moſt atrocious. To envenom the mind of the empreſs Elizabeth againſt the king, they perſuaded her he had been concerned in the conſpiracy againſt her life, that he might reſtore prince Iwan to the throne. The empreſs, who was of an eaſy and indolent

character, believed their aſſertions, not willing to take the trouble of examining the truth, and conceived an irreconcileable hatred to the king. France at that time had no ambaſſador at Peterſburg, and the Swediſh ambaſſador there was rather Ruſſian than Swediſh, conſequently very little proper to ſerve the king; he had therefore no means of acceſs to the empreſs, or of freeing her from the error into which ſhe had been led, by the ambaſſador of Auſtria and his creatures.

The court of Vienna, ſatisfied with the ſentiments of animoſity and hatred with which ſhe had inſpired the court of Peterſburg againſt Pruſſia, was too artful to proceed farther. She contented herſelf with having diſpoſed minds for miſunderſtandings, but would not precipitate the quarrel, that ſhe might conclude her interior arrangements, and wait a favourable opportunity of giving birth to her vaſt projects. Thus did this court agitate all Europe, and ſecretly form a confederation againſt Pruſſia, to which the firſt important event was to give effect.

The differences between Sweden and Ruſſia concerning the frontiers of Finland were however amicably concluded; but toward the end of the year 1756, a kind of revolution happened

pened in this kingdom, of which we are obliged to take ſome notice, becauſe that its conſequences influenced the general affairs of Europe: it happened as follows.

The court had long been on ill terms with the ſenators of the French faction, becauſe of the vacant poſt of major-general, which the king had deſtined for M. von Lieven, and the ſenate for count Ferſen. The ſenate carried the day; and the court, highly piqued at the affront, took every future occaſion of counteracting the French faction. In 1755, counts Brahe and Horn and the ſieur von Wrangle, with many lords of the firſt families of the kingdom attached to the court faction, led it to hope for a ſuperiority in the diet, by electing a marſhal who ſhould be entirely at its devotion. It happened however totally the reverſe, and count Ferſen, the enemy of the court, obtained that office, by the intrigues and ſupport of the French party.

In this diet, which began on the 17th of October 1755, the ſenate, proud of its ſuperiority, preſented a memorial to the ſtates, that the grand diſpute between the king and the ſenate, relative to the appointment to places, might come to a deciſion. As the judges were all at the diſpoſal of the French ambaſſador,

the ſenate triumphed. An abuſive uſe was made of victory, and that ſhadow of authority which the king till then had enjoyed, according to the laws of the kingdom, was diminiſhed. The inſolence of theſe magiſtrates went ſo far as to ſtrip the queen of the crown jewels, and of thoſe with which ſhe had been preſented. But little was wanting, to the contempt in which ſovereign majeſty was held, for theſe ambitious ſenators to have undertaken its total deſtruction.

Such outrageous proceedings made a very ſtrong impreſſion upon the court and its adherents, and particularly on the minds of counts Brahe and Horn, and the ſieur von Wrangle, who aſſembled in the firſt emotions of indignation, and by one bold attempt reſolved to change the form of government. The king had not a ſufficient aſcendancy to prevail on them to be more temperate. Their meaſures, tumultuouſly concerted, were ſtill worſe executed; and with a mixture of timidity and temerity they heſitated in the moment of action. An enterprize deferred is uſually diſcovered. They were betrayed by ſome feeble friends, in whom they had confided. The ſenate took vigorous meaſures to preſerve itſelf from every attempt. Count Brahe was arreſted.

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The ſieur von Wrangle and other lords of the party had the good fortune to eſcape. The name of the king appeared in the depoſitions of the conſpirators. Count Brahe and ſeveral perſons of an obſcure birth periſhed on the ſcaffold; and the king was entirely ſtripped of the prerogatives which he and his predeceſſor had enjoyed, according to the form of government eſtabliſhed after the death of Charles XII.

From that time M. de Havrincourt, the French ambaſſador, was in reality king of Sweden; he governed the nation with deſpotiſm, and afterward engaged in the German war in an irregular manner, and in contradiction to the conſtitution. This could not have happened had the lawful king preſerved the authority which was legitimately his due. The only ſervice the king of Pruſſia could render his brother-in-law was to repreſent, to the court of Verſailles, that the arrogant conduct of its miniſter, which ſet all Sweden in commotion, ought in decency to be changed; but France was better pleaſed to ſee its ambaſſador at the head of the kingdom than the lawful king.

The preceding year (1754) another diſpute, but leſs vexatious, had happened between Pruſſia and Denmark. This related to a law-ſuit the counteſs of Bentinck had inſtituted againſt

her huſband. An eſtate, ſituated on the frontiers of Eaſt Friſeland, had been ceded by this lady to the count; but ſhe afterward repented of the formal contract into which ſhe had entered. The judges condemned the eſtate to ſequeſtration. The king, as director of the circle of Weſtphalia, was to ſee juſtice done. The court of Vienna gave this commiſſion to the king of Denmark, who ſent troops thither that were anticipated by the Pruſſians. The king of Denmark took fire, and, had he not been withheld by moderation, he would have employed threats. The parties were appeaſed however by the mediation of France. Every body was ſatisfied; but the counteſs of Bentinck, who loved chicanery, broke the agreement that had been accompliſhed. She carried the cauſe to Vienna, whence ſhe returned into her county; and, as no perſon ſeemed diſpoſed to interfere, the ſuit remained undetermined.

1754, and 1755. It ſeemed that, during the peace, that ſpirit of diſcord which ſpread throughout Europe had divided all courts. The king had diſputes with England, which he believed would have occaſioned a quarrel between Pruſſia and that nation. During the laſt war, the Engliſh privateers had taken ſome ſhips which belonged to Pruſſian merchants. The

Engliſh

Engliſh were both judge and party in their own cauſe; in ſo much that their court of admiralty declared the ſhips were lawful prizes. The king, after having made proper remonſtrances to the court of London, entered into negotiation. The Engliſh would not relax, and treated what was alleged concerning the illegality of their proceedings with little reſpect. After ineffectually exhauſting every mode of conciliation, no other expedient remained, for the indemnification of the Pruſſian ſubjects, but to put the ſum which the king owed the Engliſh in ſequeſtration, and which he had engaged to pay, according to the peace of Breſlau. This was the reſtitution of one million eight hundred thouſand crowns, borrowed by the houſe of Auſtria on Sileſian mortgages, for the ſupport of the war againſt the Turks, in 1737 and 1738. The laſt liquidation, of three hundred thouſand crowns, which remained to be paid was ſtopped. The Engliſh were irritated. This gave place to warm declarations on each part. The Auſtrian ambaſſador at London was very active in empoiſoning the diſpute; which perhaps might have had diſagreeable conſequences, had they not been diverted by a more ſerious quarrel, between France and England, relative to Canada.

1755. The very duke of Mecklenbourg, repoſing on the protection he enjoyed from the Imperial court, thought proper to cavil with the king. The ſubject was the rights which the king's anceſtors, from time immemorial, had been in poſſeſſion of; that is of recruiting in Mecklenbourg. This the duke, at the inſtigation of the court of Vienna, oppoſed; and the king adminiſtred juſtice in his own behalf. Some of the inhabitants of Mecklenbourg were carried off for ſoldiers; and certain land-bailiffs, who oppoſed the enrolment of the peaſants, were impriſoned, in 1756. The duke made loud complaints; but perceiving that they terminated in nothing, he thought proper to come to an accommodation, and the affair was amicably concluded.

Soon after, when the empreſs queen perceived the war between France and England on the point of breaking out, ſearching ſome pretence of quarrel with Pruſſia, ſhe perſuaded the duke of Mecklenbourg to lay his complaints before the diet of Ratiſbon. The court of Vienna was deſirous this matter ſhould be conſidered as a violation of the peace of Weſtphalia, and ſerve her as a pretext for declaring war againſt the king; and at the ſame time of claiming ſuccours from thoſe powers, by which this

this peace had been guarantied. We ſhall hereafter ſee that, though this allegation failed, the court of Vienna had no difficulty in finding another. The opportunity ſo impatiently expected was not long before it preſented itſelf, and was eagerly ſeized. When ſovereigns are determined to come to a rupture, they will not heſitate concerning materials for a manifeſto. They decide, make war, and leave the care of their juſtification to ſome laborious civilian.

Our reaſon for not having hitherto mentioned Holland is that, after the war of 1740, and particularly after the death of the ſtadtholder, the Dutch made no figure in Europe.

We have only ſuccinctly to touch on a ſingular calamity which befel Portugal, and which threatened the kingdom with deſtruction. An earthquake ſo violent happened there that the city of Liſbon was laid in ruins. Houſes, churches, palaces, were overthrown, ſwallowed up, or devoured by the flames, which iſſued from the earth's entrails. Between fifteen and twenty thouſand people periſhed. Several other towns and villages of this kingdom were ſhaken, or thrown down. This earthquake was felt along the ſea-coaſt, to the frontiers of Holland, and could only be attributed to the efforts of a ſubterranean fire; which, ſhut up

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in the bowels of the earth, had dug itſelf a channel, and formed a gulph under Portugal, where its efforts to eſcape were exerted. Poſterity perhaps may behold a volcano on the place where Liſbon now ſtands. But it may be ſaid that the plagues of Heaven were not ſufficient to afflict this wretched globe. Soon afterward the impious hands of man were armed by their own wickedneſs; they mutually murdered each other for a vile quantity of dirt. Hatred, obſtinacy, and revenge, made them proceed to the utmoſt exceſs. Europe was deluged with blood; and moral evil, to which the human race became victims, greatly ſurpaſſed the phyſical evil which Liſbon had felt with ſo much rigour.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Cauſe of the Rupture between France and England. Negotiation of Lord Holderneſs. Alliance between Pruſſia and England. Offers of M. Rouillé. Embaſſy of the Duke of Nivernois. France offended. War declared againſt England. Cape Breton taken, by the Duke de Richlieu. The Engliſh, terrified by flat-bottomed Boats, ſend for the Hanoverians and Heſſians. Ruſſia ſtrengthens herſelf on the Frontiers of Pruſſia. The Auſtrians aſſemble two Armies in Bohemia. Intelligence obtained from the Archives of Dreſden, that diſcovers all the Myſtery of Iniquity. Quarrel with Auſtria. Reaſons for declaring War. Firſt Diſpoſitions of the Troops. Plan of the Campaign.

1755. AFTER having given a ſketch of the ſituation of the ſeveral powers of Europe, at the commencement of the year 1755, it is neceſſary we ſhould take a retroſpect of thoſe diſſentions, and their cauſes, which occaſioned the war between France and England. Preſent affairs are ſo intimately related to paſt that, for this purpoſe, we muſt go back to the treaty of Utrecht, to arrive at the origin

of this quarrel; which was the diſputes of the French and Engliſh concerning the limits of Canada.

Louis XIV. in haſte to conclude the treaty of Utrecht, that he might detach queen Ann from the grand alliance, ordered his plenipotentiaries to ſign, and not to object. Theſe plenipotentiaries employed equivocal terms to indicate the limits of Canada, concerning which the difference aroſe. The gain of France by this treaty was ſuperior to all her poſſeſſions in a country ſo ſterile; but no ſooner were the troubles of Europe appeaſed than the Engliſh and French, each, interpreted the article of the limits of their American poſſeſſions to their own advantage. There were ſome contentions between the colonies of the two nations; though theſe petty quarrels did not degenerate into open hoſtilities.

By the treaty of Aix la Chapelle every difficulty ought to have been removed. The ambaſſador St. Severin and his colleagues, in conformity to the reiterated orders they received from France, to accelerate the ſigning of the preliminaries, referred the deciſion of the limits of theſe colonies to the examination of commiſſaries, who were to be appointed by the two courts, after the concluſion of the peace. The

commiſſaries, being aſſembled, inſtead of conciliating the two nations by their conferences, did but augment their mutual diſcontent and bitterneſs. The embaſſy of the duke de Mirepoix, and the negotiation he began at London, were of no effect. Mutual reproaches of ill faith were made; the Engliſh and French troops in America came to hoſtilities, ſome forts were carried, and war was begun without being declared. In the relations ſent home, the Engliſh officers did not fail to impute every violence to the French. Each party wrote juſtifications of their conduct: with theſe the city of London ſwarmed.

The Engliſh nation, eaſily inflamed, imagining it has cauſe of complaint againſt France, being diſſatisfied with the peace of Aix la Chapelle, breathed nothing but war. The conduct of the duke of Cumberland made the fermentation general. He perceived that age cauſed the king his father to approach the period of exiſtence. To increaſe his credit, and gain greater influence in the ſucceeding reign, he had formed the project of filling the council with his creatures, and of beſtowing all the great offices of the crown on perſons who were intirely devoted to his party. He deſigned to place Mr. Fox at the head of the trea-

treaſury, and to give him all the power with which the duke of Newcaſtle was inveſted. But the elevation of Fox could not take place, except by driving the duke of Newcaſtle from office; and this was the more difficult becauſe that the latter had great power over the mind of the king, and was eſteemed, in parliament, for his long ſervices, his virtues, and his wealth; and, by the nation, becauſe of his immenſe wealth, and the places which were in his gift, as well as of the numerous members of parliament whom his poſſeſſions gave him the power to have elected.

The duke of Cumberland imagined that the beſt means of obliging the duke of Newcaſtle to quit his great ſtation would be to engage England in a war with France, by which the miniſter would be under the neceſſity of adding new debts to thoſe with which the government was loaded, which would furniſh oppoſition with ſubject of complaint; or he flattered himſelf he might profit by the poſſible ill ſucceſs, of the commencement of the war, to impute error to the miniſter, and make him determine, by the vexation and perſecution he ſhould find, voluntarily to renounce his office. This was a vaſt and complicated plan, for the execution of which the quarrel between the two nations muſt be

be inflamed, and the peace infringed. Nothing could be more eaſy. At the very name of Frenchman the people of London are furious. Combuſtibles were collected, and they were preſently ſet in flames. The tumultuous nation obliged king George to prepare ſome armaments. One ſtep inſenſibly occaſioned another, till the parties came to action. Violence gave place to repriſal; and, toward the concluſion of 1754, war between the two nations appeared to be inevitable: it was however remarked that the miniſtry of Verſailles acted with the greateſt moderation, and that wrong proceedings were all on the part of the Engliſh.

The two kings, perceiving themſelves menaced by war, endeavoured each to ſtrengthen his party, and to confirm ancient alliances, or to form new. At this time the king of Pruſſia was courted both by the French and Engliſh. His alliance with Louis XV. was not expired. The poſſeſſions of the French in the Indies were in all caſes excepted from the guarantees of Pruſſia; and, under the preſent circumſtances, it appeared that the part of the Pruſſians would be to remain neuter, and become ſpectators of the enſuing troubles. The court of Verſailles thought otherwiſe; and imagined the

the king of Pruſſia was to France what a deſpot of Wallachia is to the Porte; that is to ſay a ſubordinate prince, who, the moment he receives orders, is obliged to make war. She farther perſuaded herſelf that, by carrying war into the electorate of Hanover, ſhe ſhould ſoften the king of Great Britain; and thus, in the heart of the German empire, terminate thoſe differences which ſubſiſted in America, between her and the court of London. Rouillé, who then was miniſter for foreign affairs, one day ſaid to the Pruſſian ambaſſador, Knyphauſen, with an intention of engaging the king to contribute to this diverſion,—"Write, "Sir, to the king of Pruſſia, that he may aſſiſt "us in our expedition into Hanover. He will "there find pillage; the treaſury of the king "of England is excellently furniſhed. This "he has but to ſeize, and it will be a good "capture." The king returned him for anſwer that ſuch-like propoſitions might be becoming, when negotiating with ſome perſons; but that he hoped, in future, M. Rouillé would learn to diſtinguiſh thoſe with whom he had to treat.

Theſe negotiations were more warmly preſſed toward the end of 1755. King George, informed of the deſign of the French, and alarmed at the

the ſtorm which menaced his electorate, was perſuaded that the moſt certain means of ſhelter was to conclude an offenſive alliance with Pruſſia. He knew that the connections between the kings of Pruſſia and France were almoſt at an end, for the treaty of Verſailles would expire in the month of March 1756; and he charged lord Holderneſs, his ſecretary of ſtate, to begin a negotiation with the court of Berlin.

Uncertain of the diſpoſitions of the king of Pruſſia, relative to ſuch an alliance, lord Holderneſs, that he might not expoſe his maſter to a direct refuſal, ventured to make his firſt propoſals by the intervention of the duke of Brunſwic; under pretence of ſecuring the peace of Germany, againſt the danger with which it was threatened by an approaching war. The king was required to enter into meaſures which might aſcertain the public tranquillity. Great conſequences were annexed to this propoſition. The ſituation of Pruſſia was then ſuch that the part ſhe ſhould take would highly influence peace and war. Should the treaty with France be renewed, the electorate of Hanover muſt be attacked. This would draw upon her the forces of the Engliſh, Auſtrians, and Ruſſians. Should

an alliance with England be concluded, it was probable the French would not carry the war into the empire; and Pruſſia would find herſelf connected with Great Britain and Ruſſia. This apparently muſt oblige the empreſs queen to remain at peace, whatever her deſire might be to re-conquer Sileſia, and however great the preparations ſhe might have made, to act as occaſion ſhould ſerve.

Before he came to a determination, the king nevertheleſs thought proper to be certain of the diſpoſition of the court of Ruſſia; but, as the chancellor Beſtuchef was his declared enemy, there was no poſſibility of obtaining intelligence immediately from Peterſburg itſelf; ſince all intercourſe between the two courts was interrupted. He therefore had recourſe to the ſieur von Klinggræff, his ambaſſador at the Imperial court, and to lord Holderneſs himſelf, that he might underſtand on what terms England and Ruſſia were, and eſpecially whether the court of Vienna, or that of London, had the greateſt influence at Peterſburg. Klinggræff replied that, the Ruſſians being an intereſted people, there could be no doubt but that they were attached to thoſe who could pay them, and not to thoſe who had nothing to give; that the empreſs queen often wanted

funds

funds to ſupply her own expences; that therefore the Ruſſians would be with the Engliſh, whoſe immenſe wealth enabled them to grant heavy ſubſidies.

The anſwer of lord Holderneſs implied that there was a perfectly good intelligence between England and Ruſſia; and that king George had a firm confidence in the friendſhip of the empreſs Elizabeth. The information which the king obtained, from his ambaſſador at the Hague, correſponded ſo well with that which he had received from Vienna and London, that he imagined ſo many people could not all be deceived, on the ſame ſubject; and that their conjectures, being ſimilar, muſt neceſſarily be juſt. Thus determined, he entered into negotiation with England, and anſwered lord Holderneſs that he was not diſinclined to concert innocent and defenſive meaſures with the king of Great Britain, which ſhould only relate to the neutrality of Germany. The two powers, being agreed concerning the principles of their alliance, ſoon concluded a treaty, which was ſigned at London, on the ſixteenth of January 1756. It conſiſted of four articles, the three firſt of which related to the reciprocal guarantees of their proper ſtates; the laſt regarded Germany only, and ſtipulated that it ſhould not

be invaded, or entered, by any foreign forces. There were two ſecret articles, by one of which the Auſtrian low countries were excepted from the guarantee of Germany; and by the other the Engliſh engaged to pay twenty thouſand pounds ſterling to the Pruſſian merchants, who had pretended a claim of indemnification, for the prizes made and not reſtored by the Engliſh, during the laſt war.

The treaty arrived ſigned at Berlin, about a month after the duke de Nivernois had repaired thither. Louis XV. had ſent this nobleman to the king to renew the peace of Verſailles, which would ſoon expire, and further to engage Pruſſia in the project which France meditated againſt Hanover. The ſtrongeſt argument which the duke de Nivernois employed, to induce the king to this alliance, and make him a party in the war, was an offer of the ſovereignty of the iſland of Tobago. It ſhould be known that, after the war of 1740, the French had beſtowed this iſland on marſhal Saxe; and, as the Engliſh appeared to be very much diſſatisfied, it was ſtipulated that it ſhould remain deſert, uncultivated by any nation. This was too ſingular an offer to be accepted. The king turned the affair into a jeſt, and intreated the duke de Nivernois to ſearch for ſome perſon who

who might become governor of the iſland of Barataria with greater propriety than himſelf. In like manner he declined renewing any alliance, or taking part in the war in queſtion; and, that he might act with the utmoſt candour, and convince France of the innocency of thoſe new engagements into which he had entered with England, he made no difficulty of ſhewing the duke de Nivernois the original of the treaty, which had lately been ſigned at London. The news of this alliance made a very ſtrong impreſſion at Verſailles, on Louis XV. and his council, who were but little ſhort of affirming that the king of Pruſſia had revolted againſt France. Impartially examined, the fact was otherwiſe. The alliance between Pruſſia and France would expire in two months. As a ſovereign, the king was authoriſed to form alliances with thoſe nations which might procure the greateſt advantage to his ſtates. He therefore forfeited neither his word nor his honour, by his union with the king of England; eſpecially when this union was to preſerve his own ſtates and all Germany in peace. But the French would hear no reaſon; they ſpoke at Verſailles only of the apoſtacy of the king of Pruſſia, who perfidiouſly abandoned his ancient allies; and the court uttered ſo many reproaches

that it became probable reſentment would not be confined to words.

We have, in the preceding chapter, ſeen the arts and ſubtleties with which the court of Vienna endeavoured to gain the friendſhip of that of Verſailles; and with what induſtry count Kaunitz had applied himſelf, during his reſidence at Paris, to familiarize the minds of the French to the ſuppoſition of an alliance with Auſtria. During the momentary ill-humour of Louis XV. the faſhion which obtained of declaiming againſt the king of Pruſſia, in the council of Verſailles, occaſioned this ſeed to take root. The extreme vivacity of the French nation led it to conſider an alliance with the houſe of Auſtria as a ſuperior refinement in politics. Accordingly, count Starenberg was charged, by the empreſs queen, to propoſe an alliance between the two courts. This was preſently agreed on, for both parties wiſhed the ſame thing; and it was ſigned, in the name of the moſt Chriſtian king, by M. Rouillé and the Abbé de Bernis, on the 9th of May 1756.

This famous treaty of Verſailles, announced with ſo much oſtentation, and baptiſed—"the "union of the great powers,"—was in its own nature defenſive; and in ſubſtance contained the promiſe of an aid of twenty-four thouſand

thouſand men, ſhould either of the contracting powers be attacked. It was this alliance however which encouraged the empreſs queen in the execution of the grand project which ſhe had ſo long been meditating.

The union of the houſe of Auſtria and Bourbon, ſo lately formed, began to make it ſuſpected that the treaty of London could not maintain the tranquillity of Germany. Peace might be ſaid to be ſuſpended only by a hair; ſome pretext was but wanting; and, when that is the ſole thing neceſſary, war is as if declared. It ſoon appeared inevitable; for information was obtained that the politicians had all been deceived in their dependence on Ruſſia. That power, over which the intrigues of the Auſtrian miniſters prevailed, broke with England becauſe of the alliance which the king of Great Britain had concluded with the king of Pruſſia. Count Beſtuchef for a moment remained undecided, between his paſſion for Engliſh guineas and his hatred toward the king: but hatred was victorious. The empreſs Elizabeth, an enemy to the French nation, after the laſt embaſſy of the marquis de la Chetardie, was better pleaſed to league with that nation than to preſerve the leaſt alliance with a power which had become connected with Pruſſia. Active in

every court of Europe, the court of Vienna profited by the paſſions of ſovereigns and their miniſters, to attract them to itſelf, and govern them according to the purpoſes propoſed.

During theſe ſudden and unexpected changes of ſyſtem, the Engliſh ſhips no longer kept any meaſures with thoſe of France. The vexations and infractions they committed enforced the king of France, in his own deſpite, to declare war. The French oſtentatiouſly announced they were preparing to make a deſcent on England. They lined the coaſts of Brittany and Normandy with troops, built flat-bottomed boats for their tranſportation, and aſſembled ſome ſhips of war at Breſt. Theſe appearances terrified the Engliſh, and there were moments during which this nation, which has the character of ſo much wiſdom, imagined its deſtruction near. To remove theſe fears, king George had recourſe to Hanoverian and Heſſian troops, that were brought into England.

Thus was the court of London amuſed. The French profited by the panic they had inſpired; and, while they kept up a ſhow of invaſion oppoſite the coaſts of Great Britain, made a real deſcent on the iſland of Minorca. The duke de Richelieu, who headed this expedition, laid ſiege to Port Mahon. The Engliſh

did

did not perceive the deſign of the French till it was put in execution: they nevertheleſs ſent a fleet into the Mediterranean, to the ſuccour of the place beſieged, where their admiral, Byng, was beaten by the French ſquadron. The Engliſh government, that it might diſculpate itſelf in the eyes of the furious populace, was obliged to immolate a victim. Admiral Byng was ſhot, whoſe innocence many ſenſible men pretended to prove. The duke de Richelieu in vain attempted to effect a breach in Port Mahon, the works of which are cut in the rock. Impatient at the length of the ſiege, he ordered a general aſſault: the French made a ſcalade, and the place was taken.

While fortune favoured the French in the ſouth of Europe, the affairs of the north daily became more critical. The Ruſſians formed camps in Livonia, which were ſtill more conſiderable than thoſe they had there formed during the preceding years. The court of Ruſſia was induced to take theſe ſteps by that of Vienna, by which the treaty of Peterſburg, made in the year 1746, was claimed as if war had been declared, and aſſiſtance requiſite. An army of fifty thouſand Muſcovites, on the frontiers of Pruſſia, became a ſubject of importance. Whatever the cauſe of the armament might be, its effects

effects appeared to be formidable. The king had a channel through which he obtained certain advice, relative to the projects of his enemies, which were ripe for execution, by the means of a clerk of the ſecret chancery of Dreſden, who weekly remitted to the Pruſſian miniſter the diſpatches which his court received from Peterſburg and Vienna, as well as copies of all the treaties he had found in the archives. From theſe writings it appeared that the court of Ruſſia excuſed herſelf, becauſe of inability, from undertaking war that year, her fleet not being in a condition to put to ſea; but in revenge ſhe promiſed the greateſt efforts ſhould be made the next. Thus informed, the king determined to ſend, as a ſeeming reſerve, a corps into Pomerania, compoſed of ten battalions and twenty ſquadrons. Theſe troops were cantoned in the environs of Stolpe, during the month of Auguſt, where they could incite no uneaſineſs in the Ruſſians, and where they were notwithſtanding in readineſs to reinforce marſhal Lehwald, whenever he ſhould have reaſon to apprehend any attempt on the part of the enemy.

More troops than uſual were preſently aſſembled in Bohemia, by the court of Vienna, of which two armies were formed. The one

under the command of prince Piccolomini, encamped near Königſgrætz; and the principal, under marſhal Braun (Brown) in the neighbourhood of Prague. This was not ſufficient: the court amaſſed magazines in Bohemia, and aſſembled horſes for the conveyance of proviſions and of the numerous artillery which was intended to be employed in the army. In a word, all thoſe preparations took place which are uſual, when one power propoſes to attack another.

The diſpatches which the king received from Dreſden were full of the plans that were formed by the court of Vienna to invade the ſtates of the king. From theſe he learned that, if no better could be found, the empreſs queen would make the difference of the king with the duke of Mecklenburgh a pretext for war. This difference was a trifle; the affair had been accommodated, and ſlumbered. It related to the right of recruiting. The duke thought proper to take offence at the exerciſe of this right. After the juſtice of the proceeding had been proved, he being ſtill obſtinate, the king then took executive juſtice into his own power. Though this paltry affair was no longer in queſtion, the empreſs queen determined again to bring it on the tapis. She pretended to underſtand

ſtand the proceedings of the king as contrary to the laws of the empire, and in violation to the peace of Weſtphalia, which engaged her to make herſelf a party in behalf of the duke of Mecklenburgh, and to require aſſiſtance from the princes who guarantied that peace.

The information which the king obtained of this deſign, added to the motions of three armies on his frontiers, that daily menaced open rupture, gave occaſion to demand an explanation, from the court of Vienna, relative to theſe grand armaments. This court was intreated to give a categorical anſwer, that it might be known whether it was or was not intended to break the peace. The reply of count Kaunitz was found to be conceived in equivocal and ambiguous terms; but he explained himſelf with leſs reſerve to count Flemming, the ambaſſador from the king of Poland at Vienna, who ſent his court an account of this converſation. A copy of his diſpatches was immediately ſent from Dreſden to Berlin. In theſe count Flemming ſaid—"Count Kaunitz propoſes to incite diſquietude in the king by his replies, "and to induce him to commit the firſt hoſti-"lities." It is certain that the ſtyle was ſo haughty, ſo arrogant, that it was ſufficiently clear the empreſs queen was determined on war;

and

and that ſhe wiſhed the king ſhould be ſuppoſed the aggreſſor. But it ſtill was probable the year would have paſſed away, before that the enemies of Pruſſia would have proceeded to the laſt extremities, becauſe the court of Peterſburg was deſirous of deferring war to the following year, and becauſe it was apparent the empreſs queen waited till her allies ſhould all be ready, that the king might be attacked with their united forces.

Conſiderations like theſe cauſed the queſtion to be examined, whether it were more advantageous to anticipate the enemy, by an immediate attack, or wait till they had finiſhed their grand preparations, and ſuffer them to uſe their own diſcretion, concerning the enterprizes they ſhould form. Whatever part ſhould be taken, under ſuch circumſtances, war was equally inevitable; it was the buſineſs of calculation to find whether it would be moſt advantageous to delay, ſome months, or to begin immediately.

This hiſtory will hereafter ſhow that the king of Poland was one of the moſt zealous partiſans of the union, formed by the empreſs queen, againſt Pruſſia. The Saxon army was feeble. It was known that it amounted to ſcarcely eighteen thouſand men; but it was alſo known

that it was, during winter, to be augmented to the number of forty thouſand. By deferring war, the king therefore would give an ill-diſpoſed neighbour time to become more formidable; not to add that Ruſſia could not enter into action during the preſent year; and, Saxony not having concluded its arrangements, the moment ſeemed favourable to gain upon the enemy, by obtaining, in the firſt campaign, advantages which ill-timed delicacy would loſe, ſhould military operations be deferred to the following year. Inaction would farther facilitate the enemy's means of falling, with united powers, on the ſtates of the king; which muſt, on the opening of the firſt campaign, have become the ſeat of war. Inſtead of which, by carrying war into the enemy's country, whoſe evil deſigns were proved, it would there be fixed, and the Pruſſian provinces ſpared. As to the terrific epithet of aggreſſor, this was a vain ſcarecrow, fit only to impoſe on timid minds, and to which no attention ought to be paid in a criſis ſo important, when the ſafety of the ſtate was in danger. The true aggreſſor, no doubt, is he who obliges another to arm, by attack to anticipate his enemy, and, by a war leſs difficult, guard againſt a war more dangerous; for, of two evils, the leaſt muſt be choſen.

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The ſubſtance of the conteſt would be the ſame, whether the enemies of the king did or did not accuſe him of being the aggreſſor; the conſpiracy of the powers of Europe againſt Pruſſia being already formed. The empreſs queen, the empreſs of Ruſſia, and the king of Poland, were agreed, and at the moment of entering on action; ſo that the king would not have had a friend the more, nor an enemy the leſs. In fine the preſervation of the ſtate, and the ſupport of the houſe of Brandenbourg, were to be conſidered. At a moment ſo ſerious, ſo important, would it not have been an unpardonable fault, in politics, to have ſtopt at vain formalities; from which we ought not to depart, in the common courſe of things, but to which we ought not to ſubmit, in caſes ſo extraordinary as theſe, when irreſolution and delay would have enſured deſtruction, and when ſafety could only be found by vigorous and prompt reſolution, executed with equal activity?

The different reaſons here alleged determined the king to outſtep his enemies. He gave the court of Vienna to underſtand that its anſwer was conſidered as a declaration of war, and that war it ſhould have. He afterward took the neceſſary diſpoſitions to put the troops in motion. It was the month of Auguſt, and

Pruſſia

Pruſſia had nothing to fear from Ruſſia, for the preſent year, for reaſons before given; ſo that marſhal Lehwald was ſatisfied with aſſembling the troops under his command, in the environs of Königſberg; that they might be in readineſs, and be brought into the field, ſhould circumſtances ſo require.

The king propoſed to attack the Auſtrians with two armies. Marſhal Schwerin, who received the command of that in Sileſia, was to penetrate into the circle of Königſgrætz; the other, oppoſed at once both to Saxons and Auſtrians, muſt naturally be the ſtrongeſt, and was formed of the Pomeranian regiments, of thoſe of the Electorate, the dutchy of Magdebourg, and the provinces of Weſtphalia. The king thought proper to command this in perſon. His deſign was at once to enter Saxony with ſeveral columns; either to diſarm the Saxon troops, if found diſperſed in their quarters, or give them battle, if aſſembled, that he might not have an enemy in his rear when he ſhould advance into Bohemia, or be expoſed to perfidy ſimilar to that of the Saxons in the year 1744. The king held himſelf authorized thus to act by the experience of the paſt, the engagements the Saxons had entered into with the houſe of Auſtria, and from their ill intentions, which were manifeſt in the

the diſpatches of all their miniſters, in the poſſeſſion of the king. Thus did reaſons of right, of policy, and of war, ſupport and juſtify his conduct.

It was at the ſame time reſolved to gain as much ground, during the firſt campaign, as poſſible; the better to cover the ſtates of the king, remove the war to the greateſt poſſible diſtance, and carry it into Bohemia, if this could be effected. Such were the general diſpoſitions which the king oppoſed to the league of the greateſt powers in Europe, intending to aſſail him: the Pruſſian troops were ſoon on their march, and began their operations in Saxony and Bohemia, of which we ſhall give an account in the following chapter.

CHAP. IV.

The March into Saxony. The famous Camp of Pirna. Bohemia entered. Battle of Lowoſitz. Campaign of Marſhal Schwerin. The Succour at Schandau rendered ineffectual. The Saxons taken. Winter Quarters. Line formed by the Troops.

THE firſt thing neceſſary, at the commencement of the war, was to deprive the Saxons of the means of making themſelves parties in it, and of diſturbing Pruſſia. The electorate of Saxony muſt be traverſed to carry the war into Bohemia. If Saxony were not conquered, an enemy would be left behind; who, depriving the Pruſſians of the free navigation of the Elbe, would oblige them to quit Bohemia, whenever the king of Poland ſhould pleaſe. This the Saxons had done, in the war of 1744; when, interdicting the navigation of that river to the troops of the king, they rendered his expedition fruitleſs. It was not from vague conjecture that they were now ſuppoſed to have the ſame deſigns; proofs were poſſeſſed of their

their ill intentions; and it would have been an unpardonable fault, in politics, weakly to have ſpared a prince allied to Auſtria, who waited only the proper moment openly to declare himſelf, when ſo he could do with impunity. As the king likewiſe foreſaw that the greateſt part of Europe prepared to attack him, he could not cover the electoral marche of Brandenbourg, except by occupying Saxony; in which it was better to fix the ſeat of war than in the vicinity of Berlin. It therefore was reſolved to carry the war into Saxony, in order to ſecure the Elbe, and to endeavour, if the leaſt opportunity ſhould occur, to diſarm the Saxon troops.

On a motion made by ſome Pruſſian regiments, in Auguſt, to march from Pomerania into the electorate, the Saxon forces took their poſition between the Elbe and the Mulde. They ſoon after went into their uſual quarters, and again preſently aſſembled in cantonments. All theſe marches and countermarches did not deceive the king, who poſitively knew that the deſign of the court was to aſſemble an army in the camp of Pirna; where the Saxons, occupying a poſt that could not be forced, thought they might ſafely wait the ſuccour they had been led to hope from Auſtria; and ſtill flattered themſelves they might amuſe the Pruſſians

by frivolous negotiation. Without paying the leaſt attention therefore to theſe troops, it was determined inceſſantly to penetrate with the army into the frontiers of Bohemia.

The king divided his army into three columns, the common point of reunion for which was to be Pirna. The firſt left Magdeburg, under the command of prince Ferdinand of Brunſwic, took the road to Leipſic, and paſſed through Borne, Chemnitz, Freyberg, and Dippoldiſwalda, to repair to Cotta. The ſecond column, under the king, marched to Pretſch, while prince Maurice of Deſſau made himſelf maſter of Wittenberg; after which this detachment, reunited to the reſt of the corps, croſſed the Elbe at Torgau, whence the king paſſed, by Strehlen and Lommatſch, to Wilſdruf.

Here certain information was received that the Saxon troops were all aſſembled at Pirna, where the king was in perſon, and that there was no garriſon in Dreſden, but that the queen ſtill remained there. The king ſent his compliments to the queen of Poland, and the Pruſſian troops entered the capital, obſerving diſcipline ſo ſtrict that no perſon had cauſe to complain. The army encamped near Dreſden; from which on the morrow it advanced toward Pirna,

Pirna, and took poſt between the Elbe, Sedclitz, and Zeſt.

The third column, led by the prince of Bevern, traverſed Luſatia; whence, having been joined at Elſterwerda by twenty-five ſquadrons of cuiraſſiers and huſſars, coming from Sileſia, it marched for Bautzen, Stolpen, and finally for Lohmen. Pince Ferdinand at the ſame time arrived at Cotta; ſo that, by the junction of theſe three columns, in the environs of Pirna, the Saxon troops were entirely blocked up.

The preſence of ſo many armies however gave birth to no battle; not a ſingle act of hoſtility was committed. The Saxons very civilly ſuffered themſelves to be famiſhed; and each endeavoured to ſecure his own eſtabliſhment, to the beſt of his abilities. The king of Poland, that he might gain time, began to negotiate. The Saxons could with greater facility write than fight. Repeated propoſals were made; but, as no ſolid advantages were offered, they were rejected. Their end was to obtain a perfect neutrality, to which the king could not accede; becauſe that the engagements between the king of Poland and the courts of Vienna and Ruſſia were too well known.

The Saxons however made all Europe reſound with their lamentations. They ſpread

reports the moſt injurious, to the Pruſſians, on the invaſion of their electorate. It was neceſſary to diſabuſe the public reſpecting theſe ſlanders; which, not being refuted, would gain credit, and fill Europe with prejudices, againſt the conduct of the king. He long had poſſeſſed copies of the treaties of the king of Poland, and of the narratives of his miniſters to foreign courts. Though theſe pieces fully juſtified the enterprizes of the Pruſſians, they could not be made uſeful. Had they been publiſhed, the Saxons would have accuſed them of being imaginary, and forged at will, only to authorize a daring conduct, which was not to be juſtified but by falſehoods. The king therefore found himſelf obliged to have recourſe to the original pieces, which ſtill were in the archives of Dreſden; and gave orders that they might be ſeized. They were all packed up and ready to be ſent into Poland. The queen, informed of this, oppoſed the attempt; and ſhe was with difficulty brought to comprehend that the beſt mode of acting would be civilly to yield to the king of Pruſſia, and not abſolutely reſiſt an act which, though not ſo reſpectful as might have been wiſhed, was ſtill the conſequence of abſolute neceſſity.

The

The firſt uſe made of theſe archives was to publiſh an extract from them, known to the world under the title of *Memoire raiſonné ſur les deſſeins dangereux des cours de Vienne et de Dreſde, avec les pieces juſtificatives* *. While this ſcene was enacting at the palace of Dreſden, the Pruſſian and Saxon troops remained quiet; the king of Poland amuſing himſelf with the hope of the ſuccour which the Auſtrians were to ſend, and the king of Pruſſia not being able to undertake any thing againſt a camp where numbers and valour would have been uſeleſs. It will not be improper, to render the facts we ſhall relate more intelligible, that we ſhould give a particular deſcription of the famous camp of Pirna, and of the poſition of the Saxon troops, by whom it was occupied.

Nature had been pleaſed on this capricious ſpot to form a kind of fortreſs, to which art had little or nothing to add. To the eaſt runs the Elbe, between rocks which, by narrowing its limits, render the ſtream more rapid. The right of the Saxons was ſupported by the fortreſs of Sonnenſtein, near the Elbe. In a hollow, at the foot of theſe rocks, ſtands the town

* Well known in Engliſh under the title of "Four "Pieces," &c. or—The King of Pruſſia's Juſtificatory Pieces. T.

of Pirna, from which the camp takes its name. The front which faces the north extends to the Kohlberg. This is as the baſtion of that curtain before which is one continued ravin, from ſixty to eighty feet deep, which turning thence toward the left ſurrounds the whole camp, and ends at the foot of the Königſtein. From the Kohlberg, which forms a kind of angle, runs a chain of rocks, the ſummit of which the Saxons occupied; and which, facing the weſt, extend, leaving Kottendorf in front, and narrowing toward Struppen and Leopoldſheim, and terminate at Königſtein, on the banks of the Elbe.

Too feeble to fill a camp ſo vaſt, and in which inſurmountable rocks every where preſented themſelves, the Saxons were ſatisfied with guarding well the difficult paſſes, which yet were the only ones through which they might have been attacked. They threw up abatis, redoubts, and palliſades; all which were eaſily performed, becauſe of the immenſe foreſts of pine trees, with which theſe hills are loaded. The camp, one of the ſtrongeſt in Europe, having been minutely examined, was judged ſafe from ſurpriſe and aſſault; and, as time and dearth only could vanquiſh ſo many obſtacles, a ſtrict blockade was determined on, to prevent the Saxons from obtaining

obtaining proviſions from the environs, and to act in every reſpect as in a formal ſiege. For this purpoſe the king employed a part of his force to draw lines of circumvallation, and the remainder to form an army of obſervation. This diſpoſition, the beſt imaginable under ſuch circumſtances, was the more prudent becauſe the Saxons, flying haſtily to theſe rocks, had wanted time to amaſs much ſubſiſtence, and all they poſſeſſed muſt be conſumed in two months.

The king's troops ſoon occupied all the paſſages through which ſuccour or proviſions might arrive to the Saxons. The prince of Bevern and his diviſion took poſt at Lohmen, Wehlen, Oberſwaden, and Schandau, quite along the Elbe. His right communicated with the diviſion of the king by the bridge which was built near the brick-kiln. Ten battalions and ten ſquadrons, encamped near the king, occupied the ſpace between the Elbe and the village of Sedelitz, as far as Zeſt; where the diviſion of prince Maurice began, which extended beyond Cotta, by detachments ſent as far as Leopoldſheim, Markerſdorf, Hennerſdorf, and Nöllendorf; in all, thirty-eight battalions and thirty ſquadrons were employed, to form the circumvallation of which we ſpeak.

Marſhal

Marſhal Keith had the command of the army of obſervation, in twenty-nine battalions and ſeventy ſquadrons. Prince Ferdinand of Brunſwic firſt entered Bohemia with the van-guard. Having paſſed Peterſwalde he encountered the Auſtrian general Wied at Nöllendorf, with ten battalions of grenadiers, and cavalry in proportion, whom he diſlodged from the village. The Auſtrian took to flight, and the prince continued his march. Marſhal Keith immediately approached from Auſſig, and encamped at Johnſdorf, whence he detached Mannſtein, who ſeized on the caſtle of Tetſchen, to aſcertain the navigation of the Elbe. Things continued thus in Saxony, and in that part of Bohemia, till the end of the month.

Piccolimini on the other part was advantageouſly encamped near Königſgrætz, on the heights ſituated between the confluence of the Adler and the Elbe. His camp, of an angular form, might not be approached. Marſhal Schwerin marched with his army through the county of Glatz, whence he advanced, firſt to Nachod, next to the banks of the Metau, and finally to Aujeſt; where he defeated general Buccow, who marching to meet him with a corps of cavalry loſt two hundred men. Marſhal Schwerin could undertake nothing againſt Piccolomini,

colomini, in the poſt he held. No grand project could be formed either of ſiege or battle; and, as the ſeaſon was rather advanced, he contented himſelf with conſuming all the ſubſiſtence he found in Bohemia, and foraging as far as the very cannon of the Imperial army; which general Piccolimini pretended not to perceive. A detachment of Pruſſian huſſars defeated four hundred of the enemy's dragoons, near Hohenmaut, and brought in the greateſt part of them priſoners. The attempts of marſhal Schwerin were here bounded, becauſe that Piccolimini, careful not to remove, remained ſcrupulouſly ſhut up in his camp, which was ſtronger than many fortreſſes are.

Great effects this year were only to be produced by the army of the king, employed to attack the Saxons and prevent them receiving ſuccour. Here difficulties daily increaſed. Though the camp of Pirna was ſo far incloſed as to prevent the arrival of ſubſiſtence and aid, to guard all the paths that led through the foreſts and rocks of its vicinity was impoſſible. By this means the king of Poland ſtill maintained, though with difficulty, a correſpondence with the court of Vienna, and information was received, toward the end of September, that marſhal Braun had received orders to relieve the

the Saxon troops, blockaded at Pirna, at all events. Marſhal Braun advancing with his army to Budin, had three modes of executing this taſk, the one to march againſt marſhal Keith, and beat his army, a thing not eaſily accompliſhed. The ſecond to proceed through Billin and Töplitz, and enter Saxony, either by the Baſberg, or Nöllendorf. But this would oblige him to preſent his flank to marſhal Keith, and expoſe all his magazines between Budin and Prague to deſtruction. The third was to ſend a detachment on the right of the Elbe, which, paſſing through Böhmiſch, Leippa, Schlukenau, and Rumburg, ſhould march to Schandau. Neither could this laſt produce any thing deciſive; for the Pruſſians might ſend ſuccour into that country, over their bridge of Schandau, and the ground in the vicinity of Oberrathen and Schandau was rugged, difficult, and ſo liable to be diſputed, from its impracticable paſſes, that a ſingle battalion might ſtop a whole army.

As this critical moment was to decide the fate of the campaign, the king thought his preſence neceſſary in Bohemia; that he might oppoſe every attempt of the enemy. On the 28th he arrived at the camp of Johnſdorf. Here the troops were poſted in a confined ſituation, overlooked

overlooked by eminences, and the rear ſeparated by an eſcarpement of rocks ſo limited that, ſhould they have come to action, it would have been difficult to have ſent aid from one part of the camp to another, without being greatly expoſed. From this ſituation, which muſt have been abandoned at the approach of an enemy, it was throught proper to remove on the morrow. Marſhal Braun was too diſtant for intelligence to be obtained of his motions; and, it being important to watch theſe narrowly, the king put himſelf at the head of the vanguard, compoſed of eight battalions and twenty ſquadrons, and advanced to Tirmitz, where he was informed marſhal Braun would paſs the Eger, on the morrow, near Budin. This was the moment of approach to gain information of his intentions; and even to give battle, ſhould opportunity offer. The ſituation of affairs was ſuch (September), and the plans of the two parties ſo oppoſite, that an action muſt enſue, whether marſhal Braun ſhould determine to cut his way into Saxony, ſword in hand, or ſhould proceed only by detachments.

On the 30th the army of the king followed in two columns. Scarcely had it gained the height of the Paſcopol, before it diſcovered a camp in the plain of Lowoſitz, with its right ſupported

ſupported at Wielhotta, Lowoſitz in its front, and Sulowitz on its left, and the extremity of which extended behind the pond of Schirkowitz.

The van purſued its march, and diſlodged ſome hundreds of pandours, who occupied a poſt of information, from Welmina. This village is ſituated in a bottom, ſurrounded by rocks, moſt of which riſe in the form of cones. Theſe heights, and the very bottom itſelf, overlook the neighbouring plains. The king diligently advanced with his infantry to occupy the vineyards and paſſes of the plain, beſide Lowoſitz. The troops arrived about ten in the evening, and paſſed the night under arms, a little diſtance in the rear of the van-guard, which was poſted in face of the enemy. On the morrow, the 1ſt of October, the camp that had been diſcovered was reconnoitred, by break of day. A thick fog, extending over the plain prevented objects from being diſtinctly ſeen. The town of Lowoſitz was perceived as through a black veil; and near it ſome cavalry in two corps, each of which appeared to conſiſt of five ſquadrons. The army on this was put in order of battle. A column of infantry was formed on the right, another on the left, and the cavalry ſtationed in the ſecond line; for, the ground

ground being too ample for the ſmall army of the king, it was neceſſary to place twenty battalions in the firſt line, ſo that the reverſe conſiſted only of four. The remainder of the troops were either in detachments or guarding the magazines. The field, on which the army of the king formed, increaſed in width toward the left. The declivity of the hills deſcending to Lowoſitz is covered with vineyards, that are in ſmall incloſures, with ſtone walls breaſt high. Marſhal Braun had poſted pandours in theſe incloſures, to impede the Pruſſians; ſo that, as the battalions of the left formed, they engaged the enemy immediately as they entered the line. The fire of the pandours was but ill ſuſtained; and, as they made no great reſiſtance, the opinion was confirmed that the detachment that had been perceived on the eve, encamped in this vicinity, now prepared for retreat, and that the pandours who ſkirmiſhed in the vineyards, and the cavalry that was ſcattered over the plain, were but the rear-guard. This appeared the more plauſible becauſe no trace of an army was diſcovered. The conjecture however was very falſe; for the troops firſt ſeen at Lowoſitz were the van-guard of Braun. The Auſtrians, ignorant of the march of the king's army, did not gain the intelligence till they ſaw it leaving

Welmina, when the news was ſent to Braun by the general of his van-guard, upon which he marched that very night to join him with his army at Lowoſitz. The fog we have mentioned continued till about eleven o'clock, and did not totally ſubſide till the action was almoſt over.

As it was ſtill ſuppoſed that there was only the rear-guard to combat, the Auſtrian cavalry was cannonaded; by which it was diſturbed, obliged to change its poſition, and form ſeveral times, now in a ſquare, preſently in three lines, then in one; and ſometimes five or ſix bodies toward the left would diſappear, and ſoon after return more numerous than they ſeemed to be at the beginning. Weary of this trifling, which was but loſt time, the king ſuppoſed that, by charging this cavalry with twenty ſquadrons of dragoons, the enemy's rear-guard would ſoon be diſperſed and the affair ended; on which the dragoons came from the heights and formed in the bottom, protected by the infantry. They aſſailed and overthrew all their opponents. In purſuing the fugitives they received a fire of ſmall arms and artillery in flank and front, at the village of Sulowitz, which drove them to the poſition they had aſſumed at the foot of the vineyards. Hence it was conjectured that this

was

was no longer a combat with the rear-guard, but that marſhal Braun and the Auſtrians were in face of the army. The king wiſhed to call off his cavalry, and place it in the ſecond line on the height; but, by one of thoſe miſtakes which unfortunately are but too common on the day of battle, it happened that the cuiraſſiers had all joined the dragoons before they could receive orders from the aid du camp of the king. Yielding to their impetuoſity and deſire of ſignalizing themſelves, they attacked a ſecond time. They ſoon overthrew the enemy's cavalry; and, though received with the ſame fire that had repulſed the dragoons on the firſt charge, they continued purſuing for three thouſand paces. Carried away by their ardour, they freed a ditch of fifty feet wide, three hundred paces beyond which another ditch, more deep, covered the Imperial infantry. A battery of ſixty pieces then played on the Pruſſian cavalry, and forced it to return and form anew at the foot of the hill; which, not being purſued, was executed in good order. The king, unwilling they ſhould indulge in ſuch ſallies, formed them into a ſecond line, in the rear of his infantry.

While the cavalry retreated, the fire of the

left began to be more hot and general. Marſhal Braun was deſirous of reverſing the queſtion. Seeing himſelf on the point of being aſſailed, he rather choſe to attack. For this purpoſe he cauſed twenty battalions to file off, behind Lowoſitz, which, having ſucceſſively glided along the Elbe, came to ſupport the pandours, who combated in the vineyards, and even endeavoured to turn the left flank of the Pruſſians. They were vigorouſly repulſed by the infantry, which forced the vineyards one after another, and, deſcending into the plain, purſued ſome battalions of the enemy, whoſe fears hurried them into the Elbe. Another body of fugitives threw themſelves into the firſt houſes of Lowoſitz, and made a ſhow of defence. Some battalions from the right were then detached to reinforce the left, ſo that the left of the Pruſſians was ſupported by the Elbe; and in this order it advanced proudly, and with a determined air, on Lowoſitz; while the right of the army remained on the height by which it was ſupported. The grenadiers fired into the houſes through the doors and windows, to which for the greater diſpatch they ſet fire; and, though they had conſumed all their powder, ſtill were not the regiments of Itzenplitz and Manteufel prevented from entering Lowoſitz with lowered bayonets,

bayonets, and forcing nine freſh battalions, which Braun had ſent thither, to cede the place and take to flight. All the forces of the enemy that had combated in this part afterward gave ground, and yielded the victory to the Pruſſians.

The king could not profit ſo much as he would have wiſhed by this ſucceſs, becauſe he had properly only beaten the right wing of the Imperialiſts. They ſtill occupied the village of Sulowitz; and, as their left was poſted behind the ditch before mentioned, they were ſafe from the Pruſſian cavalry. Braun in the interim made a fine motion with his troops. He advanced ſome brigades of his left that had not been in action, with whom he covered his diſbanded troops, flying from Lowoſitz in great diſorder. He withdrew by night, and occupied Leutmeritz by a detachment that broke down the bridge of the Elbe which was in his van. The marſhal with his main army recovered his camp of Budin, and deſtroyed all the bridges of the Eger to impede the paſſage of the Pruſſians.

The king loſt in dead and wounded twelve hundred men: two field generals, Quadt and Luderitz, fell on this day. Only ſeven hundred priſoners were taken; among whom was a prince

Lobkowitz, an Imperial general. Could the cavalry have been employed, toward the close of the action, the number might have been much greater.

On the morrow, the prince of Bevern was detached with eight thousand men to Schirkowitz, a village on the right of the king, half way to Budin. He sent parties from his camp along the Elbe, to reconnoitre the passages, and still more to incite the attention and the fears of marshal Braun, in order to keep him inactive by appearances, and prevent any attempt to succour the king of Poland and the Saxons. To this the Bohemian army was confined. Too feeble to attack, it was satisfied with observing the enemy. The king in reality could not act offensively. To effectually incite the apprehensions of marshal Braun, the Eger must be passed; in which case the Imperial detachment at Leutmeritz, being in the rear of the Prussians, might have carried their magazine of Aussig; and to pass the Eger would have been to depart too far from the line of defence. The army too would have been rendered incapable of sending any prompt succour into Saxony. Should it be determined to attack Leutmeritz, far from gaining by the conquest, embarrassment would but have been increased; for the army would have been

enfeebled by putting a garriſon into the town; and, being unable to garniſh the heights which ſurround and overlook it, this garriſon would have been expoſed to be taken as ſoon as attacked.

All theſe reaſons obliged the king to remain contented with the gain of a battle, at the commencement of the war, and not to attempt any thing farther than to prevent Braun from making detachments; or, if he made any, to be able to ſend others equally ſtrong to the ſuccour of the camp of Saxony. The Imperial army in Bohemia was twice the ſtrength of the Pruſſian; but the troops of the latter were ſo excellent, ſo well diſciplined, and their officers were ſo brave, that they were ſuppoſed equal if not ſuperior to the foe. However well founded any good opinion of ourſelves may be, ſecurity in war is always dangerous; and rather than be negligent it is beſt to take ſuperfluous precaution. As numbers were in favour of the Auſtrians, and the king might ſtill be obliged to make detachments, he ordered ſome batteries to be raiſed, and the moſt feeble parts of his camp to be intrenched. Theſe meaſures were found to be the more ſage when it was known, on the 6th, that Braun had ſecretly detached ſome regiments, to the amount as ſup-

poſed of ſix thouſand men; which, paſſing through Raudnitz, advanced toward Böhmiſch Leippa, and from thence were to continue their route toward Saxony. Though this detachment excited no great apprehenſion, the king ſent intelligence to the margrave Charles and prince Maurice in Saxony, and put himſelf at the head of the reinforcements of cavalry, to conduct them to the camp of Sedelitz, where there were only thirty ſquadrons, which were inſufficient to contain the Saxons, eſpecially ſhould they attempt to paſs by the ſide of Hohendorf and Töplitz. On the 13th, his majeſty departed from Lowoſitz, with fifteen ſquadrons; and on the 14th, at noon, arrived at his army, which he found at Struppen, the quarters the king of Poland had occupied, during the whole time that the Saxons had been blockaded.

The face of affairs had entirely changed, in Saxony, ſince the king had taken the command of his army in Bohemia. The battle of Lowoſitz had terrified the court. The hope of aſſiſtance from the Imperialiſts was but feeble. The troops being menaced with approaching famine, the Saxon generals were deſirous to cut their way through the Pruſſians by their own ſtrength. Their project was to eſcape

over

over the Elbe, acroſs which they attempted to throw a bridge at Wilſtedt. Here they found a Pruſſian redoubt, which ſunk ſome of their boats, and deranged their meaſures. Changing their plan, they then tranſported their pontoons to Halbſtadt, which they believed to be the propereſt place for their ſally; eſpecially becauſe of the ſuccour which again was promiſed them by marſhal Braun.

Every operation of the armies was ſo intimately connected with the nature of the ground that we are obliged, for the information of the reader, to give him as exact an idea of this as we are able. What has been ſaid ſufficiently indicates the ſtrength of the poſt of Pirna; but if this was difficult to be carried it was equally difficult to be abandoned. The moſt natural and eaſy way of quitting it is through Leopoldſheim. The Saxons deſcending from the rocks might take the road to Bohemia, through Hermerſdorf and Nöllendorf; not that it can be ſaid they might have forced this paſs without loſs; but ſtill it is probable they would have ſaved a part of their troops. Töplitz once gained, they would meet with but trifling obſtacles; and their junction with the Auſtrians by the Eger could not be impeded. According to all appearance, the Saxon generals were un-

acquainted with the ſituation of Halbſtadt, Burkerſdorf, Schandau, and Ziegenruck, and were particularly ignorant of the manner in which theſe poſts were occupied by the Pruſſians; otherwiſe they never would have made ſo ill an attempt. Leſtwitz was advantageouſly poſted, with eleven battalions and fifteen ſquadrons, between Schandau and a village named Wendiſche Fehre. Marſhal Braun, who had entered Saxony at the head of his detachment, encamped in his preſence; and the Auſtrians occupied the villages of Mitteldorf and Altendorf; but, finding Leſtwitz ſtronger than they had ſuppoſed, they were careful not to attack. Braun could not attain Burkerſdorf, from which he was ſeparated by a chain of impracticable rocks. He did not find it to his advantage to engage Leſtwitz; and yet, to aid the Saxons on the ſide of Altſtadt, he would be obliged to file off with his men two at a time, in face of the Pruſſians, and under the fire of their ſmall arms. There was therefore no mode which a man of experience, like marſhal Braun, could take, without riſking his reputation. He preferred remaining inactive to thus ineffectually leading his troops to ſlaughter.

Beſide Altſtadt, where the Saxons had determined to paſs the Elbe, and on the right ſhore

of

of that river, is a ſmall plain, overlooked by the Lillienſtein, a ſteep rock by which it is in part bounded. On each ſide of this rock were five Pruſſian battalions, under the command of Retzow, behind an abatis, which in the form of a half moon was extended and ſupported at each ſide by the elbowing of the Elbe. Five hundred paces in the rear of this poſt, ſix battalions and five ſquadrons held the defile of Burkerſdorf, on the back of which is a chain of rugged and ſteep rocks, named the Ziegenruck, which, encompaſſing the whole ground, extends at each end to the Elbe. To force their way therefore the Saxons had three ſucceſſive poſts to attack, each more formidable than the other: yet this was the ſide on which they began to eſtabliſh their bridges, on the 11th of October, to effect their eſcape.

The Pruſſians took good care not to diſturb them. Their deſcent from Tirmſdorf toward the Elbe was not difficult; but, when their bridges were finiſhed, and they wiſhed to mount the rocks on the other ſide to gain the plain of Altſtadt, they found only a fiſherman's path. Half a day was neceſſary for the paſſage of two battalions. The heavy rains that fell rendered the roads ſtill more intolerable. They were obliged to abandon their cannon, which it was impoſſible

impoſſible to tranſport to the oppoſite ſhore: thus their whole artillery remained in the intrenchments they had quitted. The ſlowneſs of their paſſage occaſioned the cavalry, infantry, baggage, and rear-guard of this pell-mell multitude, to remain in the environs of Struppen. On the 13th, before day, prince Maurice of Anhalt was firſt informed of the flight of the Saxons. He ordered the men immediately to arms, and divided the army into ſeven columns, that with difficulty clambered the rocks of Pirna. The generals formed on the ſummit of theſe mountains, abandoned as they were by their defenders, between the Sonnenſtein and Rottendorf. Ziethen immediately attacked the rear-guard of the enemy with his huſſars, and drove it to Tirmſdorf. The free companies and Pruſſian chaſſeurs took poſt in a wood, near this rear-guard, which they incommoded greatly by their fire. Prince Maurice came up, and ſent a regiment of Pruſſian infantry to occupy the height in the rear of the Saxons. The cannon from this hill ſcarcely made two diſcharges before the Saxons, ſurpriſed at receiving a fire from a part ſo little expected, fell in diſorder, and ſuddenly took to flight. The huſſars fell upon and pillaged the baggage. The chaſſeurs glided into a wood near the Elbe, whence

whence they fired on the Saxon rear-guard, that had juſt paſſed the bridge. The latter then entirely loſt all recollection. They cut the cables of their own bridge; which, carried away by the ſtream as far as Rathen, was there taken by the Pruſſians. Prince Maurice immediately made the troops encamp on the heights of Struppen; their left inclined toward the Elbe, and their right extended behind a deep ravine, which ends beſide Hennerſdorf.

Such was the ſtate of things when the king arrived with his dragoons at Struppen. The Saxons waited a given ſignal, according to agreement with the Imperialiſts, to attack the Pruſſians in concert. This ſignal was not given, and all hope was loſt. They were then but too well convinced, ſeeing the manner in which Retzow was poſted, it was impoſſible they ſhould cut their way by their own efforts. The king of Poland, who had taken refuge at the Königſtein, warmly preſſed his generals to attack Retzow at Lillienſtein; and count Rutowſky in return forcibly repreſented the inefficacy of ſuch an attempt, which muſt end in effuſion of blood and butchery, and from which no advantage could be drawn.

Marſhal Braun, though not in equal danger, was not leſs embarraſſed. In his front was an army

army of Pruſſians ſuperior to his own. As all communication was cut off with the Königſtein, there being natural impediments which interdicted any attempt to relieve the Saxons, who he well might fear would ſurrender without his knowledge, after which the whole Pruſſian force would fall upon him, judging the ſituation of the Saxon army hopeleſs, and thinking only of his own ſafety, on the 14th of October he retreated into Bohemia. The Pruſſian huſſars purſued. Warneri beat his rear-guard, and put three hundred Croat grenadiers to the ſword.

This ill executed attempt occaſioned the moſt injurious reproaches to paſs between the Saxon and Auſtrian generals. They were mutually wrong; the Saxon general who had formed this project of eſcape alone was culpable. He muſt no doubt have conſulted defective maps. He had never been in thoſe parts, of the ſituation of which he was ſo ignorant. For what man in his ſenſes would chooſe to retreat through defiles, between ſteep rocks, of which the enemy is the maſter? The ground, wholly inimical to the manœuvres the Auſtrians and Saxons intended to make, was the true cauſe of the misfortunes of the latter. So neceſſary is it to ſtudy the ſituation of places, by which mi-

litary actions are decided, and with them the welfare of ſtates.

The king of Poland, on the heights of the Königſtein, was a ſpectator of the deplorable ſituation of his troops, in want of bread, ſurrounded by enemies, and incapable, even by the moſt deſperate reſolution, of eſcaping at any expence of blood, for all reſource was cut off. That he might not ſee them periſh with famine, he was obliged to conſent they ſhould ſurrender priſoners of war, and lay down their arms.

Count Rutowſky was employed to draw up this melancholy capitulation. The whole corps was taken, and the officers gave their parole of honour not to ſerve againſt the Pruſſians, during the war. As their word was depended on they were releaſed. Not to humble a vanquiſhed foe, the king reſtored to the king of Poland the colours, ſtandards, and drums; he alſo conſented to the neutrality of the fortreſs of Königſtein. But, at the very time he was endeavouring to ſoften the afflictions of the king of Poland, the latter concluded a ſecret treaty with the empreſs queen, by which he ceded to her, in conſideration of a certain ſubſidy, four regiments of dragoons, and two pulks of Ulans, whom he maintained in Poland. Such a procedure only ſerved to juſtify the conduct

conduct of the Pruſſians. The king of Poland, more than ever diſguſted with war after the ſcene that had ſo lately been acted, demanded free paſſage for his perſon, that he might repair to Poland. This was not only granted him but attention was carried ſo far as to withdraw the Pruſſian troops, from the road on which he was to paſs, that he might not behold objects which only could give him pain. On the 18th he departed with his two ſons and his miniſter for Warſaw.

The Saxon army that ſo lately had capitulated amounted to ſeventeen thouſand men, and the artillery to more than eighty cannon. Of theſe troops, which the king diſtributed, he formed twenty new battalions of infantry; but he committed the error of not incorporating them with his ſubjects, the officers excepted, who all were Pruſſians. This was the cauſe that little advantage could afterward be made of theſe regiments, and of the ill ſervices they performed.

After the reduction of the Saxons, the king returned to withdraw his army out of Bohemia. Marſhal Keith quitted the camp of Lowoſitz on the 25th, and retreated to Linay without being followed by the enemy. The regiment of Itzenplitz, that guarded the ford of the Elbe

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at the village of Soleſel, was attacked the ſame night, and defended itſelf ſo well that, not ſatisfied with repulſing the enemy, it took ſome priſoners. From Linay the army continued its march through Nöllendorf, Schönwalde, and Giſhubel, and arrived on the 30th in Saxony. The king cantoned the men between Pirna and the frontiers of Bohemia.

While the army of the king entered Saxony, marſhal Schwerin forſook the vicinage of Königſgrætz, and retired into Sileſia. On his march toward Skalitz he was followed by ſome thouſands of Hungarians, who harraſſed his rear-guard. The marſhal, not underſtanding raillery, put himſelf at the head of a part of his cavalry, fell upon them ſuddenly, and defeated and purſued them to Smirſitz; after which he tranquilly continued his march, and on the 2d of November arrived on the frontiers of Sileſia.

The enemy kept ſo quiet that the troops were early permitted to go into winter quarters, for which a line was formed. Prince Maurice had the command of the diviſion ſent to Chemnitz and Zwickau, whence detachments were made to guard the defiles of Bohemia; and the poſts of Auſche, Oelſnitz, and the Baſberg, were intrenched. General Hulſen

commanded the battalions of Freyberg and Dipholdiſwalde, and held the poſts of Sayda, Frauenberg, and Einſidel. The defile of Giſhubel and the paſs of Höhlendorf the king confided to general Zaſtrow; beyond which, paſſing the Elbe, the line extended through Dreſden and Biſchofswerda to Bautzen, where a body of ten battalions and ten ſquadrons was ready to ſend ſuccour wherever it ſhould be requiſite. Leſtwitz was poſted at Zittau, with ſix battalions. To aſcertain his communication, he had detachments at Hirſchfelde, Oſtritz, and Marrienthal. The prince of Bevern commanded the poſts of Gölitz and Lauban, with ten battalions and fifteen ſquadrons. General Winterfeld, and the prince of Wurtemberg, who marched with a detachment into Sileſia, continued the line; including Grieffenberg, Hirſchberg, Landſhut, and Friedland. General Fouquet covered the county of Glatz. Another corps of the army of marſhal Schwerin wintered beſide Neuſtadt, and ſerved to cover Upper Sileſia againſt the incurſions the Imperialiſts might have made from Moravia.

Such was the diſpoſition in which the Pruſſian troops paſſed the winter of 1756 to 1757.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

The Winter of 1756 *to* 1757.

THE invaſion of Saxony by the Pruſſians occaſioned very lively ſenſations throughout Europe. Several courts, unacquainted with his reaſons, or wiſhing ſo to be, blamed and diſapproved the conduct of the king. The king of Poland exclaimed againſt the violence committed by the Pruſſians; his miniſters in foreign courts exaggerated the calamities of Saxony, and empoiſoned and calumniated the moſt innocent proceedings of the king. Aſperſions like theſe were re-echoed at Verſailles, Peterſburg, and throughout Europe. The king of France was piqued that the king of Pruſſia, inſtead of renewing the treaty of Verſailles, had concluded an alliance with England. On one part the Auſtrian miniſters embittered the minds of the French to engage them in a German war; and on the other the tears of the Dauphineſs were employed to excite the compaſſion of Louis XV. that he might take part with the king of Poland. The moſt Chriſtian

king yielded to theſe ardent ſolicitations, and reſolved to carry the war into Germany: he only delayed this ſtep that he might obtain ſome apparent and plauſible pretext. This his ambaſſador, the duke de Broglio, had orders to furniſh, by giving occaſion to the Pruſſians to inſult his public character. He was the propereſt of perſons that could have been choſen to have embroiled the two courts. The commiſſion given him was the cauſe of his ſtrange conduct. While the Saxons remained blockaded in their camp of Pirna he had continued at Dreſden, and made various attempts to repair to Struppen, where the king of Poland was, though there was a general prohibition to the contrary. He attempted to force the guards to induce them to commit ſome violence. He vainly eſſayed to paſs the chain of horſe patroles. He was oppoſed on every occaſion with ſo much firm politeneſs that he could not come to the king of Poland, nor find any trifling pretext of national quarrel. The court of Verſailles grew impatient at this, and without further ceremony diſmiſſed the Pruſſian ambaſſador, M. von Knyphauſen, from Paris, and recalled M. de Valori, the French ambaſſador at Berlin. This open interference obliged the king, on his return from Bohemia, to ſignify to the duke de Broglio

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at Dreſden, where the king fixed his quarters, that, all intelligence having been interrupted between the two courts by the late recal, it was no more proper for an ambaſſador of France to reſide in the ſame city with his majeſty, and that he muſt inceſſantly prepare to depart to the king of Poland, whom his embaſſy concerned. The ambaſſador received this declaration with that air of haughty dignity which the French ſo well know to aſſume, when they recollect the proſperous period of Louis XIV. He did not by this delay his departure for Warſaw. The court of Verſailles determined on a rupture, and, having loſt ſight of that fixed point in her politics, which was to puſh the war by ſea againſt the Engliſh, abandoned herſelf to caprice and impulſes given by foreign powers. She declared ſhe conſidered the invaſion of Saxony as a violation of the peace of Weſtphalia, of which ſhe was a guarantee. She imagined this pretext of guarantee ſufficient to authorize her to take part in the war, and even to induce the Swedes to do the ſame. The Abbé de Bernis, who had been the promoter of the alliance with the houſe of Auſtria, became miniſter for foreign affairs, inſtead of M. Rouillé.

In fine, French impetuoſity, which always carries the nation to extremes, the inconſiſtency

of miniſters, the animoſity with which the king of France had previouſly been inſpired againſt the king of Pruſſia, novelty, and faſhion, all ſo contributed to promote the alliance of that court with Auſtria that this alliance was conſidered as a maſter ſtroke in politics. Imperial miniſters only were in vogue, and they ſo adroitly employed their influence over the councils of Louis XV. that, inſtead of twenty-four thouſand auxiliaries, ſtipulated by France to be ſent to the empreſs queen, they intrigued ſo effectually that, in the following ſpring, a hundred thouſand French paſſed the Rhine.

The Swedes were preſently ſummoned to fulfil their guarantee of the treaty of Weſtphalia, by the French miniſtry; and the Swediſh ſenate had long been in the pay of France. Though the laws of the kingdom, in expreſs and poſitive terms, forbade any declaration of war, without the conſent of the three orders which form the general diet of the ſtate, the partiſans of France violated theſe fundamental laws; and, neglecting all uſual formalities, blindly adopted the meaſures the king of France propoſed.

While the court of Verſailles laborioufly prepared the means of overwhelming Germany, a madman endeavoured to accompliſh a revolu-

tion in France. An obſcure fanatic, who had lived ſervant at a convent of Jeſuits in Flanders, undertook to aſſaſſinate Louis XV. This lunatic, named Damiens, repaired to Verſailles, that he might watch the moment of putting his abominable project into execution. One evening, when the king was to depart for Choiſi, he mingled with the crowd, approached the king behind, and plunged his knife into his ſide. He was immediately arreſted. The wound was found to be ſlight; and the culprit was committed to the care of the parliament. The priſons were filled with perſons whom he had accuſed in his depoſitions, but who being innocent recovered their liberty; nor has the public hitherto obtained any other than vague motives, which could induce the monſter to commit an act ſo atrocious.

The court of Vienna, ſo active at Verſailles, was not leſs diligent in intrigue with the other powers of Europe. She depicted the invaſion of Saxony by the Pruſſians, at Peterſburg, in the blackeſt colours. It was an inſult to Ruſſia! It was to brave the force of that empire! It was a manifeſt contempt of the guarantees the empreſs Elizabeth had granted the king of Poland for his electorate! In ſupport of theſe inſinuations the Auſtrians were prodigal of their ſlanders

againſt Pruſſia, as they alſo were of money, which was not uſeleſsly diſperſed. To haſten the march of the Ruſſian troops, the empreſs queen promiſed an annual ſubſidy, of two millions of crowns, to the empreſs Elizabeth. This ſum, properly ſpeaking, was paid by France, and was the equivalent of the contingency ſhe owed to Auſtria. By this the latter power engaged Ruſſia to declare war againſt the king.

The ſervants of the empreſs queen laboured with no leſs zeal at Ratiſbon to involve the ſtates of the empire in theſe troubles. The French ſo far intimidated the diet, by their threats, that it blindly ſubſcribed to the will of the court of Vienna. This diet reſolved that the holy empire ſhould form an army of execution, which ſhould immediately advance into the electorate of Brandenbourg; the command of which was beſtowed on the prince of Hildbourghauſen, a marſhal in the Auſtrian ſervice. The fiſcal of the empire entered the liſts, and affirmed the kings of Pruſſia and England merited being put to the ban of the empire. Some princes remonſtrated that, though the elector of Bavaria had formerly been put to this ban, it was not till after his defeat at the battle of Höchſtædt; and that, when the Imperial armies ſhould have gained ſimilar battles, they might then

then be at liberty to proceed againſt theſe kings. France well conceived that, were this ſentence precipitately made public, the court of Vienna would endanger its dignity; and it might further be feared that the two kings and their adherents ſhould entirely ſeparate themſelves from the holy Roman empire. This they repreſented at Vienna, and counſelled the empreſs queen to wait that opportunity which good fortune might afford, and maturely to reflect on the final meaſures ſhe ought to take. Though this advice was followed, it did not prevent the fiſcal from acting with rude and inſupportable indecency againſt kings, toward whom even enemies uſually obſerve a polite and reſpectful procedure. It would have been difficult to anſwer the injurious and bitter memorials of that diet, had not M. von Plotho, the king's ambaſſador at Ratiſbon, had the talent and the addreſs to ſteep his pen in ſimilar gall. The ſtyle of the Imperial court was not more gentle; its memorials were diſtinguiſhed from even thoſe of the fiſcal, by inſolence abounding in haughtineſs, and by ſomewhat ſtill more poignant mingled with ſupercilious arrogance. Offended by proceedings like theſe, the king inſinuated to the empreſs queen they might remain enemies without foul language, and that it might ſuffice for ſovereigns

to end their conteſts by the ſword, without proſtituting their dignity by memorials in the language of Billingſgate *. Theſe remonſtrances long continued vain, and did not acquire force till ſome battles had firſt been gained.

While all Europe armed againſt the kings of Pruſſia and Great Britain, England was in a general ſtate of commotion, which benumbed government, and would have been prejudicial to the nation, had not this been redreſſed by a ſeaſonable change. The domeſtic diſſenſions which agitated the ſtate were fomented by the duke of Cumberland, who flattered himſelf he might place his creatures in the firſt offices of the kingdom. He it was who excited the nation againſt the French; he it was who promoted war, hoping that the miniſtry could not ſuſtain itſelf in times of trouble. The firſt attempts of the Engliſh were ſo unſucceſsful that they loſt Port Mahon, and this was a pretext, employed by his party, to tax the duke of Newcaſtle with incapacity. At the opening of the parliament, the minds of men were heated, the animoſity of parties redoubled, and ſo many ſprings were made to act by the intrigues of the duke of Cumberland that the duke of Newcaſtle, rather fatigued than vanquiſhed, reſigned his poſt. The triumphant party beſtowed

* *En ſtyle des Halles.*

ſtowed the ſeals on Mr. Fox, the creature of the duke of Cumberland.

The new miniſtry could not maintain its power: Fox voluntarily quitted a place procured by ſo many arts, and the duke of Newcaſtle was reſtored to office. Theſe changes in the ſervants of the ſtate would have been of little conſequence, had they not produced a kind of inactivity and lethargy in the tranſaction of buſineſs. The miniſtry and the great were more occupied concerning the intereſts of faction than the meaſures to be taken againſt France. Animated rather againſt their competitors than againſt the national enemy, no plans were formed for the approaching campaign. No one troubled himſelf concerning the war by ſea, hitherto unfortunate; ſtill leſs concerning the war that was ſoon to rage in Germany. What moſt intereſted the king at this moment was to induce the Engliſh to take meaſures for the continental war; and, as he foreſaw what would be the general operations of the French army in the empire, he ſent the king of England a plan for the common defence of Germany. It chiefly conſiſted of the following points. The king propoſed Weſel ſhould be maintained as a place of arms for the allies, by which they would be enabled to paſs the Rhine. He required

quired an army to be aſſembled in a proper place, behind the Lippe, between Weſel and Lippſtadt. This poſition would have the advantage of enabling troops to march toward the Rhine, or toward the Weſer, as occaſion ſhould demand. If the French ſhould march into Heſſe, the army of the Lippe, by advancing toward Frankfort, would oblige them to quit their purſuits; and while the allied army ſhould be driven from the Rhine, by theſe operations, the fortreſs of Weſel would afford employment to the French till it could march back to its relief: for, while this place held out, it was not to be preſumed the French forces, on the Lower Rhine, would advance too far into Weſtphalia.

The king of England, little accuſtomed to ſubjects of this kind, read the plan without comprehending its importance; and, as it was propoſed to maintain Weſel, he ſuſpected the reaſoning of the king of Pruſſia; but he had entire confidence in his Hanoverian miniſters, who inceſſantly remonſtrated that he muſt confine himſelf to the defence of the Weſer. This judgment was falſe in every ſenſe; for the Weſer is in general fordable, and the ſhore oppoſite to the electorate of Hanover is the higheſt; ſo that nature never intended, whatever

ever M. von Munchhauſen might affirm, that an able general would put this river to the uſe he propoſed. His advice nevertheleſs prevailed, and all that could be obtained from the king of England was that he conſented the Hanoverian and Heſſian troops ſhould return into Germany. The want of harmony between the king, the Engliſh, and the Hanoverians, obliged the former to take meaſures different from thoſe he had imagined for the dutchy of Cleves and the fortreſs of Weſel. Under the neceſſity of abandoning the latter, he gave orders that a part of its works ſhould be ruined, its numerous artillery be tranſported by ſea to Magdebourg, and that the garriſon ſhould evacuate the town and retire to Bielefeld, there to join the allied army in the ſpring, which was to aſſemble under the command of the duke of Cumberland.

After the proof that had been given of the influence which the Hanoverian miniſters had over the king of England, it was evident that, to apply to the fountain head whence he derived his reſolutions, it was neceſſary they ſhould be addreſſed. Every thing was to be feared for the army of the duke of Cumberland, which was leſs under the command of this prince than under a knot of civilians; who, never having ſeen a camp,

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nor read a book on the military art, imagined themſelves equal to Marlborough and Eugene. The intereſt of the king was too cloſely connected with that of the king of England for him to remain a cool ſpectator of the falſe conduct of which he was going to be guilty; and with the hope of preventing this he ſent general Schmettau to Hanover. Schmettau made the moſt energetic remonſtrances to theſe preſumptuous and ignorant rulers, to induce them to renounce the plan they had formed for the campaign. He demonſtrated its faults, and vainly predicted its conſequences: had he ſpoken Arabic he would have been equally well underſtood. The miniſtry, whoſe minds were exceedingly confined, had not underſtanding ſufficient to follow a chain of military reaſoning. Their want of knowledge rendered them ſuſpicious, and the fear of being deceived, on a ſubject concerning which they were ignorant, increaſed their natural obſtinacy. Such were the reaſons that rendered the miſſion of general Schmettau inefficacious.

The more artful French had firmly perſuaded them it was their intention only to croſs their country; and that the plan of their campaign was entirely directed againſt the king of Pruſſia; that, in a word, they intended to beſiege Magdebourg;

debourg; and, provided the Hanoverians would remain peaceful ſpectators of the ſcene, their country ſhould be ſpared and their perſons reſpected. The miniſters were the dupes of their own credulity, and the French puniſhed their perfidy toward the king of Pruſſia, as will be ſeen in the relation of the enſuing campaign.

While theſe negotiations agitated Europe, the king was at Dreſden, where the queen of Poland raiſed him other difficulties. This princeſs, while ſhe daily ſent her grand maſter, count Queſtenberg, to compliment the king with infinite aſſurances of friendſhip, maintained a ſecret intelligence with the Auſtrian generals, and informed them of whatever ſhe knew. Theſe proceedings gave place to the precautions taken to diſcover this correſpondence. As all packages and merchandize which came from Bohemia were carefully examined at the gates, a box of puddings was one day opened, addreſſed to madam Ogilvi, firſt lady to the queen, who had eſtates in the vicinage of Leutmeritz. Theſe puddings on examination were all ſtuffed with letters. The diſcovery rendered the court more circumſpect in its correſpondence; the ſame practices however were continued, but with additional fineſſe. The ill-will of the queen did not ſtop here;

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ſhe ſent emiſſaries to all the garriſons where the king formed new-raiſed regiments of the Saxons taken at the Lillienſtien, to excite them to ſedition, revolt, and deſertion. Many of them were ſeduced, and this was the cauſe that, at the commencement of the campaign, entire corps mutinied and paſſed over to the enemy. The intention of the king of Poland and his allies was to reincorporate theſe corps in Hungary, and put them on the ſame footing they were before they had been taken by the Pruſſians. Soldiers were aſſembled, but, wanting officers, they had recourſe to a means ſuch as hiſtory furniſhes no example of, on the part of ſecular princes. The Saxon officers were releaſed from their parole given to the Pruſſians; and many of them were mean enough to obey the mandate. In the ages of ignorance, popes may be found who abſolved nations from oaths of fidelity ſworn to their ſovereigns. Thus cardinal Julian Ceſarini obliged Ladiſlas, king of Hungary, to violate the peace he ſolemnly contracted with Soliman. The crime which authorizes perjury had only been the crime of ambitious and implacable pontiffs; but never of kings, among whom good faith ought to be found, though it had been baniſhed the reſt of the world. Should I be thought to inſiſt on ſuch traits,

traits, it is but to characterize the ſpirit of animoſity and obſtinate revenge which were predominant in this war, and diſtinguiſhed it from all others. France and Auſtria did not obtain all the aid from theſe Saxon regiments which they expected; they did but increaſe their expences.

Amid this general effervescence, the enemy's troops were not more tranquil in their quarters than were negotiators in their intrigues. Thoſe corps which the king had in Luſatia were moſt expoſed to projects of attack. This province toward Zittau forms a kind of point, which narrows as it advances between the provinces of Bohemia, and it was ſurrounded by the Auſtrians, with large detachments, ſent to Friedland, Gabel, and Rombourg. Theſe, being commanded by young officers who ardently ſought occaſions to diſtinguiſh themſelves, were in the field during the greateſt part of the winter. The prince of Löwenſtein was at the head of one; and general Laſcy, ſon of the marſhal who had ſerved with diſtinction in Ruſſia, led the other. They ſometimes attempted the poſt of Oſtritz, at others that of Hirſchfeld, or Marienthal; and, though their attempts were ineffectual, men were killed to no purpoſe. Major Blumenthal, of the regiment of Henry, loſt

loſt his life on one of theſe occaſions, as did many ſoldiers from whom the ſtate might have expected better ſervices. The corps of Leſtwitz at Zittau, and that of the prince of Bevern at Görlitz, were fatigued by perpetual alarms, being obliged to ſend aid, ſometimes on this ſide, at others on that: the reſtleſs activity of the Auſtrians kept them continually on foot and in action. As the enemy increaſed in ſtrength, by the troops that came to join them from Flanders, the conteſt muſt at length have become unequal; and, as reinforcements were neceſſary for the Pruſſians to maintain themſelves in Luſatia, the king ſent a reſerve thither, which had occupied that part of Pomerania that is neareſt to the province of Pruſſia. The firſt deſtination of theſe troops had been to join marſhal Lehwald, the better to enable him to reſiſt the Ruſſian army; but the more immediate neceſſity muſt be attended to, and the more diſtant neglected. It was to be remembered that, by dividing the army into three corps that were relatively too equal, neither of them could ſtrike any vigorous and deciſive blow; whereas by aſſembling a large army in Saxony, ſome conſiderable advantages over the Imperialiſts might be hoped, at the commencement of the campaign, which might confound their allies,

allies, and induce ſome among them to deſiſt from intended war, and conqueſts which ambition projected.

The Pruſſian regiments that came from Pomerania arrived at Görlitz, toward the middle of March, and were employed to ſtrengthen the poſts in which there were not ſufficient troops; and after their arrival in Luſatia the enemy remained quiet.

About this time the king made a journey into Sileſia, to concert with marſhal Schwerin. They met at Haynau. The plan of the approaching campaign was there laid down, and the beſt poſſible meaſures taken to conceal it, even from the knowledge of the army; after which the king returned into Saxony, where, as well as in Sileſia, every preparation was made to execute this plan, as ſoon as the arrangements relative to ſubſiſtence and the coming ſpring ſhould permit.

I CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Campaign of 1757.

THE Pruſſian troops entered into cantonments toward the end of March. They were divided into four different corps. Prince Maurice commanded in the vicinity of Zwickau. The king, with the main army, kept between Dreſden, Pirna, Giſhubel, and Dippoldiſwalde. The prince of Bevern had aſſembled the corps that had wintered in Luſatia, near Zittau; and marſhal Schwerin advanced with his army, on the frontiers of Bohemia, between Glatz, Friedland, and Landſhut. The plan of the campaign was to penetrate at once with theſe four corps into Bohemia, and by different directions to arrive at Prague, which was the place of rencontre. This grand manœuvre would certainly throw the different corps of the enemy, diſperſed in their quarters, into commotion and aſtoniſhment. There were hopes that ſome might be ſurpriſed, and that others might be brought to action, and cut off in detail, which might give a ſuperiority and aſcendancy to the Pruſſians during the remainder of the campaign, and bring

bring on a decisive action, the success of which might fix the fortune of the war. To conceal this project was of the utmost importance, and it could only be effected by depriving the enemy even of suspicion, as well as the court of Saxony, by which the Prussians were betrayed. Neither must the army be informed. Nothing must be left to the tongue of imprudence. That every body might be deceived, the city of Dresden was fortified and palisadoed, to put it in a situation of defence. The king meantime chose a certain number of advantageous camps round Dresden, as if he prepared for defensive war. These camps were marked out at Cotta, Maxen, Possendorf, the Windberg, and Moren. The Saxon chasseurs employed for this purpose informed the court with all haste; and the queen of Poland was equally hasty to inform the Austrian generals. Nor were these false appearances all; but, the better to lull the enemy, feeble incursions were made into Bohemia, as if meant to avenge the alarms of the enemy during winter, in Lusatia, to the disturbance of the Prussians. With this intent prince Maurice took a circuit toward Eger. Marshal Keith came up with an Austrian detachment unexpectedly at Schlukenau. The prince of Bevern surprised four hundred foot and pan-

dours at Böhmiſch Friedland, who ſurrendered themſelves priſoners. Theſe trifling attacks kept the Imperialiſts in ſecurity, who were perſuaded the king would content himſelf with giving them petty alarms, and did not ſuſpect him of more grand deſigns.

The different corps of the Pruſſian army were in motion, ſome on the 20th, others on the 29th of April. Prince Maurice entered Bohemia, by the Baſberg, whence he advanced to Commotau. The king encamped at Nöllendorf, and ſent his van-guard to Karwitz, where Zaſtrow was detached with his brigade to occupy Auſſig, and drive the Auſtrians from the caſtle of Tetſchen. On the morrow the army marched to Linay, where prince Maurice joined it from Brix. The quarters of the Auſtrians all fell back beyond the Eger, at the approach of the Pruſſians. The caſtle of Tetſchen ſurrendered on the 27th; general Zaſtrow there had the misfortune to be killed. The army afterward paſſed the Paſcopol, and traverſing the plains of Lowoſitz (24th) encamped at Trebnitz. The Haſenberg was occupied, and the right was ſupported at the Paſcopol. This poſition was facing that which marſhal Braun had lately taken at Budin. It was known that the marſhal expected a diviſion of his troops, that

that had wintered in the circles of Saaz and Eger, on the morrow; and it was thought proper to attempt to prevent this junction, and combat this corps, before it was near enough to receive aid from the camp at Budin. To this effect it was reſolved that the army ſhould paſs the Eger, at night, a mile and a half above the camp of marſhal Braun; and, if no opportunity of beating this diviſion, which was on the march, ſhould preſent itſelf, ſtill the manœuvre muſt turn the marſhal, and oblige him to abandon his poſition. Bridges were in conſequence eſtabliſhed at Koſchtitz; which were not finiſhed before the morning of the morrow, when the troops paſſed the Eger. The huſſars, ſent immediately on diſcovery, met the diviſion that was to join the marſhal near Penitz. Informed of the paſſage of the Pruſſians, that diviſion retired to Welwarn, without any poſſibility of being attacked, becauſe ſcarcely half of the army had paſſed the river. Marſhal Braun ſoon perceived his poſt was turned, and that he could not join his diviſion, but by retiring himſelf to Welwarn; conſequently he immediately began his march: the Pruſſian huſſars haraſſed his rear-guard and took ſome priſoners.

The army of the king (28th) encamped at Budin, and employed the morrow in repairing

the bridges of the Eger, to aſcertain a communication with Saxony. The important magazines which the enemy had at Martinowe, Budin, and Karwatitz, were taken by the Pruſſians, which greatly facilitated the ſubſiſtence of the troops. From Budin the army advanced to Welwarn, which the enemy had abandoned, and the van-guard, compoſed of forty ſquadrons, and all the grenadiers, were ſent forward as far as Tuchomirſitz (30th), where the king himſelf was, and ſaw the army of marſhal Braun ſtill on its march. Behind the columns that were filing off followed the rear-guard; the apparent ill countenance of which gave birth to the deſire of attack. Ziethen fell on it and took three hundred priſoners. The enemy from the beginning had taken poſt on the Weiſſe-Berg; this they abandoned on the 2d of May. It was ſeized by the van-guard of the Pruſſians, who ſaw the enemy paſs the city of Prague and encamp beyond the Muldau. On the ſame ſide, the army of the king occupied all the environs of the city, and formed a kind of circumvallation. His right was ſupported by the Upper Muldau, whence the camp proceeded, including St. Roc and the convent of Victory, and ſupported itſelf at Podbaba, at the Lower Muldau.

During

During the march of the army of the king, the prince of Bevern had proceeded with vigour. On the 20th of April he entered Bohemia, advancing through Krottau and Kratzen to Machendorf. On the march his cavalry beat an Auſtrian detachment, which advanced to reconnoitre; the enemy had taken an advantageous poſition at Reichenberg. Count Königſeck commanded this corps, the ſtrength of which was eſtimated at twenty-eight thouſand. On the 21ſt of April, the prince of Bevern marched to the attack, in two columns, taking the road from Habendorf toward the army of the enemy. To arrive there the cauſe-way muſt be paſſed. This defile, which the enemy could not defend with ſmall arms, delayed the Pruſſians but little. Beyond was the corps of Königſeck, which he had formed in a circle, with the Auſtrian cavalry in the centre, arranged in three lines, on a ſmall plain, included between the two wings of infantry which advanced, with the rear ſupported by thick foreſts, having in ſome places abatis in front, and redoubts, with artillery, for the protection of the cavalry.

The right of the prince attacked the left of the enemy. Fifteen ſquadrons meantime charged the Imperial cavalry in the plain, and

put it to the rout. The prince of Wurtemberg here enacted wonders. Leſtwitz attacked the right of the enemy, and the redoubts that covered Reichenberg: and, though it croſſed various defiles before it arrived, ſtill the regiment of Darmſtadt, commanded by colonel von Hertzberg, forced theſe redoubts, and obliged the enemy to take to flight, who was purſued from height to height, as far as Kochlitz and Dorffel. The difficulty of this hilly country, and the impoſſibility that troops deſirous of maintaining their order ſhould come up with a ſcattered enemy, prevented the prince of Bevern from entirely ruining this corps. The Auſtrians loſt about eighteen hundred men, eight hundred of whom were taken by the prince of Bevern. The Pruſſian loſs did not exceed three hundred, for the reſiſtance of the foe was not obſtinate. The prince followed count Königſeck to Libenau, where an impracticable defile, behind which this general formed, impeded any new aſſault.

The Pruſſians would have been unable to penetrate farther into Bohemia, on this ſide, had not the march of Schwerin afforded them ſeaſonable ſuccour. The army from Sileſia was the firſt that entered Bohemia, on the 18th of April, by five different routes. One co-

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lumn directed its courſe to Schatzlar, and had nearly ſurpriſed the princes of Saxony, who were there. Another, taking the route of Guldene Els, met with three hundred pandours, who defended a paſs on a ſteep rock. Winterfeld found means of ſending ſome troops to climb theſe rocks, who took the pandours in the rear, and put them to the ſword. The other three columns, paſſing through the county of Glatz, met no enemy on the road, and all joined marſhal Schwerin at Königſhof.

The marſhal, having received intelligence of what had paſſed between the prince of Bevern and Königſeck, came on the rear of the latter, thinking to ſurpriſe him in his camp of Libenau. The Auſtrians haſtily departed, intending to march toward Jung-Buntzlau. They were again prevented by marſhal Schwerin, who at the ſame time ſeized a conſiderable magazine the enemy had formed at Koſmanos. At this place the corps from Luſatia joined the army from Sileſia. Count Königſeck nevertheleſs advanced by long marches toward Prague. The marſhal followed him to Benatek; whence he detached general Wartenberg to purſue the enemy more cloſely, who defeated the Auſtrian rear-guard fifteen hundred ſtrong, the greateſt number of whom were killed or taken near

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Alt-Buntzlau; but the brave general, one of the beſt officers of cavalry in the army, here loſt his life, and was univerſally regretted. Fouquet then marched with the van-guard of the army to Buntzlau, and halted there till the 4th of May, to re-eſtabliſh the bridges of the Elbe, that had been broken down by the enemy to ſecure their retreat. The ſame day the marſhal croſſed the river with his army, and encamped a mile and a half from Prague.

A part of the troops that had ſerved under Piccolomini the preceding year was not yet aſſembled. Of theſe marſhal Daun received the command, after the death of Piccolomini. Hearing of theſe different incurſions of the Pruſſians, the marſhal received orders to aſſemble his army and march immediately for Prague. Braun expected him with the more impatience when he perceived he ſhould be incontinently attacked by the whole Pruſſian force. The king was informed of the march of marſhal Daun, but his army could not undertake any thing againſt Braun, who was covered by the Muldau and the city of Prague; yet ſuch was the ſituation of affairs that the fate of the two armies muſt neceſſarily be decided by a battle; and, ſince marſhal Braun could only be attacked on the oppoſite ſhore of the Muldau, the king

king reſolved to engage him before his junction with Daun.

To this effect a bridge was thrown over the Muldau, near Seltz, and the king croſſed at the head of a detachment of twenty battalions and forty ſquadrons. This was the 5th of May. He had time to reconnoitre the poſition of the enemy, found the front of the marſhal too difficult for attack, and perceived that, by turning the right of the enemy, the ground would preſent an aſpect more advantageous for engagement. Early on the morning of the morrow, the two Pruſſian armies joined within reach of the enemy's artillery; and it was determined immediately to begin the attack. The left of the Auſtrians was ſupported by the hill of Ziſka, and protected by the fortifications of Prague. Its front was covered by a ravin more than a hundred feet deep. Its right terminated on a height, at the foot of which ſtands the village of Sterboholi. To render the meditated battle more equal, marſhal Braun muſt be conſtrained to abandon a part of theſe hills, and deſcend into the plain. The king, that he might effect this, changed his order of battle. The army had filed off in broken columns: it was placed in two lines, and marched to the left, taking the road to Poſtchernitz. As ſoon

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as marſhal Braun perceived this motion, with his reſerve of grenadiers, his cavalry of the left, and his ſecond line of infantry, he kept pace with the Pruſſians in a parallel line. He acted exactly as the king wiſhed. The army of the king advanced to Bichowitz, through defiles and marſhes, which ſomewhat ſeparated the troops. The Pruſſian cavalry filed through the village, where it came to a plain bounded by a pond, which preſented the exact diſtance neceſſary to form, between this village and the pond, and adjuſt its flanks free from all inſult. It then vigorouſly attacked the Auſtrian cavalry, which after three ſucceſſive charges was broken and put entirely to the rout. Scarcely were ten battalions of the left formed, before the ſecond line could join them, when they attacked the enemy with more precipitation and courage than wiſdom. They received a prodigious fire of artillery, and were repulſed, but not certainly with ſhame, for the braveſt officers and half the battalions were extended on the field. Marſhal Schwerin, who in deſpite of his great age ſtill preſerved all the fire of youth, beholding with indignation the Pruſſians repulſed, and ſeizing a pair of colours, headed his regiment, led it to the charge, and performed extraordinary acts of valour; but, as there were not yet ſufficient

ficient troops to ſupport him, he fell, was ſlain, and thus terminated a glorious life by death which acquired him additional glory.

In the interim the ſecond line came up. The king farther ſent for prince Ferdinand of Brunſwic and ſome regiments, and the battle was reſtored with the more facility becauſe that Treſkow, with his brigade, who though however little was more to the right, had pierced the enemy's line. The king cauſed the regiments of Charles and young Brunſwic to join Treſkow, and with this corps purſued the Auſtrian infantry beyond their tents, which they had wanted time to ſtrike. From this moment the rout on the right of the enemy became general. Cavalry was ſent for to profit by the diſorder. Unfortunately the huſſars and dragoons had fallen upon the flying enemy's baggage; and arrived too late to attack the infantry, who otherwiſe would have been all taken or put to the ſword. This did not prevent the king from hotly purſuing the foe. Putkammer was ſent with huſſars toward the Saſſawa, whither a part of the fugitives had eſcaped, and the main army advanced toward the Wiſcherad; ſo that the left and right of the Auſtrians were totally ſeparated.

It was not intended that the right of the

Pruſſians ſhould engage, becauſe of a deep ravin before noticed, which was in front, and of the diſadvantages of the ground; but they were led on by the imprudence of Mannſtein, whoſe courage was ſometimes too violent. This ardent bravery, which flamed forth at the ſight of the enemy, occaſioned him to advance without having received orders. He immediately attacked the foe. Prince Henry and the prince of Bevern, who diſapproved his conduct, ſtill, unwilling to abandon him, were obliged to ſupport the attack. The Pruſſian infantry had difficult rocks to climb, defended by the whole left of the Auſtrians, and a numerous artillery. Prince Ferdinand of Brunſwic, perceiving the battle begun on this ſide, and being uſeleſs on the left, where he had no more foes to face, took the Auſtrians in flank and rear, by which the efforts of prince Henry were ſo well ſeconded that he ſeized on three of the batteries of the enemy, whom he purſued from hill to hill. The vanquiſhed, cut off from the Saſſawa by the corps of the king in their rear, at the village of Michele, could only find ſafety by throwing themſelves into the city of Prague. They attempted to eſcape near the Wiſcherad, where they were thrice repulſed by the cavalry of the king. They next made an eſſay

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toward Königſaal, and were again driven back by marſhal Keith, whoſe army occupied all the heights at the foot of which they were to paſs.

It was indeed known that the Imperial fugitives had eſcaped to Prague, but not how many of them; the king therefore was ſatisfied with inveſting and blockading the city, as well as the darkneſs and the ſpecies of confuſion attendant on victories would permit.

This battle, which began about nine in the morning, continued, including the purſuit, till eight in the evening, and was one of the moſt murderous of the preſent century. The enemy there loſt twenty-four thouſand men, five thouſand of whom were made priſoners, with thirty officers, eleven ſtandards, and ſixty cannon that were taken. The loſs of the Pruſſians amounted to eighteen thouſand, without enumerating marſhal Schwerin, who himſelf was equal to more than ten thouſand men. His death withered the laurels of victory, bought by blood ſo precious. This day beheld the pillars of the Pruſſian infantry fall: generals Fouquet and Winterfeld were dangerouſly wounded. Hautcharmoy, Goltz, the prince of Holſtein, Mannſtein *, Anhalt, and a number of valiant

* Either there were two officers of the name of Mannſtein, or this is a miſtake, as will preſently be ſeen. T.

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officers and old ſoldiers, there loſt their lives, and could not be replaced, during a cruel and bloody war.

On the morrow the king ſent general Krockow to Prague, to ſummon the city to ſurrender; who was highly aſtoniſhed to find prince Charles of Lorraine there, and to learn with certainty that forty thouſand Auſtrians, eſcaped from the battle, were incloſed within the walls. This news obliged the king to take different meaſures. He ſeized on the hill of Ziſka, where the right of the army encamped, and where the front, occupying all the vineyards that looked toward Prague, extended through Michele, and ended at Podoli and the Muldau. A bridge was here conſtructed to preſerve a certain communication on that ſide with marſhal Keith, and a ſimilar one at Branick, on the Lower Muldau. The city of Prague cannot be conſidered as a fortreſs. Situated in a bottom, it is ſurrounded by vineyards and rocks, which overlook it on all ſides. Its ditches are dry, its ſtone works ſlight, the parapets in many places too thin, the curtains too long. All its ramparts had been ſo neglected during the peace that they were in many parts liable to inſult; but the garriſon was very different. To attack this in form a more numerous army was requiſite,

quiſite, eſpecially after the detachments the king had been obliged to make, and of which we ſhall preſently ſpeak. This induced him to attempt nothing more than a blockade, that the garriſon might be taken by famine. It was hoped the bombs might ſet fire to the magazines: mortars and artillery were brought up, and three grand batteries fixed, one on the hill of Ziſka, another before Michele, and the third by the ſide of marſhal Keith, toward the Strohhof. All theſe were ineffectual; the city had caſemated baſtions, where the magazines were ſheltered from every attempt of the Pruſſian artillery.

While theſe arrangements were made round Prague, marſhal Daun and his corps had advanced to Teutſchbrodt. The king firſt ſent general Ziethen to oppoſe him, and ſoon after the prince of Bevern; who at the head of twenty thouſand men inclined firſt to Kaurzim, then to Kuttenberg, ſtill obliging Daun to recede till he had retired as far as Haber. But every ſtep in retreat did but ſtrengthen him, and give him the means of collecting the ſcattered fugitives from the battle of Prague; who having eſcaped beyond the Saſſawa were enabled to join the marſhal.

On another ſide the king ſent colonel Mayer into the empire with his volunteers, and five hundred huſſars, to terrify the German princes, and retard the union of the army of the circles; and, at the ſame time, to alarm the pedants of Ratiſbon, whoſe inſulting eloquence violated every rule of good breeding. Mayer entered the biſhopric of Bamberg, and thence proceeded toward Nuremberg, cauſing the arrogant deputies, who imagined themſelves judges of kings, to deſert Ratiſbon; after which he ventured into the Upper Palatinate. The elector of Bavaria, and ſeveral princes whom this irruption inſpired with fears, ſent deputies to the king to treat on their perſonal intereſts, and the whole empire would have abandoned the party of the empreſs queen, if one of thoſe revolutions, ſo common to war, and which are part of the ſports of fortune, had not croſſed the proſperity of Pruſſia. In the continuation of this work, we ſhall perceive how many of theſe viciſſitudes overthrew the hopes of the Pruſſians, and of the Imperialiſts.

The blockade of Prague however continued; the city was bombarded, but the Auſtrians made frequent ſallies. One day they were deſirous of attacking the batteries of the Strohhof, whither prince Ferdinand of Pruſſia haſtened, and chaſed them

them to their covered way, with the loſs of twelve hundred men. Another time they attempted a ſally toward Wiſcherad, but, with ſo little precaution and foreſight that, preſenting their flank to the Pruſſian batteries placed beſide Podoli, the artillery made them re-enter Prague in the utmoſt diſorder. A third time prince Charles of Lorrain, with four thouſand men, made a ſally on the little ſide of the city. His troops took an arrow defended by fifty ſoldiers, but they were ſoon repulſed by Retzow, and purſued to the very gates.

During this ſiege, the Pruſſians had not only enemies but the elements themſelves to combat: a violent ſtorm and deſcending rains ſuddenly ſwelled the waters of the Moldau, the impetuoſity of which broke the bridge of Branick, and carried it away toward the bridge of Prague. The enemy took twenty-four pontoons; twenty others eſcaped them, and were recovered at Podoli.

The great number of bombs thrown by the Pruſſians into Prague had conſiderably damaged certain quarters of the city, and had even conſumed one of the bakeries. All the deſerters aſſerted proviſions began to fail, and that, inſtead of butcher's meat, the garriſon fed on horſe fleſh. It was vexatious to perceive that neither

force nor ſtratagem prevailed againſt the city, and that all hope depended on time. Famine and deſpair only could force prince Charles to cut his way through the beſiegers; for they were ſo fortified, in their quarters, that he muſt have been obliged, after ſome fruitleſs efforts, to have ſurrendered.

The project of taking Prague, with the army by which it was defended, muſt however have ſucceeded, would time have permitted to have brought it to maturity; but marſhal Daun was to be oppoſed, a battle was to be fought, and misfortune was the reſult.

We have left the prince of Bevern encamped at Kuttenberg, and marſhal Daun at Haber. Here the marſhal was joined by all the garriſons the court could ſend from the hereditary ſtates, and the troops of Hungary, excluſive of the fugitives from the battle of Prague; ſo that his army, only fourteen thouſand ſtrong at the commencement of the campaign, then contained ſixty thouſand men. The increaſe of this army deranged all the combined preceding projects of the king: it was neceſſary to reinforce the prince of Bevern, that he might ſupport himſelf againſt an army which tripled his own force; yet was it dangerous to enfeeble the beſieging army, which had a vaſt circumference to defend,

fend, and which might daily expect to be attacked by forty thouſand men, incloſed within the walls. Means however were found, by œconomy of poſts, fortifying ſome, and narrowing others, to make a detachment of ten battalions and twenty ſquadrons. Theſe troops might depart, but not for any length of time, or the blockade muſt have ſuffered. In order to take Prague, and the army by which it was defended, marſhal Daun muſt indiſpenſably be driven from theſe parts; becauſe that the troops employed in the circumvallation, though well poſted to repulſe ſallies, formed but one line, and could not at once defend themſelves in front and rear; and becauſe that, leaving the army to be incloſed round Prague, the Pruſſians would have wanted ſubſiſtence, the cavalry being already obliged to go four or five miles from the camp, in ſearch of forage.

Theſe important conſiderations determined the king to head the detachment that was to join the prince of Bevern, that he might perſonally judge of the part it was neceſſary to take. On the 13th of June the king left Prague: Treſkow was detached at the ſame time to clear the banks of the Saſſawa, which began to be infeſted by the light troops of marſhal Daun. The king purſued his march through Schwartz

Koſtelitz, to Malotitz, where he was joined by Treſkow, who had taken the route to the right. The intention of the king was to arrive at Kolin, and join the prince of Bevern. He found a conſiderable corps in his front, encamped at Zafmuky, commanded by general Nadaſti, who had taken this poſition, and in ſome manner cut off the prince of Bevern from the Pruſſian army. Two columns were diſcovered at a diſtance, on the road of Kolin, taking the route to Kaurzim, and from the party ſent to reconnoitre it was learned that this was the prince of Bevern, coming to join the king. The day declined and night arrived before the prince, by which the king was obliged to remain ſatisfied with encamping the troops as well as darkneſs would permit. He was aſtoniſhed at the motion of the prince, which was unexpected. It was occaſioned by what had paſſed on the eve. He had been attacked, on the 13th, at Kuttenberg, by Nadaſti, whom he had repulſed; while marſhal Daun made a motion upon his flank, which had obliged him, that it might not be turned, to quit his poſition of Kuttenberg, and aſſume that of Kolin. Here he received information that the Auſtrians, encamped at Wiſoka, prepared to attack him on the morrow. That he might run no riſk he rather choſe to depart

and meet the Pruſſian detachment, which he knew was on its march to reinforce him, than wait the attack.

On the 16th the king wiſhed to reconnoitre the roads of Wiſoka, that he might judge of the diſpoſition of the enemy; but this could not be performed, becauſe of the thick foreſts and the numerous pandours by which they were infeſted. The ſame day four thouſand Croats attacked a convoy, coming from Nymburg to the army, eſcorted by two hundred foot, under the command of major Billerbeck, of the regiment of Henry. This brave officer defended himſelf for three hours againſt his numerous aſſailants, till the arrival of ſuccour, by which he was relieved, without having loſt the ſmalleſt part of his convoy, and with only ſeven wounded; a very inconſiderable number when we recollect the ſtrength of the corps by which he was attacked. Such petty details are only ſo far worthy of hiſtory as they are exemplary of the effects of fortitude, and good diſpoſition, in war.

The ground on which the Pruſſians encamped was not ſufficiently advantageous, to wait for the enemy in ſafety. The king wiſhed to march to Scwoiſchitz, the vicinage of which was ſuſceptible of defence; but ſcarcely was this under-

taken before the army of marſhal Daun made its appearance, and formed near Scwoiſchitz, in a kind of triangle, with the left toward Zaſmuky, the right toward the Elbe, and the front oppoſite Kaurzim and Malotitz, covered by a marſhy meadow, through which a rivulet ran. This motion of the enemy (17th) produced a neceſſary change in the diſpoſition of the Pruſſians. The army took another direction, inclined more to the left, approached Nymburg, and encamped, having Planiany to the left of its front, and its right at Kaurzim, into which a battalion was thrown to ſecure the flank. A corps of Auſtrians was encountered near Planiany, the intention of which could only be to ſeize on the proviſions of the Pruſſians at Nymburg. This corps was obliged to retreat, and to take poſt on a height behind Planiany, where it remained all night.

The ſituation of the king daily became more critical and difficult; his poſition was bad, his camp narrow, ſhut up between mountains; his front indeed was unapproachable, becauſe of the marſh and rivulet which ſeparated the armies; but ſo was not his right, ill ſupported at Kaurzim, and which marſhal Daun had the power to turn when he pleaſed, by inclining from Zaſmuky toward Malotitz. Had the enemy

enemy made this motion the army muſt have been taken in flank, and beaten without reſource.

The objects to accompliſh were too numerous and too contradictory to be reconciled; yet to neglect any one would be of conſiderable prejudice. The magazines of Brandeis and Nymburg were to be covered, from which the army of obſervation derived bread; and the blockade of Prague protected, by preventing, with a feeble corps, an army doubly ſuperior from making approaches, or detaching troops. The more the inferiority of the Pruſſians became evident the more had they to dread ſome conſiderable check; for, ſuppoſing they could even maintain the camp in which they lay, the impoſſibility of preventing marſhal Daun from ſending a large detachment, which proceeding beſide the Saſſawa ſhould come on the back of the Pruſſians, encamped between Branick and Michele, was not the leſs. Thus the beſieging army, attacked in rear while prince Charles of Lorrain ſhould make a ſally, would be between two fires, and conſequently entirely beaten.

Should the king retire to Koſteletz, or Teutſchbrodt, he there would find camps more advantageous, but the inconveniencies juſt mentioned

tioned would ſtill ſubſiſt; for, by approaching the Elbe, and covering the magazines, the road toward Prague would be left open; and, by inclining toward the Saſſawa, to protect the ſiege, the magazines would be left uncovered, and this loſs muſt be immediate; not to mention that, by giving ground in a country where there was forage, the army muſt retire into one more cloſe and exhauſted, the proviſions of which had already been conſumed.

Conſiderations ſtill more forcible preſented themſelves. Marſhal Daun commanded an army of ſixty thouſand men, aſſembled by the empreſs queen at a great expence. Was it to be preſumed that, having ſo many troops in Bohemia, the court would with impunity ſuffer that the Pruſſians ſhould take prince Charles of Lorrain and forty thouſand men priſoners in Prague, and in preſence of this army? It was even known that marſhal Daun had orders to riſk every thing for the deliverance of the prince. It therefore was to be determined whether the enemy ſhould be left to attack the Pruſſians in their poſt, or by aſſault prevent aſſault. Add to this that, ſince marſhal Daun had become ſo ſtrong, it was impoſſible to take Prague without a ſecond victory; and it would have been ſhameful to have raiſed the ſiege at the approach

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of the enemy, ſince the worſt that could happen was to abandon the place, ſhould the enemy be victorious.

Independent of what has hitherto been ſaid, there was a ſtill more important reaſon: by gaining another battle the king would have an entire ſuperiority over the Imperialiſts. The princes of the empire, who already began to waver, would have conjured him to grant them a neutrality; the operations of the French in Germany would have been deranged, and perhaps impeded; the Swedes would have become more pacific and circumſpect: even the court of Peterſburg would have taken time to reflect, becauſe the king would have been enabled to ſend ſuccours to his Pruſſian army without any riſk, and to that of the duke of Cumberland likewiſe. Such were the weighty reaſons that induced the king to attack marſhal Daun on the morrow.

Early on the morning of the 18th the march began. Treſkow, with the van-guard, diſlodged the corps that had encamped, the evening before, on the heights behind Planiany. This was neceſſary as a preliminary ſtep in order to clear the road of Kolin, on which the army was to march in two columns. It filed off to the left in two lines in preſence of the enemy.

enemy. Marſhal Daun, diſcovering this motion, immediately changed his front, and marching to the right, proceeded on the top of the hills which inclined toward Kolin. Nadaſti was placed before the army of the king, with from four to five thouſand huſſars, that were driven from ground to ground by a corps of cavalry; but this retarded the march of the columns. Theſe light troops were continually preſſed upon till an eminence was gained, which muſt neceſſarily be occupied to attack the enemy.

As the troops did not arrive with that promptitude which might have been deſired, the king profited by the interim to aſſemble his general officers, and with them to concert the plan of the battle. There was an inn adjoining the road on which the troops marched. Here the order in which marſhal Daun had arranged his forces, and the ground on which it was neceſſary to act, were diſtinctly ſeen. At this place the following meaſures were taken. It was reſolved to attack the right of the enemy, becauſe it was ill ſupported, and the ground was the moſt acceſſible. The Auſtrian front extended over rugged and ſteep rocks, at the foot of which were villages, in the plain, filled with pandours. But the more impregnable they

were on this ſide the leſs were they ſo on the right. The place where the left of the Pruſſians was to attack was the height which they already occupied. From this a lonely churchyard preſented itſelf, defended by Croats, which muſt be carried; afterward, turning a little to the left, the army of Daun would be taken in flank and rear. This attack, to be ſupported, muſt be ſupplied with all the Pruſſian infantry; for which reaſon the king propoſed entirely to refuſe his right to the enemy, and ſeverely forbad the officers who commanded it to paſs beyond the high road of Kolin. This was the more reaſonable becauſe that part of the Auſtrian army, poſted oppoſite his right, occupied ground that could not be approached. Had the poſition the king preſcribed been obſerved, he would have been enabled, during the action, to file off ſuch battalions as might be wanted, to ſuſtain the brigades that made the firſt attack.

In addition, general Ziethen had orders to make head againſt Nadaſti, with forty ſquadrons, that the Pruſſian army might not be moleſted in its operations: the remainder of the cavalry was placed in reſerve in the rear. When every thing was regulated, general Hulſen departed, at the head of ſeven battalions and

and fourteen cannon, to begin the action. Of twenty-four battalions, that remained, ſix formed the ſecond line, and fifteen the firſt *.

Such was the diſpoſition which would have rendered the Pruſſians victorious, had it been followed. We ſhall relate what actually happened.

Ziethen attacked the corps of Nadaſti, which was generally routed, and purſued to Kolin, ſo that it was ſeparated from the Auſtrians, and diſabled from affording the leaſt impediment, during the action, to the plans of the king. At one o'clock Hulſen attacked the churchyard, and the village on the height, where he met with no great reſiſtance. He next maſtered two batteries, each of twelve pieces. Every thing was ſucceſsful, during this firſt attack; but here follow the errors which occaſioned the loſs of the battle. Prince Maurice, who led the left of the infantry, inſtead of ſupporting it behind the village that Hulſen had carried, formed it at the diſtance of a thouſand paces from the height. This line was in the air. The king perceived the fault, and brought it near the foot of the height, while a warm

* Either there is an error in the preſs, or, the king has omitted to mention in what manner the remainder was employed. T.

firing

firing was heard on the right. Obliged to haſten, and incapable of acting otherwiſe, he filled the ſpaces he found in his line by the battalions of the ſecond: he then repaired to the right, to learn the cauſe of the firing in queſtion. He found Mannſtein *, who had engaged ſo unſeaſonably at the battle of Prague, had again committed a ſimilar error. He perceived ſome pandours, in a village near the road maintained by the column. Theſe he took a fancy to diſlodge, entered the village contrary to orders, drove away the enemy, purſued, and found himſelf under the fire of the caſe-ſhot, from the Auſtrian batteries. He was attacked in turn, and the right of the infantry marched to his ſupport. At the time the king arrived the affair had become ſo ſerious that there were no means of retreating, without the loſs of the battle. The left was preſently in like manner engaged, which the commanders however might have prevented. The action became general, and it was afflicting for the

* The king recounts the death of Mannſtein, at the battle of Prague. Perhaps this is a miſtake. It appears however that there were ſeveral Mannſteins, for the name again recurs after the death of the preſent, which ſoon follows. The Mannſtein here mentioned is the general whoſe memoirs the world is in poſſeſſion of, tranſlated by the immortal Hume. T.

king

king to remain a ſpectator, without having one battalion in reſerve, of which he could diſpoſe. Marſhal Daun, like a great general, profited by the errors of the Pruſſians. He filed off his reſerve, in the rear of his front, and attacked Hulſen, who till then was victorious. Hulſen ſtill maintained his ground; and, could four freſh battalions have been ſent to his aid, the victory would have been gained. The Auſtrian reſerve was repulſed; the dragoons of Normann fell upon the enemy's infantry, diſperſed it, and took five pair of colours. They next attacked the Saxon carabineers, whom they drove to Kolin. Meantime, the Pruſſian infantry, of the center and the right, had gained ſome ground, without however any conſiderable advantage. Theſe battalions, having all ſuffered by the cannon and fire of ſmall arms, being half cut off, left intervals of thrice the ſpace they ought to have done; and, as there were neither ſecond line nor reſerve, the intervals could only be filled by regiments of cuiraſſiers, placed at ſome diſtance in the rear of theſe intervals. The Pruſſian regiment of cavalry even attacked a body of the enemy's infantry, which it would have deſtroyed, had not a caſe-ſhot battery timely played upon it, by which it was repulſed

in

in confuſion, and threw the regiments of Bevern and Henry in its rear into diſorder. This the enemy immediately perceived, profited by the moment, attacked with the cavalry, and confuſion became univerſal. The king wiſhed to charge with the cuiraſſiers that were at hand, and who might in part have repaired the evil; but he found it impoſſible to put them in motion. He had recourſe to two ſquadrons of Truchſes' regiment, took the enemy's cavalry in flank, and ſent it back to the foot of its hills. Of the line of infantry, there remained only the firſt battalion of guards which ſtill kept its ground on the right; it had repulſed four battalions of infantry and two regiments of cavalry, by which it had been attempted to be ſurrounded: but a ſingle battalion, however brave, cannot gain a battle.

Hulſen, with his infantry and ſome cavalry, that had been ſent him, ſtill maintained the ground from which he had driven the Auſtrians at the commencement of the action. Here he remained till nine o'clock, when he and the whole army were obliged to retire. Prince Maurice led the troops to Nymburg, where he paſſed the Elbe, without being purſued by a ſingle huſſar of the enemy. This

action coſt the king eight thouſand of his beſt infantry. He loſt ſixteen cannon, which could not be carried off, the horſes having been killed. After he had given orders to his generals, concerning the retreat of the troops, he haſtened with all ſpeed to his army at Prague, where he could not arrive before the evening of the morrow; and diſpoſitions were made to raiſe the blockade of the city, which the fatal day of Kolin would no longer allow to be continued.

A ſingular circumſtance at the battle of Kolin was that the Auſtrian infantry began to retire, and the cavalry prepared to follow their example, when one colonel Ayaſſas, of his own proper motion, attacked the Pruſſian infantry, with his dragoons, at the very moment the cuiraſſiers of Pruſſia had put them in confuſion, and when ſucceſs occaſioned the firſt orders to be revoked. No doubt the embarraſſment of the Auſtrians, after ſo obſtinate a battle, prevented their purſuit of the Pruſſians. They were nevertheleſs victorious. Had marſhal Daun poſſeſſed more reſolution and activity, his army might certainly have arrived on the 20th before Prague, and the conſequences of the battle of Kolin would have become more fatal, to the Pruſſians, than defeat itſelf.

Early

Early on the morning of the 20th, the Pruſſians raiſed the blockade of Prague. The corps that had encamped toward Michéle retired, beyond the Elbe, through Alt-Buntzlau, and Brandeis, to join the army of Kolin, that encamped at Nymburg. The corps of marſhal Keith was to retire to Welwarn, to cover the magazines of Leutmeritz, and Auſſig. Contrarieties happened. The bridges were not removed with ſufficient promptitude; delay ſucceeded, and marſhal Keith could not quit his camp before eleven o'clock. The Pruſſians had left Michéle by three in the morning. Prince Charles, who had received intelligence of the victory of Daun, prepared to make a ſally on the troops of marſhal Keith, that were about to raiſe the piquet guard. He came from the city on the little ſide, and hotly cannonaded the two Pruſſian columns, as they retired by the convent of Victory. The grenadiers of the rear-guard calmed the impetuoſity of the enemy; and the prince of Pruſſia took a poſition at Reeſin, where he protected the retreat. The Pruſſians only loſt two hundred men, killed and wounded, in this affair. Prince Charles took two three-pounders, the horſes of which were killed; which was the ſole trophy he acquired.

The corps with which the king had marched to Brandeis took, on the morrow, the camp of Liſſa, where it was joined by the remaining troops from Kolin. It was falſely ſuppoſed that marſhal Daun would act againſt the army of the king, and prince Charles againſt that of marſhal Keith. The Auſtrians loſt much time in bringing up their magazines; and the two Auſtrian armies formed a junction, at Brandeis, a week afterward. The prince of Pruſſia took the command of the army of Liſſa, with which he marched to Jung-Buntzlau, and ſoon after to Böhmiſch Leippa. The king took the road to Melnick, with a reinforcement, to join marſhal Keith, and paſſed the Elbe at Leutmeritz.

In order however not to loſe a communication with the prince of Pruſſia, he left prince Henry, with a detachment, at Trebotſchau, on the right ſhore of the Elbe. The army of the king extended over the plain, between Leutmeritz and Lowoſitz.

Some battalions occupied the Paſcopol, and the defile of Welmina. The paſſes of Saxony were guarded by troops newly levied.

The town of Leutmeritz (July) had ſerved as a depoſit, during the ſiege of Prague; and was the grand magazine and hoſpital of the army.

army. Situated in a bottom, this town cannot be defended, except by camps that ſhall occupy the ſurrounding hills. As the troops arrived, care was taken to diſencumber it of the ſick, ammunition, and artillery, that were guarded here. No activity, or haſte, with theſe tranſports, could complete them before the 20th of July. At the commencement of this month Nadaſti approached the army, encamped at Gaſtorf, in preſence of the corps of prince Henry, and made every effort to interrupt the communication which the Pruſſians held, between the camps of Leutmeritz and Leippa. This he did without difficulty, by ſending his pandours into the foreſts, and defiles, which are numerous in this part of Bohemia.

On the left of the Elbe, only a ſmall corps of Auſtrians appeared, commanded by general Laudon. This partiſan, at the head of two thouſand pandours, took poſt at the foot of the Paſcopol, whence he infeſted the high roads, diſturbed the detachments, and gained inconſiderable advantages. That in which he was moſt ſucceſsful was fatal to Mannſtein, famous for having begun the battle of Prague, and having occaſioned the loſs of victory at Kolin. This general was on his road to Saxony, that he

might there have his wounds cured. He was eſcorted by two hundred newly raiſed men. Laudon attacked him; his eſcort was thrown into diſorder; Mannſtein left his carriage, drew his ſword, furiouſly defended himſelf, and, refuſing to receive quarter, fell dead on the ſpot.

War was carried on with greater vigour in the parts where the prince of Pruſſia commanded. Prince Charles of Lorrain and marſhal Daun, after their junction, quitted Brandeis, and followed the prince. They encamped at Nimes, where they turned his left flank, and gained a march on the Pruſſians toward Gabel. General Puttkammer defended the caſtle of that town, whither he had been ſent, by the prince of Pruſſia, with four battalions, to protect the convoys that arrived at his army from Zittau. Had the prince marched immediately to Gabel, the Auſtrians would have gained nothing by their motion. But, not at firſt perceiving its conſequences, he remained tranquilly in his camp, and ſuffered the enemy to act as he pleaſed. Marſhal Daun ſent a detachment of twenty thouſand men, to attack Puttkammer at Gabel. The general, after a vigorous reſiſtance, when the trenches had been three days opened, not being ſuccoured, was obliged

obliged to ſurrender priſoner of war. After the loſs of this poſt, the prince of Pruſſia underſtood its importance. The high road from this camp to Zittau was through Gabel; which being interdicted, the remaining road led through Rumburg, but was ſome miles longer, and could only be paſſed by one column. This the army was obliged to take, and loſt its baggage and ſome pontoons, that were broken, in the narrow roads, between the rocks. The prince arrived at Zittau by deſcribing an arch, and marſhal Daun by the chord of that arch. General Schmettau, who commanded the van of the Pruſſians, as he approached Zittau, found the Auſtrians eſtabliſhed on Eckartſberg, the poſt the moſt important in that vicinity, and one which commands the town and the environs. The army of the prince of Pruſſia occupied a height that faced the camp of the enemy, with the town of Zittau before his right, between the two armies, and his left extended toward the hill of Hennerſdorf. The prince might ſupport the town, though he could not prevent it from being inſulted by the Imperialiſts. Excited by prince Charles of Saxony, marſhal Daun bombarded the town. The ſtreets of Zittau are narrow; moſt of the roofs are boarded; theſe took fire,

and the planks communicated the conflagration to ſeveral quarters of the town at once; the houſes fell and paſſage was ſtopt by their ruins. The prince ſaw the neceſſity of withdrawing the garriſon. The troops of the oppoſite ſide could not regain the army, becauſe of the flames and ruins in their way, by which means colonel Dierke, with a hundred and fifty pioneers, and colonel Kleiſt, with eighty men of the regiment of the margrave Henry, were taken by the enemy.

As the town of Zittau was in itſelf of no conſequence, this misfortune was only felt becauſe of the conſiderable magazine which was there. After it was conſumed by the flames, the army of the prince of Pruſſia being obliged to derive ſubſiſtence and bread from Dreſden, theſe muſt have been brought twelve miles, before they could arrive at the camp; and, as the difficulties of ſuch tranſportation were inſurmountable, the prince was obliged to approach his proviſions. He decamped from Zittau, without being followed by the enemy, and choſe a poſition for the army in the vicinage of Bautzen.

When the king was informed of the loſs of Gabel, he propoſed to evacuate Leutmeritz, and return into Saxony. The town of Leutmeritz was empty; the ammunition and proviſions had arrived

arrived at Dreſden; and, as there was no time to loſe, prince Henry paſſed the Elbe. After he had joined the king, the army encamped between Sulowitz and Lowoſitz. (Auguſt) Nadaſti, who had followed the rear of the prince, attacked the grand guards of the camp: warmly received, and repulſed with loſs, he repaſſed the Elbe with promptitude. The following days the army retired to Linay; and from thence to Nöllendorf and Pirna. A detachment of two hundred newly raiſed men, who guarded the Schreckenſtein, was attacked and taken by Laudon. The poſts of Auſſig and Tetſchen were evacuated without loſs. The king left prince Maurice, at Giſhubel, with fourteen battalions and ten ſquadrons, to defend that paſs, and marched with the remaining troops, deſirous to join the prince of Pruſſia at Bautzen. The prince, who had fallen ill, quitted the army and languiſhed ever after. The king advanced, with a detachment, from Bautzen to Weiſſenberg, whence he diſlodged general Beck, who retreated toward Bernſtadt. The arrangements neceſſary for the re-eſtabliſhment of order in ſubſiſtence, and the preparation of new cheſts, retarded the king a fortnight. Preſſed by the progreſs of the French on his right, and the Ruſſians on his left, he was obliged to make detachments.

tachments. This inſpired him with the project of marching to the Auſtrians, and ridding himſelf of them, before he ſhould be too feeble. On the 16th, he departed for Bernſtadt, heading the column of the left, and the prince of Brunſwick that of the right. They thought to ſurround Beck, on the hill near Sohland, and this partiſan could only eſcape by loſing a part of his men. At Bernſtadt, information was received that a detachment of the enemy had aſſembled at Oſtritz. Hither Werner was ſent, and was on the point of taking Nadaſti, whoſe baggage and the troops that eſcorted him fell into his hands. Among his papers were found original letters, from the queen of Poland, informing this general of all ſhe knew, concerning the Pruſſians, and propoſing projects of ſurpriſe. The king ſent the originals to Finck, governor of Dreſden, that he might ſhew them the queen, in order that ſhe might underſtand her proceedings were known.

The king detached (17th) five battalions from Bernſtadt, to take poſt at Görlitz, and marched with the main army immediately toward the Auſtrians. Marſhal Daun was encamped at the Eckartſberg. He had but a motion to make with his troops, to preſent his front to the Pruſſians. This poſt was not to be attacked. A hill

hill on the left, cut in the form of a baſtion, and defended by ſixty twelve pounders, flanked the half of his army. In the van of his front the village of Wittgenau lay, in a bottom, through which runs a rivulet, between ſteep rocks. Three roads preſented themſelves, which led to the enemy through this village, the largeſt of which was wide enough for a carriage. The right of the marſhal was ſupported by the Neiſſe, beyond which river Nadaſti was encamped, with the reſerve of the army, on a height; whence, with thirty heavy cannon, he could ſweep the whole front of the Imperial army.

The main armies were only ſeparated by the hollow way of Wittgenau, and the day was paſſed (18th) in a reciprocal cannonade. On the morrow a corps, under the command of Winterfeld, croſſed the Neiſſe at Hirſchfeld, to reconnoitre whether ſome means might not be found of engaging Nadaſti, which would have induced Daun to ſuccour him, and might have brought on a battle. But the difficulty of ground again oppoſed this plan, and it was renounced. Nothing however could be more advantageous for the king, under his preſent circumſtances, than a deciſive action. He had no time to loſe. A body of French was at Erfurt. The army of the duke of Cumberland was cooped up at Stade.

Stade. The dutchy of Magdebourg, and the old March, were expoſed to the incurſions of the French. The Swediſh army had paſſed the Peene, near Anclam. The troops of the circles were in motion, toward Saxony. Yet did the impoſſibility of engaging, on ground ſo difficult and impracticable, and the neceſſity of making immediate detachments, oblige the king to retire (20th.) The infantry retreated in a line, which the enemy pretended not to perceive. The army marched to Bernſtadt, and encamped on the heights of Jauernick, as far as the Neiſſe, beyond which the corps of Winterfeld extended to Radomeritz. A detachment was ſent to the relief of the brigade of Görlitz, with which Grumbkow was ordered to repair to Sileſia, to clear the frontiers of the enemy's parties, that committed diſorders there, and at the ſame time to watch for the ſecurity of the fortreſs of Schweidnitz.

The king gave the command of the army to the prince of Bevern (25th) in conjunction with general Winterfeld, in whom he really confided. They were particularly recommended carefully to cover the frontiers of Sileſia, after which he departed, with eighteen battalions and thirty ſquadrons, to oppoſe the French and the troops of the empire. That we might not interrupt the incidents

incidents of the campaign, which were each connected with the other, we have made no mention of the campaign of the allied army, under the command of the duke of Cumberland, of which it is at preſent neceſſary to give a ſhort recapitulation.

At the beginning of April, the French took poſſeſſion of the towns of Cleves and Weſel, without encountering oppoſition. The count de Giſors ſeized on Cologne, which the French deſigned to make a place of arms. Marſhal d'Etrées, who was to take the command of the army, arrived there in the beginning of May, and advanced, on the 26th, with all his forces, and encamped at Munſter. The duke of Cumberland collected his troops at Bielefeld, whence he had ſent a detachment to Paderborn, at the approach of d'Etrées, whoſe army encamped at Rheda. The duke retired to Herford, on which the French ſent a detachment into Heſſe; which, meeting with no oppoſition, ſeized on the whole landgraviate. Caſſel itſelf (the capital) ſurrendered after a feeble reſiſtance.

The duke of Cumberland, not intending to maintain his ground till he had paſſed the Weſer, according to the plan of the Hanoverian miniſtry, who believed the paſſage of this river more difficult than that of the Rhine, croſſed

(July)

(July) with his troops over bridges that he had prepared in the villages of Rhemun and Vlotho. He gave orders, in the mean time, that the fortifications of the towns of Munden and Hameln ſhould be haſtened. This was thinking tardily. The French inclined toward Corbie. One of their detachments, having paſſed the Weſer, occaſioned the duke to change his poſition, and he encamped with his right at Hameln, and his left at Afferde. The duke of Orleans, in the interim, threw bridges over the Weſer, to croſs at Munden. The duke of Cumberland, who expected ſoon to be attacked, called in all his detachments, and aſſembled them at Haſtenbeck, the poſition of which had been deſcribed to him as admirable. The right of his army was there well ſupported, and the centre retreated elbowing. In his front was a wood, and in this wood a conſiderable ravin.

The French army approached the allies, who were reconnoitred by d'Etrées on the 25th, while he was cannonaded by the duke of Cumberland. On the morrow the French attacked his left, by gliding through this ravin at the bottom of the wood, and carried the centre battery of the allies. This the hereditary prince of Brunſwick recovered, ſword in hand; by which firſt eſſay he ſhewed nature had deſtined him

a hero. Meantime a Hanoverian colonel, Breitenbach, took upon himſelf to collect the firſt battalions he met, entered the wood, fell upon the French in the rear, expelled them, and ſeized their cannon and colours. Every body ſuppoſed the battle gained. D'Etrées, who ſaw his troops routed, had given orders for retreat. Theſe the duke of Orleans oppoſed. At length, to the great aſtoniſhment of the whole French army, they learned that the duke of Cumberland was on the full march, retreating to Hameln. The hereditary prince was obliged to abandon the battery he had with ſo much glory recovered; and the retreat was made with ſuch precipitation that the brave colonel Breitenbach even, whoſe merits were ſo conſpicuous on that day, was forgotten. This worthy officer remained ſingly the maſter of the field, and departed by night to join the army, bringing his trophies to the duke, who wept in deſpair, to perceive he had been ſo haſty to quit a field which was no longer diſputed.

Not all the remonſtrances of the duke of Brunſwick (Auguſt) and the generals of his army could diſſuade him from continuing to retreat. He marched firſt to Nienburg, and afterward to Verden; whence, through Rotenburg, and Bremervörde, he took the road for Stade. By this

this falſe manœuvre, he abandoned the whole country to the diſcretion of the French. Hameln was immediately occupied by the duke of Fitz-james.

What was moſt remarkable, and ſingular, on this occaſion, was that marſhal d'Etrées was recalled, for having gained a victory. The duke de Richelieu, on whom the court beſtowed the command of the army, arrived on the 7th at Munden. He took Hanover, the duke d'Ayen Brunſwick, and M. le Voyer Wolfenbuttle. Richelieu ſent the prince de Soubiſe, with a detachment of twenty-five thouſand men, to Erfurt; where he was to be joined by the army of the circles, and a detachment of Auſtrians. The duke himſelf purſued the allies, paſſed the Aller, and encamped at Verden. D'Armentieres meantime ſeized on Bremen, on the 1ſt of September. The French army advanced toward Rotenburg, with an intent to attack the duke of Cumberland, but did not find him there: he had already retreated to Bremervörde, avoiding, after the battle of Haſtenbeck, all engagement with the enemy.

No ſooner did the king perceive, by the manœuvres of the duke of Cumberland, that he confined himſelf to the defence of the Weſer, than he foreſaw what would be the reſult, and recalled

recalled the ſix battalions he had in that army, to throw them into Magdebourg; which he did very ſeaſonably, as we ſhall hereafter perceive.

By what we have ſaid, it will be ſeen the dutchy of Magdebourg was menaced with invaſion, and the city with a ſiege, by the French; that Saxony was to become the prey of the army which aſſembled at Erfurt; that the garriſons of Dreſden and Torgau were to be taken; and finally that Berlin, a metropolis without defence, was on the point of being invaded by the Swedes, who had penetrated into the Uckerane March, and who there found only a handful of men to oppoſe their progreſs. Under ſuch circumſtances, the moſt preſſing reaſons required a body of troops ſhould march againſt ſo many enemies. The king accordingly put himſelf at the head of a few forces, that he might not enfeeble his army of Sileſia, which had the moſt formidable foe to combat.

The prince of Bevern, with whom remained fifty battalions (Auguſt 31ſt) and one hundred and ten ſquadrons, encamped, after the departure of the king, at the Landeſkrone, near Görlitz. Winterfeld placed his detachment beyond the Neiſſe, on the Holtzberg, near the village of Moys. The prince tranſported his

magazine from Bautzen to Görlitz. Marſhal Daun and prince Charles (September) encamped oppoſite him, at Auſſig; and detached Nadaſti to Schönberg, to obſerve Winterfeld. Count Kaunitz had lately arrived at the Auſtrian army, perſonally to regulate the remaining operations of the campaign, with the generals. Nadaſti, to pay his court to the count, propoſed attacking the poſt of Winterfeld, on the Holtzberg. This poſt was only held by two battalions; ten others of the ſame corps encamped three thouſand paces in the rear, near Görlitz. The day on which the attack was made (the 7th) general Winterfeld was with the prince of Bevern, with whom he had ſome arrangements to make. Information was brought him that the enemy attacked his poſt; thither he haſtened, but the Holtzberg was carried before his arrival. Deſirous to diſlodge the enemy, he advanced at the head of four battalions, and had the misfortune to be mortally wounded. Nadaſti, ſatisfied with the advantage he had gained, voluntarily retreated to Schönberg. The Pruſſians there loſt twelve hundred men, and many brave officers. General Winterfeld died of his wound; and was the more regretted, under the preſent circumſtances, becauſe he was the man moſt neceſſary to the army of the prince of Bevern.

The

The king had depended wholly on him, in the meaſures he had taken, for the defence of Sileſia. The day after this affair, the prince ſtruck his camp, and repaired through Catholiſch Hennerſdorf and Naumburg to Lignitz, neglecting to take the camp of Löwenberg, or that of Schmutſeifen, by which he would have covered Sileſia. Not ſatisfied with abandoning the frontiers, he farther enfeebled himſelf by detaching fifteen thouſand men, whom he threw into different places. Theſe were the errors that brought on all his misfortunes, at the cloſe of the campaign.

Marſhal Daun followed the Pruſſians, and marched by Löwenberg and Goldberg, encamping on the heights of Wahlſtadt. The Pruſſians were in a bottom, with their right at Lignitz, the Katzbach in their rear, and their left at the village of Beckren. From this ſituation they had every thing to fear. An enterpriſing enemy would have reaped his advantage. Daun was not ſo. One afternoon, animated by wine and the diſcourſe of the chevalier de Montazet, prince Charles wiſhed to gain ſome advantage over the enemy, and cauſed eight or ten battalions of grenadiers with artillery to advance and attack the village of Beckren. This detachment was too feeble to oppoſe an

army; it was not ſuſtained, and was repulſed by the troops that the prince of Bevern ordered to advance from the line, to ſupport the village. The Pruſſian regiment of infantry particularly diſtinguiſhed itſelf, on this occaſion. The attempt taught the prince of Bevern what the badneſs of his ſituation was, how ill he had choſen his camp, and to what dangers he was expoſed. Fearing to be attacked on the morrow with more conſiderable force, he repaſſed the Katzbach by night; and on his march to Parchwitz encountered an Imperial corps, that diſputed the paſſage of the Katzbach. He threw bridges over the Oder, paſſed this river and repaired, October the firſt, on the right ſide of the Oder, to Breſlau. Croſſing once more over the bridge of the city, he took poſt behind the ſmall rivulet of the Lohe, and threw up intrenchments. The Auſtrians faced him at Liſſa. The court of Vienna had negotiated for troops, with the elector of Bavaria and the duke of Wurtemberg, and ſent them at this time into Sileſia. Theſe corps joined the reſerve, under Nadaſti, in the environs of Schweidnitz, to which they were to lay ſiege. We will for a moment ſuſpend the narrative of the campaign of Sileſia (September) to attend the king on his expedition againſt the French.

The

The king firſt went to Dreſden, whence he detached Seidlitz, with a regiment of huſſars, and another of dragoons, to Leipſic, in order to purſue M. de Turpin, who with his light troops hovered about Halle. The French retired, at the approach of the Pruſſians; and Seidlitz, becoming uſeleſs in that part, rejoined the king between Grimma and Rötha, whence the troops marched to Pegau. Hither the enemy had detached the two Imperial regiments of huſſars, Ceczeni and Eſtherhaſi. This town is ſituated on the other ſide of the Elſter, over which is a ſtone bridge at the gate. The gate was garniſhed by the enemy, as were ſome of the neighbouring houſes, to forbid entrance. Seidlitz cauſed a hundred of huſſars to alight, who forced the gate; the main body of the regiment followed and entered Pegau full gallop. Seculi and Kleiſt, traverſing the town, left it through the oppoſite gate, and there found the two regiments of the enemy, poſted behind a hollow way. They attacked, routed, and purſued them to Zeitz; bringing back three hundred and fifty priſoners. On the morrow, the army of the king inclined to Naumburg. Here the van-guard met ſix ſquadrons of the troops that had been beaten the day before. They were ſoon diſperſed,

and loſt many men; particularly in paſſing the bridge of the Saale, near the Schul-Pforte. The bridge was repaired (September 8th), and the troops paſſed it, on their march to Buttſtett.

Here the news was received of the famous convention, ſigned, by the dukes of Cumberland and Richelieu, at Cloſter-Seven. This treaty was negotiated by one count Lynar, ambaſſador from the court of Denmark. It was ſtipulated that hoſtilities ſhould ceaſe; that the troops of Heſſe, Brunſwick, and Gotha, ſhould be ſent back into their reſpective countries; that thoſe of Hanover ſhould remain quiet at Stade, on the other ſide of the Elbe, within a given diſtrict. Nothing was regulated concerning the electorate of Hanover, either reſpecting contributions or reſtitutions; ſo that this country was abandoned to the diſcretion of the French. Scarcely was the convention concluded before the duke of Cumberland, without waiting for its ratification, returned to England; and the duke de Richelieu prepared to make an invaſion into the principality of Halberſtadt.

About this time, the Pruſſian army intercepted ſome letters, from count Lynar to count Reuſs. Theſe men were of the ſect called Pietiſts. Count Lynar, ſpeaking to his friend

of

of the negotiation, ſaid—" The thought of " concluding this convention was a celeſtial in- " ſpiration. The Holy Ghoſt gave me the power " to ſtop the progreſs of the French arms; as " the ſun was formerly ſtopped by Joſhua. " The Almighty God, the governor of the " world, has employed me, an unworthy in- " ſtrument, to ſpare the effuſion of Lutheran " blood, of precious Hanoverian blood, which " was about to be ſhed."—As misfortune would have it, count Lynar was the only perſon who applauded count Lynar. We ſhall leave him, in company with Joſhua and the ſun, to return to more important affairs.

This diſgraceful convention completely deranged the affairs of the king. The army, as it was called, which he headed was eighteen thouſand ſtrong; yet from this was he obliged to make a detachment, that was either to cover Magdebourg or reinforce the garriſon. However, as the prince de Soubiſe was at Erfurt, he wiſhed to attempt driving him thence, that he might enfeeble himſelf with the leſs danger. To this effect, he advanced with two thouſand horſe, a free battalion, and two battalions of grenadiers, to Erfurt. Great was his ſurpriſe when he ſaw the French army decamp, from the Cyriacſburg, in his preſence. De Soubiſe, not

thinking himſelf in ſafety at Erfurt, retired to Gotha. Scarcely was he gone before the town was ſummoned to ſurrender; and it was agreed, by capitulation, that the Peterſberg ſhould remain neuter; that the town ſhould be occupied by the Pruſſians; and that the enemy ſhould evacuate the Cyriacſburg.

When the troops had aſſumed a kind of poſition near Erfurt, prince Ferdinand of Brunſwick left the army, with five battalions and ſeven ſquadrons, to cover Magdebourg, and oppoſe the duke de Richelieu (20th). Theſe he might ſtrengthen with ſix battalions, drawn from the city. But ſuch meaſures, the only ones that could be taken under preſent circumſtances, were feeble, and inſufficient to reſiſt fifty thouſand French. Prince Ferdinand, determined to ſupply by ability his want of means, made a circuit to reach Magdebourg. Marching through Egeln, he fell upon the regiment of Luſignan, four hundred of whom he took. He thence audaciouſly poſted himſelf at Wanſleben, where he ſeemed to defy the duke de Richelieu, who encamped at Halberſtadt. The Pruſſian parties had every where the ſuperiority over the French, during the cloſe of that campaign; and there were few days in which they did not bring in priſoners to the prince.

Under

Under the preſent circumſtances of the king, recourſe muſt be had to every means; ſtratagem, negotiation, all poſſible attempts muſt be made, to better the ſituation of affairs. Beſide that no ill could happen from making attempts, except the chagrin of having imagined fruitleſs expedients. With this intent, colonel Balby aſſumed the diſguiſe of a land-bailiff, that he might arrive at the duke de Richelieu. He was acquainted with the duke, with whom he had made ſome campaigns in Flanders. Balby was to make propoſals, to induce the court of Verſailles to entertain more mild and pacific ſentiments. He perceived that the duke de Richelieu, doubting of his own credit, did not believe he had ſufficient influence with the French miniſtry or the king to change their ſyſtem, or their opinion, reſpecting their alliance with the houſe of Auſtria; an alliance which, recently concluded, pleaſed by its novelty. This emiſſary, perceiving all he could urge produced no effect, reduced his demands to the requeſt that the duke would at leaſt ſpare, in part, thoſe provinces of the king into which he ſhould carry the war.

The king was ſoon obliged farther to enfeeble his army, by another detachment. He ſent prince Maurice to Leipſic, with ten battalions

lions and ten ſquadrons, there to maintain a central poſition; whence he would be ready either to join the king or prince Ferdinand, as ſhould be neceſſary; and where he might watch general Marſhall, encamped at Bautzen with fifteen thouſand Auſtrians; who inſpired the greater apprehenſion becauſe that, Luſatia being uncovered, there was reaſon to fear the general ſhould make an irruption into the electorate, and even proceed to Berlin. This capital was in like manner menaced by the Swedes, from the ſide of Pomerania. They were retarded in their progreſs by Manteufel, with five hundred huſſars and four battalions. After theſe two corps had quitted the camp of Erfurt, eight battalions and twenty-ſeven ſquadrons only remained with the king. Had the enemy perceived the weakneſs of this corps, it cannot be doubted but an attack muſt have enſued. This above all things was to be avoided, and recourſe was had to various expedients, to deceive the people of Erfurt and the French. For this reaſon, the troops did not encamp; the infantry was ſent into the neighbouring villages; the quarters were ſeveral times changed; and, as on each occaſion the names of the regiments were changed alſo, this multiplied the order of battle, which the ſpies were

were aſſiduouſly collecting, for the information of the prince de Soubiſe.

Two days after the Pruſſians (16th) had taken Erfurt, the king went, with twenty ſquadrons of huſſars and dragoons, on a reconnoitring party, toward Gotha, that he might attempt to diſlodge the two Imperial regiments of huſſars, that had ſo repeatedly been beaten. His ſucceſs was beyond his hopes; the dread in which theſe huſſars held the Pruſſians haſtened their retreat. They had a defile to paſs, near Gotha, where they loſt one hundred and eighty men. They were purſued even to within ſight of Eiſenach; where the prince de Soubiſe, who had been joined by the prince of Hildbourghauſen, general in chief of the army of the circles, was encamped. The ducal houſe (of Saxe Gotha) was delighted to ſee itſelf diſencumbered of gueſts ſo indiſcreet. It had equally to complain of the French and Auſtrians. The French had committed violence on the caſtle, from which they had carried off the cannon; and the Auſtrian officers, little reſpectful in their diſcourſe, had behaved with arrogance, very unſuitable to the ſovereign princes of the empire.

Seidlitz remained with the cavalry at Gotha, there to watch the motions of the enemy, and give

give timely information to the little army of Erfurt; that, if neceſſary, it might retreat, at the approach of the army of Eiſenach. A few days after, he was attacked by a very ſuperior corps. The prince of Hildbourghauſen, deſirous of ſignalizing his authority by ſome famous ſtroke, propoſed to the prince de Soubiſe to diſlodge the Pruſſians from Gotha. They began their march with their grenadiers, the Auſtrian cavalry, Laudon and his pandours, and all the light troops of the French army. Seidlitz had ſeaſonable information of the intended project. They preſently made their appearance. A column of cavalry paſſed on the right of Gotha, and over the heights which lead toward Thuringia. Another column of cavalry, preceded by the huſſars, came on the left from the ſide of Langenſaltza. The pandours, at the head of the grenadiers, formed the column of the centre.

Seidlitz had arranged his men, in order of battle, at a certain diſtance from Gotha; the huſſars on the firſt line, and the dragoons of Meinicke on the ſecond. The dragoons of Czettritz he had ſent to a defile, which lay half a mile in his rear, with orders to place themſelves on a ſingle line, to form an extenſive front, that he might deceive the enemy. This

This did not prevent the regiment from being entirely ready to protect his retreat, ſhould he be obliged to yield to numbers. Manœuvres ſo able, and a ſtratagem ſo artful, had their effect. (October 13th) The prince of Hildbourghauſen imagined the Pruſſian army, which he ſuppoſed to be conſiderable, was on its march to ſupport Seidlitz; and that he ſhould be inceſſantly attacked, by the grand line of cavalry which he diſcovered. From the wavering countenance of the Auſtrian huſſars, Seidlitz perceived his artifice had produced a proper impreſſion. He repulſed them inſenſibly; and, ſhock after ſhock, ſtill gaining ground, obliged them to repaſs the defile where, but a few days before, they had ſuffered ſo much. The column of cavalry, that compoſed the right of the enemy, retreated at the ſame time. Seidlitz then ſent ſome dragoons and huſſars into Gotha; who entered preciſely as the prince of Darmſtadt, with the troops of the circles, began to retire; and there made a number of priſoners. The precipitation with which the prince of Darmſtadt abandoned Gotha had nearly become fatal to the prince de Soubiſe, who was at the caſtle, and did not expect ſo prompt a retreat: he had only time to mount his horſe, and fly full ſpeed. A hundred and

ſixty ſoldiers, and three officers of note, were taken by the Pruſſians.

Any other general, except Seidlitz, would have applauded himſelf to have eſcaped, in ſuch a ſituation, without loſs. Seidlitz would not have been ſatisfied with himſelf, had he not derived gain. The example proves that the capacity and fortitude of the general are, in war, more deciſive than the number of his troops. A man of mediocrity, who ſhould perceive himſelf under ſuch circumſtances, diſcouraged by the awful appearance of the foe, would have retired as he approached, with the loſs of half his men, in a ſkirmiſh of the rear-guard, which the ſuperior cavalry of the enemy would have been in haſte to engage. The artful uſe made of the regiment of dragoons, extended and ſhown to the enemy at a diſtance, was highly glorious to general Seidlitz, in ſo difficult a ſituation.

Hitherto the king had been only able to keep affairs in ſuſpenſe; he could undertake nothing, and muſt wait the benefactions of time. He remained tranquilly at Erfurt, till he underſtood that a French detachment, from the army of Weſtphalia, was on its march, through Heſſe, to Langenſaltza. As he muſt not wait the arrival of this corps, which might fall

fall on his rear, he determined to retire previous to its approach. It was beſide rumoured that general Haddick traverſed Luſatia to penetrate into Brandenbourg; and that prince Maurice had been obliged to fly, that he might haſtily gain Torgau. It was probable the general would advance to Berlin. Having no ſuccour to expect, the king thought proper to remain no longer at Erfurt; and, that he might run no unſeaſonable riſk, he retreated to the Eckartſberg. Here frequent couriers arrived from Dreſden. Finck informed him a corps, under Marſhall, was on the point of quitting Bautzen, to follow that of Haddick; and it was certain prince Maurice was not ſufficiently in force to reſiſt the combined generals. This occaſioned the king to reſolve to bring him a reinforcement.

The troops repaſſed the Saale, at Naumburg. Marſhal Keith, with ſome battalions, threw himſelf into Leipſic. The king paſſed the Elbe at Torgau, and marched toward Annaberg; where he received intelligence that Berlin had eſcaped, for a contribution of two hundred thouſand crowns, paid to the Auſtrians; that Haddick had not waited for the arrival of prince Maurice; and that Manteufel remained inactive, in his camp at Bautzen.

The

The idea that firſt ſtruck the king was to cut off the retreat of Haddick. For this purpoſe, he repaired to Hertzberg. Prince Maurice was on his return, and the king wiſhed to wait for him, becauſe that Haddick had already repaſſed Kottbus. He remained in this poſition for ſome days, that he might underſtand what were the actual intentions of the French, which muſt decide the part he had to take; whether this ſhould be to oppoſe their enterpriſes, or, ſhould the campaign be ended in Thuringia, whether he ſhould return to Sileſia, for the relief of Schweidnitz, the ſiege of which was begun by general Nadaſti.

But the enemy induced the king to undertake operations (26th) which he could not then foreſee. The departure of the Pruſſians, from Erfurt, engaged the prince de Soubiſe to paſs the Saale, and approach Leipſic. Marſhal Keith ſent advice of this, warmly requeſting aid; and hither it was neceſſary to march, with all ſpeed. The king, on the 28th, immediately began his march to Leipſic. With his ſmall army, he cleared the right ſhore of the Mulde, where Cuſtine had advanced with ſome brigades; after which he entered Leipſic, and there was joined by prince Maurice, and prince Ferdinand of Brunſwick. The grand cauſeway

that

that leads to Lutzen was firſt ſecured. On the 30th, the army aſſembled, marched, and encamped at Altranſtædt; when Retzow was detached in advance, to guard the defile of Ripach. The ſame night, the king marched to fall on the enemy's quarters, diſperſed in the vicinage of Weiſſenfels; but they eſcaped, thoſe who were in Weiſſenfels excepted. The three gates of the town were attacked, and the officers were commanded, without delay, to gain the bridge of the Saale, that this important paſſage might be ſecured. The town was forced, and five hundred men taken; but thoſe of the garriſon who eſcaped had ſet fire to the covered bridge, which being wholly of wood was ſoon in flames. To extinguiſh the fire was impoſſible; for the enemy, in ambuſcade behind walls on the oppoſite ſhore, kept up ſo heavy a fire of ſmall arms that all who endeavoured to preſerve the bridge were killed, or wounded. Freſh troops ſoon appeared on the other ſide of the river, the number of whom continuing to increaſe demonſtrated the impoſſibility of effecting the paſſage of the Saale, at that place. But, as it was but the van of the army that had arrived at Weiſſenfels, and as the greateſt part of the troops were ſtill

on their march, they were ordered to take the road to Merſeburg, with the hope of being able to ſecure the bridge of that town.

When marſhal Keith arrived here (November) he found the French already had occupied the place, and that the bridge was broken. He did not remain heſitating, but took ſome battalions, and marched to Halle, whence he diſlodged the French, and repaired the bridge, which they had in like manner deſtroyed. The army of the king thus had its right at Halle, its centre oppoſite Merſeburg, and its left at Weiſſenfels, covered by the Saale, aſcertaining its communication behind that river by detached corps, which alſo watched the motions of the enemy. Marſhal Keith firſt paſſed the river, near Halle. This manœuvre, which could be of no ill conſequence to the French, occaſioned (2d) the prince de Soubiſe wholly to abandon the banks of the Saale, and retreat to the village of St. Michael. The Pruſſians employed this day, and the night following, in repairing the bridges of Weiſſenfels and Merſeburg. Early on the morning of the third, the king and prince Maurice, having paſſed the river, marched with their columns toward Roſbach: as did that of marſhal Keith, where their orders were to form a junction. During the march,

march, the king went with ſome cavalry to reconnoitre the poſition of the enemy, which was one of the very worſt. The thoughtleſs huſſars puſhed forward to the camp, and carried off ſome horſes and ſoldiers, whom they dragged from their tents. Theſe circumſtances, added to the little precaution of the French generals, determined the king (4th) to march and attack them on the morrow.

By break of day, the army quitted the camp. The van-guard conſiſted of the whole cavalry. Arriving at the place where the evening before the poſt of the enemy had been reconnoitred, no enemy was to be found. The prince de Soubiſe had no doubt reflected on the imperfect nature of his camp, and had changed it the ſame night. He had extended his troops along the height, in front of which was a ravin; his right was ſupported by a wood, which he had fortified with an abatis and three redoubts, furniſhed with artillery; his left was ſurrounded by a large pond, which could not be turned. The army of the king was too feeble, in infantry, to ruſh upon a poſt ſo formidable; had the defence been but little obſtinate, it could not have been carried, with the loſs of leſs than twenty thouſand men. The king, judging this attack beyond his ſtrength, ſent orders for the infantry

to paſs the marſhy defile, which was near, and aſſume the camp of Braunſdorf: the cavalry followed, conſiſting of the rear-guard. When the French ſaw the Pruſſian troops retreating, they cauſed their piquets to advance, with ſome artillery, and kept up a warm cannonade, but to no effect. All the muſicians and trumpeters in the army, all their drums and fifes, began to play at once, as if they had gained a victory. However little agreeable this ſpectacle might be, for men not accuſtomed to fear the foe, it was neceſſary to remember circumſtances, behold it with the cold eye of indifference, and oppoſe German phlegm to French petulance, and French gaiety.

The ſame night, intelligence was received that the enemy made a motion, from the left to the right. The huſſars were in the field by break of day; they entered the camp the French had quitted; and learned, from the peaſants, that the latter had taken the road to Weiſſenfels. Soon after, a conſiderable body formed oppoſite the right of the Pruſſians, that had the appearance of a rear-guard, or a corps that covered the march of an army. The Pruſſians paid little attention to theſe manœuvres, becauſe that their camp was covered, as well in front as at each wing, by an impracticable marſh. There

were

were only three narrow cauſeways, by which they might have been attacked; but three plans therefore ſeemed to remain for the enemy; either to retire through Freyburg into Upper Thuringia, becauſe ſubſiſtence failed; or to take Weiſſenfels, the bridges of which however were deſtroyed; or finally to gain Merſeburg before the king, and cut off his paſſage of the Saale. Yet the Pruſſian army was much nearer than that of the French, and this manœuvre was the leſs to be feared becauſe it led to a battle, from which good fortune was to be hoped, ſince there would be no poſt to force. The king ſent many parties over the country, and tranquilly waited in his camp, till the intention of his antagoniſts ſhould become more clear; for any precipitate motion, made mal a propos, might have ſpoiled his whole plan. Intelligence, ſometimes falſe, and ſometimes true, brought by the ſcouts, kept him in this incertitude till toward noon, when the van of the columns of the French was perceived, which at a certain diſtance turned the left of the Pruſſians. The troops of the circles, in like manner, inſenſibly diſappeared from their former camp; ſo that the corps which was ſuppoſed to be a rear-guard, and which in fact was the reſerve under St. Germain, remained ſingly in face of the Pruſſians. The

king went himſelf to reconnoitre the march of the prince de Soubiſe, and was convinced it was directed to Merſeburg. The French proceeded ſlowly, becauſe that they had formed different battalions in columns, by which they were impeded, whenever the narrowneſs of the road obliged them to break.

It was two o'clock when the Pruſſians ſtruck their tents: they made a quarter wheel, to the left, and began to march. The king kept pace with the army of the prince de Soubiſe: his troops were covered by the marſh from Braunſdorf, and which, extending a full quarter of a league from thence, ends at the diſtance of two thouſand paces from Roſbach. Seidlitz, with the whole cavalry, formed the van-guard. He had orders to glide along the hollows, with which this cōuntry abounds, to turn the French cavalry, and fall on the van of their columns, before they ſhould have time to form. The king could only leave prince Ferdinand, who that day commanded the right of the army, the old guards of the cavalry, who put themſelves in one line, to make a ſhow; which they might the better do becauſe they were covered by a part of the marſh of Braunſdorf. The two armies, marching ſide by ſide, continued to approach. The army of the king carefully maintained a ſmall eminence,

nence, which goes immediately to Roſbach. That of the French, apparently unacquainted with the ground, marched in the valley. The king eſtabliſhed a battery on this height, the effects of which were deciſive, during the action. The French raiſed one in the valley; and, as it fired up hill, it produced no effect.

While each party were taking theſe precautions, Seidlitz had turned the enemy's right, unperceived by themſelves, and fell with impetuoſity on the cavalry. The two Auſtrian regiments formed to face him, and ſuſtained the ſhock; but, being abandoned by the French, the regiment of Fitz-james excepted, they were almoſt totally deſtroyed. The infantry of the two armies were ſtill on the march, till their reſpective vans were within five hundred paces of each other. The king wiſhed to have gained the village of Reichardſwerben; but, as it was ſix hundred paces diſtant, and as he each moment expected the action would begin, he detached marſhal Keith thither, with five battalions, in which conſiſted the whole of his ſecond line. The king meantime advanced within two hundred paces of the two French lines; and perceived that their order of battle was compoſed of battalions in columns, alternately interlined with battalions extended. The wing of

the prince de Soubiſe was in the air; and, the Pruſſian cavalry being employed in the purſuit of that of the enemy, the wing of the French could only be outwinged by the infantry. For this purpoſe, the king placed two battalions of grenadiers in a line, forming a hook * with his left flank: they had orders, the moment the French ſhould advance, to make a half wheel to the right, which would neceſſarily bring them on the flank of the enemy. Theſe orders they punctually executed; as the French came up, they received the fire of the grenadiers in flank; and, having ſtood at the moſt three diſcharges of the regiment of Brunſwick, their columns were ſeen to preſs on the left. They had ſoon cloſed upon the extended battalions which ſeparated them, and that maſs of infantry became at each moment more large, heavy, and confuſed. The more it fell back on the left the more it was outwinged, by the front of the Pruſſians.

While diſorder increaſed in the army of the prince de Soubiſe, the king was informed that a corps of the enemy's cavalry preſented itſelf in the rear of his troops. He haſtily aſſembled the firſt ſquadrons that could be found, and

* *Un crochet.* Perhaps an angle. T.

ſcarcely

ſcarcely had he oppoſed thoſe that were coming upon his rear before they retreated with promptitude. The body-guard and the gendarmes then were employed againſt the French infantry, which was in the utmoſt diſorder. The cavalry attacked it, diſperſed it, and made a conſiderable number of French priſoners. This charge was made at ſix in the evening; the weather was cloudy, and the darkneſs ſo great that to have purſued the enemy would have been imprudent, however great the confuſion and the rout. The king contented himſelf with ſending different parties of cuiraſſiers, dragoons and huſſars, after them; none of whom exceeded thirty men.

During this action, ten battalions of the right of the Pruſſians had remained idle ſpectators. Prince Ferdinand of Brunſwick, who commanded them, had not quitted the marſh of Braunſdorf, which ſerved to cover a part of his front. He had repulſed the troops of the circles, who oppoſed him, by ſome diſcharges of artillery, and obliged them to give ground. There were only ſeven battalions of the king's army engaged, and the battle did not continue above an hour and a half, before the victory was decided.

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On the morrow, the king departed at day-break, with the huſſars and dragoons, following the enemy, who had retired through Freyburg. The infantry had orders to purſue the ſame route. The rear-guard of the French was there ſtill. The dragoons alighted, and drove ſome detachments of the enemy from the gardens. Diſpoſitions were then made to attack the caſtle; but the enemy, not giving time for this, repaſſed the Unſtrut in haſte, and burnt the bridges. The detachments the king had ſent out the evening before arrived here ſucceſſively. Some brought in officers, ſome ſoldiers, others cannon. None of them returned empty handed.

So much diligence was employed, in repairing the bridge of the Unſtrut, that in leſs than an hour it was fit for uſe. The army of the prince de Soubiſe had taken ſo many roads that it was impoſſible to know which to follow. The peaſants affirmed, the greateſt part of the fugitives had taken the route of the Eckartſberg; and thither the king marched, with his troops. The number of priſoners augmented, during the whole day; all the detachments, that were ſent into different parts, brought in ſome. The Eckartſberg was found to be garniſhed by a corps of the troops of the circles, which might amount to five or ſix thouſand men. The king,

king, having no other infantry than the volunteers of Meyer, ſent them in ambuſcade, with ſome huſſars, into a wood in the vicinity of the camp, with orders to alarm the enemy all night; who, little pleaſed at having their reſt diſturbed, forſook their poſt, and loſt four hundred men, with ten pieces of artillery. General Lentulus, who followed them on the morrow as far as Erfurt, took eight hundred more of their men, whom he brought back to the king.

The battle of Roſbach had coſt the army of the prince de Soubiſe ten thouſand of his troops: the Pruſſians took ſeven thouſand men, ſixty-three cannon, fifteen ſtandards, ſeven pair of colours, and one pair of kettle drums. If the conduct of the French generals be examined, it will be found difficult to grant it our approbation. Their intention indubitably was to drive the Pruſſians out of Saxony. But did not the intereſt of their allies rather demand they ſhould ſimply bound their views to the detention of the king, that marſhal Daun and prince Charles might have time to complete the conqueſt of Sileſia? Had they but kept the army of the king in Thuringia, for a ſhort time, this conqueſt would not only have been made but the ſeaſon would have become ſo rigorous, and ſo far advanced, that it would have been

been impoſſible for the Pruſſians to make that progreſs, in Sileſia, of which we ſhall have immediate occaſion to ſpeak. As to the battle in which they ſo untimely engaged, certain it is that the prince de Soubiſe, by his incertitude and the order of his troops, rendered it poſſible for a handful of men to vanquiſh his army. The manner in which the court of France diſtinguiſhed the merit of its generals was ſtill more ſurpriſing. D'Etrées was recalled, for having gained the battle of Haſtenbeck: and the prince de Soubiſe, for having loſt that of Roſbach, was ſoon after promoted to be a marſhal of France.

Properly ſpeaking, the battle of Roſbach did but afford the king an opportunity of haſtening, in ſearch of new dangers, into Sileſia. The victory was only important by the impreſſion it made on the French, and on the ſhattered army of the duke of Cumberland. No ſooner did the news of it reach the duke de Richelieu than he quitted his camp, at Halberſtadt, and withdrew into the electorate of Hanover: while the allied troops, ready to lay down their arms, recovered courage, and acquired hope. An advantageous change, about the ſame time, happened in the Engliſh miniſtry, of which we ſhall preſently ſpeak, that gave new ſtrength

to the Britiſh government. Theſe miniſters, aſhamed of the diſgraceful convention of Cloſter-Seven, reſolved to break it: which they might with the greater juſtice do, becauſe it had been neither ratified by the king of England nor the king of France. They began immediately to reſtore the army of Stade to activity. Diſguſted with the duke of Cumberland, who had loſt the confidence of the troops, the king of England wiſhed to appoint another general, and requeſted the king would ſend him prince Ferdinand of Brunſwick, whoſe juſtly-acquired fame was ſpread through Europe. Though, by his abſence, the Pruſſians loſt a good general, of whom they had need, it ſtill was ſo important to reſtore the army of the allies that the king could not refuſe the requeſt. Prince Ferdinand departed, and repaired to Stade, by private roads, in the environs of which he found a body of thirty thouſand men diſperſed, whom the inconſiſtent and thoughtleſs French had neglected to diſarm.

The king returned from the Eckartſberg to Freyburg, at the ſame time that a detachment, ſent by marſhal Keith to Querfurt, came back from purſuing the French. The very peaſants of the neighbourhood brought in priſoners. They were enraged at the ſacrilege which had been

been committed, by the ſoldiers of the prince de Soubiſe, in the Lutheran churches. Thoſe things which the populace held in the higheſt veneration had been profaned, with groſs indecency, and the unbridled fury of the French had brought all the peaſants of Thuringia into the intereſts of Pruſſia.

The king was preparing to depart. The affairs of Sileſia demanded his preſence and aid. He propoſed to march immediately for Schweidnitz, and conſtrain Nadaſti to raiſe the ſiege. On the 12th of November, he left Leipſic at the head of nineteen battalions and twenty-eight ſquadrons. Marſhal Keith marched at the ſame time, with a ſmall corps, to penetrate into Bohemia, near Leutmeritz, in order to facilitate the paſſage of the king into Luſatia, and by this diverſion oblige Marſhall to quit the environs of Bautzen and Zittau. Marſhal Keith took a conſiderable magazine from the enemy at Leutmeritz, whence he feigned to advance toward Prague.

The king meantime entered Luſatia, diſlodged Haddick from Groſſenhayn, and Marſhall at his approach fell back to Löbau. During the march from Bautzen to Weiſſenberg, the van of a column was ſent toward Löbau, and on its appearance Marſhall retreated to Gabel.

Gabel. The king then purſued his route without impediment. On his arrival at Görlitz, he received the diſagreeable news of the reduction of Schweidnitz. The place was taken in the following manner. Nadaſti had opened the trenches, on the 27th of October, between the fort of Bögendorf and the tile-kiln. His third parallel was finiſhed on the 10th of November. The garriſon had made ſome ſucceſsful ſallies; and, though the bombs had in part ruined the town, the enemy had not yet carried any work. Impatient at this ſlow progreſs, Nadaſti reſolved to riſk a coup de main. On the night of the 11th, he made a general aſſault, on all the redoubts which ſurround the body of the place: two were taken. This misfortune occaſioned the governor, Seers, and Grumbkow his aſſociate, to loſe all recollection. They capitulated, and ſurrendered priſoners of war with their whole garriſon; conſiſting of ten ſquadrons of huſſars, and ten battalions of infantry. The Auſtrians diſarmed the ſoldiers; and, as moſt of them were Sileſians, gave them paſſports, and liberty to return to their villages.

This accident could not have happened in a worſe time, for the derangement of the plans of the king. His junction with the prince of Bevern became ſo much the more neceſſary

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ſince it was eaſy to foreſee that Nadaſti, having taken Schweidnitz, would join marſhal Daun, to overwhelm the remaining Pruſſians near Breſlau. The king had indeed commanded the prince of Bevern to attack the foe, and not ſuffer Schweidnitz to be taken, as it were, under his eye. The plan was practicable, the poſition of the Auſtrians at Liſſa conſidered. The prince had but one evolution to make to come upon the enemy's flank, which he would probably have beaten. Thus would the ſiege of Schweidnitz have been raiſed, and the Imperialiſts diſconcerted. Inſtead of which, by remaining inactive, Nadaſti could not fail of finally taking a place which had no hope of ſuccour; and the whole force of the enemy, coming to fall upon the Pruſſians, muſt carry their intrenchments of the Lohe.

Ill fortune would have it that the prince could not comprehend the force of theſe arguments. The generals however prevailed on him, one day, to make the attempt. He left his camp, and beat the light troops that covered the right flank of the Auſtrians; after which, inſtead of attacking the army, and driving it into the Oder, as muſt have happened, his want of confidence in himſelf, and the dread of failure in an undertaking where certainty never

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is to be obtained, induced him to forbear. He thought he had done ſufficient, and ordered his troops back to their intrenchments.

The king arrived at Naumburg, on the Queis, November the 24th, and there was informed of the victory of the Auſtrians over the prince of Bevern, and of the loſs of Breſlau. All that had been predicted to the prince had but too literally proved true. Nadaſti joined prince Charles and marſhal Daun; and the enemy, impatient to complete their conqueſt, loſt no time in putting their project into execution. On the night of the 21ſt of November, they conſtructed four heavy batteries, in the front of the Pruſſians, between Pilſnitz and Groſs-Mochber. The prince of Bevern remained a tranquil ſpectator, ſuffering them to finiſh their works, although ſuch preparations announced the deſigns of marſhal Daun, on the Pruſſian intrenchments. Nadaſti marched beſide the Lohe (22d) and formed toward Gabitz. The prince of Bevern ſuppoſed this was to come upon his rear, though that was difficult, and he farther enfeebled himſelf by a detachment, under the command of general Ziethen, to oppoſe all attempts of the enemy on that ſide. The front of the Pruſſian camp, behind the Lohe,

was covered by redoubts, with ill-placed apertures, ſome of which were even overlooked from the oppoſite ſhore, nor had care been taken to ſend a ſufficient number of cannon thither. The greateſt part of the artillery remained in an intrenchment, which the prince of Bevern had thrown up in a bottom, to cover his flank of the Lohe, toward the ſuburb of Breſlau.

Marſhal Daun having had time enough attentively to perceive and examine all theſe negligences, and blunders, turned them to his own advantage. The attack began on the 22d, at nine in the morning: ſome redoubts were alternately taken and re-taken. The Pruſſian cavalry was made to act in a marſh, where it could not fight, and where it was thundered upon by ſixty pieces, from an Auſtrian battery beyond the rivulet. Notwithſtanding all theſe falſe ſteps, the Pruſſians did not yet loſe ground. Ziethen, on the left toward Gabitz, not only repulſed his attacks but purſued Nadaſti beyond the Lohe. The routed enemy retired behind the rivulet of Schweidnitz. In the interim, the Auſtrians, who attacked the prince of Bevern, had paſſed the Lohe, protected by their artillery. They immediately took ſome of the Pruſſian redoubts, by the aid of the apertures. The troops made a brave

a brave defence, and the Pruſſians diſlodged them ſeveral times. Prince Ferdinand of Pruſſia even drove back a body of the enemy as far as the Lohe; but the Auſtrians were too numerous, the camp was loſt, and night came on.

Though reſources ſtill might have been found, theſe the prince of Bevern did not perceive. In his firſt conſternation, he paſſed the Oder, and threw Leſtwitz with eight battalions into Breſlau. Thus he loſt eighty pieces of artillery, and near eight thouſand men, which the attack of the camp of Liſſa would not have coſt. The Auſtrians pretended that the action coſt them eighteen thouſand men; and certain it is that the neighbouring villages were full of the wounded. On the morrow, or rather by night, the prince of Bevern thought proper to reconnoitre the corps under general Beck, who was encamped at no great diſtance. He was alone, and ſuffered himſelf to be taken by ſome pandours. General Kyau, the next in rank, aſſumed the command of the forces; and, without conſulting what was to be done, took the road to Glogau. Leſtwitz no ſooner ſuppoſed himſelf left to his own ſupport, in Breſlau, than he loſt all confidence. The Auſtrians approached the city, and Leſtwitz, who till then had maintained the reputation of a brave officer,

without waiting till the enemy fired a ſingle ſhot againſt the ramparts, demanded to capitulate, and obtained free egreſs with arms and baggage. In two days, he and his garriſon, the half of which deſerted, followed the army on the road that Kyau had marched.

The king received theſe various afflicting articles of intelligence all at the ſame time. Without dwelling on diſaſter, he thought but of redreſs, and made a forced march to gain the banks of the Oder. On his route, he made a circuit round Lignitz, which the Auſtrians had fortified, and puſhed forward immediately to Parchwitz. His van-guard fell unexpectedly on a detachment of the enemy, three hundred of whom were taken. He arrived at Parchwitz on the 28th, having marched from Leipſic to the Oder in twelve days. The king deſired general Kyau ſhould paſs the Oder at Koben; but this could not be performed, becauſe that moſt of the troops had already gained Glogau. Under theſe circumſtances, time was of all things the moſt precious: not a moment muſt be loſt, the Auſtrians muſt inceſſantly be attacked, however great the hazard, and expelled Sileſia, or the province muſt be given up eternally.

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The army that paſſed the Oder, at Glogau, could not join the troops of the king till the 2d of December: this army was diſcouraged, and overwhelmed by the memory of recent defeat. The honour of the officers was appealed to; their former exploits recapitulated; and mournful ideas, the impreſſion of which was ſo ſtrong, were endeavoured to be diſſipated; wine even was had recourſe to, that the depreſſed ſpirit might be renovated. The king converſed with the ſoldiers, diſtributed proviſions gratis, in fine, exhauſted every means, imagination could ſupply and time could admit, to awaken confidence in the troops, without which all hope of victory is vain.

The countenances of the men began already to be cheerful; and thoſe who had beaten the French at Roſbach perſuaded their comrades to take heart. A little repoſe reſtored the ſoldier, and the army was diſpoſed to waſh out the ſtain, received on the 22d, whenever any occaſion ſhould preſent itſelf. This occaſion the king ſought after, and it was preſently found. He advanced on the 4th to Neumarkt, was with the van-guard of the huſſars, and heard the enemy had eſtabliſhed a bakery in that town, that it was garniſhed with pandours, and that the army of Daun was expected.

The heights ſituated beyond Neumarkt would give the enemy advantage, ſhould he be permitted to occupy this height; and the difficulty was to take it, for the infantry was not come up, nor could join the van-guard before night. There was no artillery preſent. The huſſars were the only troops ready to act, and it was reſolved to make a virtue of neceſſity. The king, unwilling to admit the prince of Lorrain to encamp in his preſence, made ſome ſquadrons of huſſars alight, ſent them to force the town-gate, and a regiment on horſeback entered full gallop. Another regiment paſſed the ſuburbs, and gained the gate of Breſlau, and the attack was ſo ſucceſsful that eight hundred Croats were made priſoners by the huſſars. The place of encampment was immediately occupied, and the piquets and traces which the Auſtrian engineers had left, to mark out the poſition of their troops, were there found. The prince of Wurtemberg took the command of the van-guard, and it was reinforced at night by ten battalions, with which he encamped at Kammendorf. The cavalry paſſed the defile on the ſame day; the main body of the infantry cantoned in the town of Neumarkt, and the neighbouring villages.

Poſitive

Poſitive intelligence now informed the king that the prince of Lorrain had quitted the camp of the Lohe, and had advanced beyond Liſſa; that his right was ſupported at the village of Nypern, his left at Golau, and his rear by the ſmall rivulet of Schweidnitz. The king was rejoiced to find the enemy in a poſition that added ſuch facility to his wiſhes; for he was obliged and determined to attack the Auſtrians wherever he could meet them, were it even at the Zobtenberg. The diſpoſition of the march was immediately formed, and the army put in motion, on the 5th, by dawn of day. It was preceded by a van-guard of ſixty ſquadrons and ten battalions, headed by the king in perſon. The four columns of the army followed, at a ſmall diſtance; the infantry formed the centre, and the wings were compoſed of cavalry. Approaching the village of Born, the van-guard diſcovered a grand line of cavalry, the right of which extended towards Liſſa, and the left more advanced was ſupported by a wood, that was on the right of the Pruſſian army. This was ſuppoſed to be a wing of the Auſtrians, whoſe centre could not be ſeen. The officers ſent to reconnoitre affirmed it was the van-guard: it was learnt alſo that general Noſtitz was the commander, and that the corps con-

ſiſted of four regiments of Saxon dragoons, and two of Imperial huſſars.

For the greater certainty, ten battalions glided into the wood that covered the left flank of Noſtitz, on which the Pruſſian cavalry, having formed, fell with great heat. The regiments were diſperſed in a moment, and purſued to the front of the Auſtrian army. Five officers and eight hundred men were taken, and were marched in preſence of the columns to Neumarkt, to animate the ſoldiery by the example of ſucceſs. It was with difficulty the king reſtrained the fury of the huſſars; they were on the very act of attacking the centre of the Auſtrian army, when they were aſſembled, between the villages of Heyde and Frobelvitz, within cannon-ſhot of the enemy.

Here the Imperial army was ſo perfectly diſtinguiſhed that it might be counted man by man. Its right, known to be at Nypern, was concealed by the great wood of Liſſa; but of the centre and the left nothing was inviſible. On the firſt inſpection of them and the ground on which they ſtood, it was judged neceſſary to make the grand attacks on the left wing, which was extended on a ſmall hill encumbered with pine-trees, but ill-ſupported. This poſt carried, the advantage of ground would be gained for

for the remainder of the battle, becauſe from that part there was one continual deſcent toward Nypern: inſtead of which, ſhould the centre be aſſaulted, the right wing of the Auſtrians might, by traverſing the wood of Liſſa, have taken the Pruſſians in flank: and ſtill this hill muſt have finally been attacked, for it commanded the whole plain. To have delayed would have been to have reſerved the greateſt difficulty to the time when the troops muſt be haraſſed, fatigued, and incapable of grand efforts: whereas, by conquering the greateſt danger at the commencement, advantage was taken of the firſt ardour of the ſoldier, and the remainder of his taſk became eaſy.

In conſequence of this chain of reaſoning, the army was incontinently diſpoſed to attack the left. The columns that had been formed had their order reverſed. They were placed in two lines, and the platoons with a quarter-wheel filed off to the right. The king, with his huſſars, kept pace with the march of his army upon a ſucceſſion of hillocks, which concealed the motions from the enemy that were made behind the hillocks; and, being between the two armies, he could obſerve that of the Auſtrians, and direct the march of his own. Confidential officers were ſent, ſome to obſerve the right

of

of Daun, others toward Canth to watch the motions of Draſkowitz, who there was encamped. The enemy at the ſame time was reconnoitred along the rivulet of Schweidnitz, that there might be no apprehenſion he ſhould come upon the rear, when the battle ſhould be begun. The plan the king was preparing to execute was to bring his whole army on the left flank of the Imperialiſts, to make his grand efforts with his right, and to refuſe the enemy his left, with all that foreſight which might avoid faults ſimilar to thoſe committed at the battle of Prague, and which had cauſed the loſs of the battle of Kolin.

Already had Wedel, who with his ten battalions of the van-guard was to form the firſt attack, marched in front of the army. The van of the columns had already gained the rivulet of Schweidnitz, without being perceived by the foe. Marſhal Daun underſtood the motion of the Pruſſians as a retreat, and ſaid to prince Charles of Lorrain—"Theſe good "folks are going, let them go"—Wedel however had formed before the two lines of infantry on the right. His attack was ſupported by a battery of twenty twelve-pounders, formed of the cannon which the king had taken from the ramparts of Glogau. The firſt line received orders to advance

vance in ſhort ranks, like the ſteps of a ladder, the battalions keeping fifty paces in the rear of each other, ſo that, the line being in motion, the extremity of the right was a thouſand paces in advance to the extremity of the left; and this diſpoſition rendered it impoſſible to engage without orders.

Wedel now attacked the wood where Nadaſti commanded, found no great reſiſtance, and carried it with promptitude. The Auſtrian generals, ſeeing themſelves turned and taken in flank, endeavoured to change their poſition; endeavoured, but too late, to form a line parallel to the Pruſſian front. The whole art of the king's generals was employed to rob them of time. The Pruſſians had already gained a height which commanded the village of Leuthen; and, at the very inſtant when the enemy wiſhed to throw infantry into this village, a ſecond battery, of twenty twelve-pounders, played on them with ſuch timely effect that they gave up the attempt, and retreated. The Auſtrians, on the ſide where Wedel fought, ſeized on the bank beſide the rivulet, to prevent him from ſweeping their line in its whole extent. But Wedel did not ſuffer them long to remain here: after a combat more obſtinate than the preceding, they were obliged to give ground.

Ziethen

Ziethen at the ſame time charged the enemy's cavalry, and put it to the rout. Some ſquadrons of his right were taken in flank, from the buſhes on the banks of the rivulet, by a volley of caſe ſhot which came unexpectedly, and repulſed his corps; but it formed again beſide the infantry. The officers who were ordered to obſerve the right of Daun then came to inform the king this right was croſſing the wood of Liſſa, and would inſtantly appear in the plain: in conſequence of which Drieſen received orders to advance, with the left wing of the Pruſſian cavalry. When the Auſtrian cuiraſſiers began to form, near Leuthen, they were ſaluted, from the central battery of the king, with a complete volley, and attacked at the ſame time by Drieſen. The diſpute was but ſhort. The Imperialiſts were diſperſed, and fled routed. The line of infantry that had formed beſide theſe cuiraſſiers, behind Leuthen, was taken in flank by the regiment of Bareuth; which, driving them on the volunteers of Wunſch, took two entire regiments, officers and colours.

The enemy's infantry being totally diſperſed, the king advanced with the centre of his infantry on Leuthen. The fire was hot and ſhort, for the Auſtrian infantry was only ſcattered among the houſes and gardens. Leaving the village,

village, a new line of infantry was perceived, which the Auſtrian generals had formed, on an eminence, near the wind-mill of Segeſchutz. The army of the king was obliged to ſuſtain their fire ſome time; but the foe did not perceive, amid this confuſion, that the corps of Wedel was in his neighbourhood. The Auſtrians were ſuddenly taken in flank and rear, by this brave and able general; and that excellent manœuvre aſcertained victory, and ended this important battle.

The king collected the firſt troops that preſented themſelves, and went in purſuit of the enemy, with the cuiraſſiers of Seidlitz and a battalion of Jung-Stutterheim, directing his march between the rivulet of Schweidnitz and the wood of Liſſa. The darkneſs became ſo great that he ſent ſome horſemen forward, to reconnoitre the foreſts, and to bring intelligence. He occaſionally cauſed vollies of artillery to be fired toward Liſſa, whither the main army of the Auſtrians had fled. Approaching this town, the van-guard ſuſtained a diſcharge from about two battalions, but not a man was wounded. It replied with fire from the artillery, ſtill continuing its march. As he proceeded, the cuiraſſiers of Seidlitz brought in priſoners by troops. Arrived at Liſſa, the king found all the houſes filled

filled with fugitives, and the diſperſed men of the Imperial army. He immediately ſeized the bridge, on which he placed his artillery, with orders to fire while any powder remained. The enemy retired on the road to Breſlau, and he threw ſome platoons of infantry into the houſes neareſt the rivulet of Schweidnitz, that they might fire on the oppoſite ſhore, during the whole night, either to keep up the panic of the vanquiſhed, or to prevent them from ſending troops on the oppoſite ſide, that might on the morrow diſpute the paſſage.

The battle began at one o'clock, and it was eight when the king arrived with his van-guard at Liſſa. When his army engaged with the Imperialiſts, who were ſaid to amount to ſixty thouſand combatants, he was thirty-three thouſand ſtrong. Had not night come on, this battle would have been one of the moſt deciſive of the age.

The troops had no time to reſt. They left Liſſa (6th) while it was yet night, took many of the enemy's ſtragglers, and arrived about ten o'clock on the banks of the Lohe; where, in deſpite of the ſtrong rear-guard under the command of Serbelloni, poſted near Groſs-Mochber, ten battalions paſſed the rivulet. They were formed in a ravin, ſheltered from the Auſtrian artillery,

artillery, and huſſars were ſent behind the villages and hamlets, in ambuſcade, where they remained covered, and ready to act whenever occaſion ſhould require. Serbelloni haſtened his retreat as much as poſſible, and retired about two in the afternoon toward Breſlau. Ziethen, with all the huſſars, twenty ſquadrons of dragoons, and ſixteen battalions, as ſpeedily followed. A party of the Auſtrians threw themſelves in a diſorderly manner into Breſlau; and this rear-guard, inſpired with terror, and retiring in confuſion, loſt many men on its march. Ziethen purſued the army of marſhal Daun through Borau, Reichenbach, and Kunzendorf, to Reichenau, where he was joined by Fouquet, who came with ſome troops from Glatz, and they drove the Auſtrians thence into Bohemia.

The king on his ſide formed the circumvallation of Breſlau, on the 7th. Poſts were taken at the ſuburb of St. Nicholas, at Gabitz, at the Lehmgruben, at Hube, and at Durgenſch; and, as military reaſons required the city ſhould be in like manner incloſed on the other ſide of the Oder, the king ſent orders to Wied, who had been ill at Brieg, to leave this place with three battalions, to which were added five ſquadrons, and to take poſt on the grand cauſeway that leads from Breſlau to Hundsfeld. Here

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he intrenched himſelf to the beſt of his power, to prevent the garriſon from eſcaping into Poland, ſhould it make the attempt.

Preparations then were made for a ſiege. The king drew ammunition, artillery, and mortars, of which he ſtood in need, from the fortreſſes of Brieg and Neiſs. On the 10th ſix battalions took poſſeſſion of the ſuburb of Ohlau, and fixed themſelves at the convent of the order of mercy, from which they drove the pandours. Forcade took poſt in the church-yard of St. Maurice, where a battery was raiſed protected by the walls; and, to divert the attention of the governor, prince Ferdinand of Pruſſia erected a battery, and threw up one end of an intrenchment, in the ſuburb of St. Nicholas, that he might be led to believe the Pruſſians meant to make their attacks on that ſide; while Balby drew his parallel from the church-yard of St. Maurice, extending oppoſite to the gate of Schweidnitz. From this parallel two grand croſſing batteries directed their fire on the Taſchen-baſtion, and on the cavalier by which it is commanded. The beſieged made a poor defence. They attempted a ſally through the ſuburb of Poland, on the ſide where Wied commanded, in which they loſt three hundred men. On the 16th a bomb by chance ſet fire to a

powder magazine of the Taſchen-baſtion. The epaulement was blown up, and its ruins formed a kind of breach. The cold became ſo ſevere that the governor dreaded, in deſpite of his precautions, the moats being frozen, leſt the Pruſſians ſhould make an aſſault, and the place ſhould this way be taken. He likewiſe knew the Imperial army was driven into Bohemia, and that he could expect no ſuccour. Theſe conſiderations induced him to capitulate; and he and his whole garriſon ſurrendered priſoners of war; on which occaſion fourteen thouſand men beſieged and captured ſeventeen thouſand. But it muſt be remembered a part of this garriſon conſiſted of the fugitives of Leuthen; and that in general neither fortifications nor numbers defend a town, but that all depends on the ſtrength or weakneſs of the underſtanding and the courage of the commander.

We have without interruption related the incidents of this expedition into Sileſia; perhaps it will not be improper here to give an abſtract of the loſſes of each party.

The Pruſſians, at the battle of Leuthen, only loſt two thouſand ſix hundred and ſixty men in killed and wounded; becauſe that they there

obtained, the firſt attack excepted, the advantage of ground.

The Auſtrians on this day loſt three hundred and ſeven officers, twenty-one thouſand ſoldiers, one hundred and thirty-four cannon, and fifty-nine pair of colours. Generals Ziethen and Fouquet took two thouſand five hundred priſoners, in purſuit. The capture of Breſlau coſt the enemy thirteen generals, ſix hundred and eighty-ſix officers, and ſeventeen thouſand ſix hundred and thirty-five common men. The ſum total was forty-one thouſand four hundred and forty-ſeven, by which the Imperial army was enfeebled on its return into Bohemia.

Long, ſevere, and painful as this campaign had been, and fortunate as was its concluſion, ſtill another expedition remained to be undertaken, ſo great were the loſſes that had happened in Sileſia. The town of Lignitz muſt be recovered, where the Imperialiſts had made inundations and erected works. Hither the king ſent Drieſen, who with a corps of cavalry had held the place inveſted from the 16th, and, on the 25th, Prince Maurice came up, with a detachment of infantry, regularly to lay ſiege to the town. All was prepared, the artillery arrived, and Bulow, whom Daun had appointed governor, preferred the preſervation of his gar-

riſon to a defence which muſt finally have been inefficacious. He capitulated on condition he and his troops had free leave to depart. This was willingly granted, becauſe the men were fatigued to exceſs, and the ground was ſo frozen that it could not be opened by ſpade and pick-ax. The works and ſluices were raſed, that, ſhould the enemy take it a ſecond time, it might not haſtily be put in a ſtate of defence, or be made a place of arms. The whole cavalry was afterward employed in the blockade of Schweidnitz, the ſiege of which was delayed till the approaching ſpring. The corps of Ziethen formed a line which, extending from Schmiedeberg through Landſhut, Friedland, and Braunau, terminated at Glatz. On the 6th of January the troops went into winter quarters, and the king remained at Breſlau, that he might watch over affairs perſonally, prepare all neceſſaries to re-complete the army and put it in a good condition; and that he might early commence the enſuing campaign.

To conclude the hiſtory of the events of the year, it ſtill remains for us to report what paſſed in Pruſſia, between marſhals Lehwald and Apraxin, and what the Swedes performed in Pomerania. Apraxin approached the frontiers of Pruſſia in the month of June, at the head of

a hundred thouſand men. His main army marched toward Grodno, the capital of Poliſh Lithuania. Fermor, with a corps of twenty thouſand men, aided by the Ruſſian fleet, laid ſiege to Memel, which was taken by capitulation on the 5th of July. Lehwald had propoſed to defend the banks of the Pregel, and had encamped at Inſterburg, whence he obſerved Apraxin. After Memel had ſurrendered, the enemy penetrated into Pruſſia, and approached Inſterburg; while Fermor on his part inclined toward the Pregel. This ſeemed to be the moment when Lehwald ought to have acted deciſively, and to have given battle to one of the generals. An opportunity more favourable perhaps would not preſent itſelf. The corps of Fermor, that arrived at Tilſit, gave him apprehenſions; he feared being turned, and retired to Welau. He had two regiments of huſſars in his army, amounting at the utmoſt to two thouſand four hundred men; which huſſars not only made head againſt twelve thouſand Tartars and Coſſacks, whom the Ruſſians drew after them, but during the whole campaign obtained many ſignal advantages over theſe enemies.

(Auguſt.) After the retreat of marſhal Lehwald, Apraxin, being under no conſtraint, joined

joined Fermor at Inſterburg. They both advanced, marching beſide the Aller, and encamped at Jægerndorf, a mile and a half from the Pruſſian army. The king had given full powers to Lehwald to act as he ſhould think proper; as well becauſe of the diſtance of the place as becauſe the parties, which often hovered round the army of the king, might intercept diſpatches of much conſequence. Lehwald, who dreaded leſt a corps of Ruſſians ſhould approach Königſberg, the works of which were too vaſt for defence, and that the place ſhould be taken in which were his magazines, while he ſhould be kept in awe by the Ruſſian marſhal, imagined he could not more effectually impede any ſuch attempt than by giving battle to the foe: for which reaſon he determined to march and attack him in his camp at Jægerndorf.

He put himſelf in motion on the 29th, and inclined toward the wood, where he came preciſely upon the flank of the Ruſſians. Had he made his attack without delay, he would, apparently, have been ſucceſsful. Though his corps only amounted to twenty-four thouſand men, he might hope for the advantage becauſe the Ruſſians were ſurpriſed by his arrival, did not expect an attack, and their camp was

in great confuſion. They were beſide ill poſted, and there was no obſtacle to prevent his marching upon them immediately. What were the reaſons that reſtrained him, and occaſioned him to defer that till the morrow which he ought inſtantly to have put in execution, it is impoſſible to ſay.

He gave battle on the 30th. The huſſars and Pruſſian dragoons made the Ruſſian cavalry and the Coſſacks by whom they were oppoſed give way, and drove them to the camp. The enemy had changed his poſition, during the night, whence it reſulted that the diſpoſitions made by marſhal Lehwald, the day before, to attack him as he was then poſted, no longer correſponded with the ground. His cavalry of the left nevertheleſs aſſailed that of the Ruſſians, and drove it to the rear of its van. But here the Pruſſians met ſo hot a fire of artillery and caſe-ſhot that they were obliged to rejoin the infantry. It was at this moment that Lehwald attacked a wood full of abatis, in which the Ruſſians had placed their grenadiers. The wood was in the centre of the army of Apraxin; the grenadiers were beaten, and almoſt cut off; but the intricate braky ground where this action paſſed concealed a manœuvre, which the enemy then made, from the Pruſſians, and which

which became fatal. Romanzow advanced with twenty battalions of the ſecond line to the ſupport of the grenadiers. He took the Pruſſian infantry in flank and rear. It loſt ground inſenſibly, and at length was obliged to retire, which it did in good order, while the dragoons and huſſars covered its retreat. This corps, which was not purſued by the enemy, returned to Welau and aſſumed its former camp. In this battle the marſhal only loſt, dead, wounded, and priſoners, fourteen hundred men, and thirteen pieces of artillery.

Apraxin remained ſome days in his camp at Jægerndorf. On the 7th of September he made a feint of paſſing the Aller, and of marching immediately for Königſberg; but he certainly could not be very intent on this expedition; for, finding a Pruſſian corps that diſputed the paſſage of the river, he deſiſted from his attempt. Ten days after he ſuddenly decamped from Jægerndorf, and retired toward the frontiers of Poland. Marſhal Lehwald, for form ſake, followed him as far as Tilſit, leſs with a deſign to engage with the rear-guard than to impoſe upon the public. The diſproportion of ſtrength was too great between the two armies, and the check the Pruſſians had received too recent. He obtained his wiſhes without in-

curring any danger; for the enemy, of his own motion, retiring into Poland, he had but to ſuffer him tranquilly to purſue his march.

Marſhal Apraxin evacuated all Pruſſia, Memel excepted, of which the Ruſſians remained in poſſeſſion. The Pruſſian army halted in the vicinity of Tilſit, too fortunate to be thus cheaply diſencumbered of a foe ſo formidable. But, though it had eſcaped the calamities by which it was threatened for this campaign, it was little probable it would long enjoy the ſame good fortune. Had marſhal Lehwald poſſeſſed the talents of prince Eugene, how might he, ultimately, with twenty-four thouſand Pruſſians, have reſiſted an army of a hundred thouſand men? The king had too many enemies to combat, and his troops were too much diminiſhed, for him to be able to ſend ſuccour to his army of Pruſſia. It was to be feared, nay it might be predicted, that the Ruſſians by gaining greater knowledge would extend their views, correct the faults they had committed, and would, at the commencement of the next campaign, detach a conſiderable corps toward the Viſtula, which ſhould expoſe Lehwald to the peril of being cut off from Pomerania. There was every reaſon to fear that, ſurrounded by enemies ſo numerous, he would have undergone a fate

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ſimilar to that of the duke of Cumberland; with this difference, that the Ruſſians, not ſo polite as the French, would have obliged him to lay down his arms.

The Swedes had only made a progreſs in Pomerania becauſe they had met with no reſiſtance. They were in poſſeſſion of Anclam, Demmin, and the fort of Peenamunde, which they had taken after a fortnight's ſiege. The garriſon of Stettin conſiſted in ten battalions of militia, that had been raiſed by the ſtates of Pomerania. Manteufel, at the head of four battalions, was not in force ſufficient to form any grand plans. Should the armies remain divided as they then were, the king would incur the greateſt riſks in Pruſſia, and at the ſame time hazard the invaſion of Pomerania by the Swedes. He therefore reſolved to concentrate his forces more that he might proceed with the greater ſecurity, and to abandon the extremities, which the number of his enemies no longer permitted him to defend.

Theſe motives induced him to recal Lehwald and his army from Tilſit. The marſhal immediately marched into Pomerania againſt the Swedes, whom he quickly diſlodged from Anclam and Demmin. They were ſoon driven under the cannon of Stralſund, whence, not thinking

thinking themſelves in ſafety, they retired, and took refuge in the iſle of Rugen. A great froſt came on, by which the arm of the ſea that ſeparates this iſland from Pomerania was frozen over. Marſhal Lehwald might have profited by the occaſion, had not his great age prevented him; he might have marched over the ice with his army, and have deſtroyed all theſe Swediſh troops. Such an occaſion would, at leaſt for a time, have delivered the king of an enemy who made a vexatious diverſion. Though marſhal Lehwald did not attempt all that he might have done, ſtill he made three thouſand Swedes priſoners, in this ſhort expedition. A detachment that he ſent to beſiege the fort of Peenamunde did not take the place before the month of March, in the enſuing year.

The multifarious objects that were to be attended to during this campaign were immenſe. Preſſed to make efforts on every ſide, ſucceſs might only be obtained by employing the ſame troops in various places. Prince Ferdinand of Brunſwick was in want of cavalry for his army, and this muſt neceſſarily be ſent him for the enterpriſe he meditated. As it was for the benefit of the king that the French ſhould be driven from Lower Saxony and the Lower Rhine,

Rhine, that he might contribute on his part as much as his ſituation would permit, he detached ten ſquadrons of dragoons and five of huſſars from the army of marſhal Lehwald, with orders to join prince Ferdinand of Brunſwick at Stade. The prince immediately made an attempt on Zell which was unſucceſsful; firſt becauſe the duke de Richelieu, having foreſeen his intention, prevented him from paſſing the Aller; and again, becauſe this barren country, which produced nothing but heath, could not furniſh him with ſubſiſtence.

Notwithſtanding this deſign failed, he ſoon after took Harburg. The king afterward concerted with him the plan of his campaign. His advice was that the allies ſhould incline for the Weſer, and for two reaſons. The firſt, that they ought not to ruin the capitals of the electorate of Hanover and the dutchy of Brunſwick, by laying ſiege to them for their recovery: the ſecond was to inſpire the French with the fear of being cut off from the Rhine, which would induce them wilfully to evacuate theſe provinces; eſpecially if a detachment of Pruſſians ſhould, at the ſame time, appear on the ſide of Brunſwick. Prince Henry, who had remained in Saxony for the cure of the wound which he had received at Roſbach,

Roſbach, was to command this detachment. The plan was well laid, and we ſhall ſee, at the commencement of the following campaign, the ſucceſs which accompanied prince Ferdinand in its execution.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

The Winter of 1757 *to* 1758.

NEVER was campaign more fruitful in ſudden changes than that the hiſtory of which we have juſt concluded. That chance which preſides over the incidents of war had inſolently ſported with the deſtiny of the belligerent powers. At one time it had beſtowed on Pruſſia the moſt brilliant ſucceſs; at another it had hurled her headlong into an abyſs of miſeries. The Ruſſians had gained a battle in Pruſſia, yet had retreated as if they had been vanquiſhed. The French, on the point of diſarming the duke of Cumberland, appeared to be the umpires of Germany: yet ſcarcely had this news time to be rumoured throughout Europe, before the defeat of one of their armies was publiſhed, and the reſurrection of the army of the duke, which was ſuppoſed to be for ever extinct, was beheld. Such a ſucceſſion of deciſive yet contradictory events had as it were ſtupified Europe. Incertitude was ſeen to attend projectors; deſigns were no ſooner conceived than overthrown, and armies were almoſt deſtroyed in a ſingle day.

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Some moments of tranquillity were requiſite for the minds of men to recover their recollection, and that each power might coolly conſider its actual ſituation. Here were beheld the burning deſire of vengeance, wounded ambition, vexation, and deſpair, arming the hand of emperors and of kings who formed the grand alliance. There was ſeen the neceſſity of continuing war; and rays of hope ſhone forth on Pruſſia, inducing her to exert her utmoſt efforts for ſelf-defence. Renovated fermentation gave a renovated degree of activity to politics and to courts. Each prepared to carry on the war with additional obſtinacy, fury, and deſtruction.

Such is the general picture of the paſſions which agitated kings and their miniſters. The nature of this work requires us to enter into the moſt circumſtantial details; and that we ſhould take a ſucceſſive retroſpect of all the courts of Europe, that we may diſtinctly figure to ourſelves what was paſſing in each.

During the laſt autumn a change had taken place in the Britiſh miniſtry. Fox, who had intrudingly been made a member of it by the intrigues of the duke of Cumberland, ſaw himſelf unable to maintain his ſtation againſt the oppoſing party. He reſolved voluntarily

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to reſign, and was ſucceeded by Pitt, whoſe eloquence and high genius had rendered him the idol of the nation. He was the greateſt man in England. He had ſubjugated the houſe of commons by the force of oratory, over which he reigned, and of which he might be pronounced the ſoul. Having taken the helm, he applied the whole extent of his genius to render his country queen of the ocean, and like a great man thought the convention of Cloſter-Seven diſgraceful, which he regarded as opprobrious to England. His firſt ſteps in his new career all tended to aboliſh the very remembrance of this ſhameful treaty. He it was who propoſed to reinforce the troops of Germany by an Engliſh corps, which corps effectually joined them in the year 1758. He ſtill farther judged it conducive to the nation's glory to renew the alliances that had been contracted, as well with the king of Pruſſia as with other princes of Germany. He concluded a treaty with the king, by one article of which the king of England engaged to pay the king of Pruſſia an annual ſubſidy of four millions of crowns, which was continued to the year 1761. The king ſaw himſelf under the neceſſity of accepting this ſubſidy, which otherwiſe was repugnant to his manner of thinking. But the French had deſpoiled him of the provinces he poſſeſſed on the

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Lower Rhine, and he was on the eve of beholding Pruſſia invaded by the Ruſſians, whom he was the leſs enabled to impede ſince marſhal Lehwald had been obliged to haſten into Pomerania, and oppoſe the Swedes. This ſubſidy was beſide the only ſuccour that might be obtained from England, ſince ſhe had various times declined the requeſt that had been made to ſend a ſquadron into the Baltic.

Pitt, about this time, ſent Sir Robert Keith into Ruſſia, there to counteract the intrigues of the French and Auſtrian faction, and to endeavour to remove the film from the eyes of the empreſs, blinded by the prejudices with which ſhe had been inſpired againſt the king of Pruſſia. Mr. Goderick* departed with ſimilar views for Sweden; but the French party, who deſpotically governed the ſenate of Stockholm, put every ſpring in action to interdict all entrance into the kingdom to this Engliſhman. Goderick remained in Denmark, and the ſenators applauded themſelves for having prevented the money of England from overturning their ſyſtem. While Pitt was taking meaſures ſo proper reſpecting politics, the ports of Great Britain abounded with ſhips; plans for war by land and ſea were concerted, and new

* Read—Sir John Goodricke. T.

activity

activity reanimated every branch of government.

Keith, who in the interim had arrived at Peterſburg, found not the court in a diſpoſition favourable to liſten to the purport of his embaſſy. The ambaſſadors of Auſtria, France, and Saxony, were there all puiſſant. By the aid of their intrigues, and the profuſion of their bribes, they had gained the favourite of Elizabeth, who then governed the empreſs, conſequently the empire. The ambaſſadors, diſguſted with the ſmall progreſs of the Ruſſian army, and particularly with its retreat, at the cloſe of the laſt campaign, endeavoured to animate the mind of the empreſs with their own warlike enthuſiaſm, and excited her to make ſtill greater efforts in the coming year than ſhe had done in the paſt. They perceived that their intentions were ſecretly traverſed by the grand chancellor Beſtuchef, and they determined his downfal, in which they were effectually ſucceſsful.

We have in this work depicted count Beſtuchef as a man who had changed paſſion into principle, and had become the ſworn enemy of Pruſſia: but he renounced his ſyſtem that he might pleaſe the grand duke, who he foreſaw would ſoon aſcend the throne. He gave

inſtructions to marſhal Apraxin in a manner as favourable as circumſtances would permit, and this was the ſole cauſe that the Ruſſians evacuated the ſtates of the king at the cloſe of the campaign. Beſtuchef was encouraged in this conduct by the counſels of the grand duke and grand dutcheſs of Ruſſia, who mutually entertained the moſt favourable ſentiments of the cauſe of the king. The grand duke, by birth prince of Holſtein, had acquired from the hiſtory of his anceſtors an implacable hatred againſt the Danes, occaſioned by the injuſtice the kings of Denmark had committed on his family. Fearing the affairs of the king might oblige him to an alliance with the Danes, he offered his credit, and every ſervice he could render him in Ruſſia, provided he would not enter into any engagement with theſe conſtant enemies of Holſtein. His offers were accepted by the king, who promiſed to enter into no treaty with Denmark; and, though this condeſcenſion was of no preſent advantage, it will hereafter be ſeen that it was this his cloſe connection with the grand duke of Ruſſia that overthrew the vaſt projects of Auſtria.

However ſecret all theſe affairs might be kept, ſtill ſomething was perceived: the ambaſſadors of France and Auſtria ſaw the conduct of the grand

grand chancellor vary. They obtained cognizance of the orders that had been expedited to marſhal Apraxin, and employed the favourite of the empreſs to effect the fall of the miniſter, and to afford every kind of contrariety to the court of the grand duke. From that moment all bowed before theſe ambaſſadors in Ruſſia, and they drove the empreſs Elizabeth into violent meaſures that were little conformable to the true intereſts of her empire.

The court of Vienna had received ſhocks ſo violent, at the cloſe of the laſt campaign, that its fortitude began to be ſhaken. Auſtria had ſuppoſed the war was almoſt terminated, and regarded the conqueſt of Sileſia as accompliſhed. Suddenly deprived of theſe flattering hopes, ſhe had beheld her army ruined, and its ſhattered remains with difficulty eſcaping into Bohemia. Misfortunes ſo unexpected relaxed her ardour for war, and ſo many projects rendered abortive diminiſhed her diſlike, or rather her inſurmountable averſion, to peace. The ſtyle of her chancery, and the memorials of Ratiſbon, became milder, but bitterneſs and rudeneſs revived with renovating hope. While the firſt impreſſions of misfortune were ſtrong, the empreſs queen wiſhed ſome intercourſe with the king; whether it were to begin a negotiation,

or to acquire the honour of magnanimity. Count Kaunitz informed the king of an imaginary conſpiracy againſt him, entered into by two Neapolitans and a Milaneſe. The king replied he was obliged to the empreſs queen for the information ſhe had been pleaſed to give him; but as there were two modes of aſſaſſination, the one by the poniard, the other by injurious and diſhonourable writings, he aſſured her majeſty that he concerned himſelf little with the firſt, but that his feelings were infinitely more ſtrong reſpecting the ſecond. This did not prevent indecency and ſcandal from being continued in theſe writings; nor even from increaſing, according as ſucceſs favoured the arms of Auſtria.

France heard with chagrin of the pacific propenſities of the empreſs queen, becauſe that the defection of Auſtria would have been very conſiderably prejudicial to her affairs, while ſhe ſhould continue at war with the Engliſh by ſea and land. Louis XV. piqued at the diſgrace which the battle of Roſbach had inflicted, hoped by the continuation of war to find opportunity of revenge; and the miniſters of France laboured, at Vienna, with infinite application, to inflame the paſſions that began to be calmed at that court. The ſhame of a great power being abaſed by a petty prince

was

was what weighed moſt on the mind of the empreſs. Ancient animoſity againſt Pruſſia was awakened; all diſpoſitions toward peace vaniſhed; and the connections of friendſhip and intelligence between the courts of Vienna and Verſailles became more than ever intimate. Thus, far from the powers with which Pruſſia was at war being repulſed by her ſucceſs, they undertook to redouble their efforts, that they might appear ſuperlatively formidable and dangerous, at the opening of the enſuing campaign.

The king likewiſe took ſimilar meaſures for the re-eſtabliſhment of the army, during winter, that it might be enabled to act with vigour. The loſſes that had reſulted from ſeven pitched battles, which the Pruſſians had fought, were to be repaired. But the ravages of war were unequal to the ravages which epidemical diſeaſe made in the hoſpitals. The diſeaſe we ſpeak of was a ſpecies of inflammatory fever, accompanied with all the ſymptoms of the plague. The ſick became delirious on the day they were attacked. Carbuncles appeared on the neck, and under the arm-pits. Whether they were or were not bled it was the ſame; death carried off all thoſe without diſtinction who were attacked by this malady; the venom of

which was ſo violent, its progreſs ſo rapid, and its effects ſo prompt, that the patient in three days was in the grave. Reſort was ineffectually had to every kind of remedy. At length emetics * were employed, and ſucceeded. Three grains were diſſolved in a meaſure of water, the ſick were made to drink till the doſe began to operate, and this was found to be a ſovereign ſpecific againſt the diſeaſe; for, after it was brought into uſe, ſcarcely three out of a hundred died. The cauſes of the diſeaſe, no doubt, were perſpiration impeded by cold, and indigeſtion occaſioned by bad food. Powerful evacuations only were found effectual.

Though the loſſes of the army in the hoſpitals were conſiderable, ſufficient recruits ſtill were collected, during winter, to fill up theſe loſſes; but it was impoſſible to employ them in the ſpring, becauſe that moſt of them were peaſants, whom it was neceſſary to exerciſe and diſcipline; and the campaign began early.

The royal houſe this year loſt the queen mother. The fatal news was received by the king after the battle of Kolin, and at the moment when fortune was moſt averſe to Pruſſia. His majeſty was deeply affected. He had

* *On eu recours à l'émétique.* By this phraſe the royal author probably means ſome preparation of antimony. T.

venerated

venerated and adored this princeſs, as a tender mother, whoſe virtues and great qualities were the admiration of thoſe who had the happineſs to approach her. Her death did not occaſion a ceremonious mourning; it was in this inſtance a public calamity. The great regretted her eaſy and gracious affability, men of a ſubordinate rank her clemency, the poor their loſt refuge, the unfortunate their late reſource, men of letters their protectreſs, and every branch of her family that had the honour to be neareſt her perſon imagined a part of themſelves was deceaſed, and were more ſenſible than ſhe herſelf was of the ſtroke of death.

In the ſame year died the ſultan Oſman. His ſucceſſor had the character of being a more bold and enterpriſing monarch. The rumour of his reputation, on his acceſſion to the throne, rekindled all the intrigues of the Pruſſian ambaſſador at the Porte. The ſieur von Rexin wiſhed to be admitted to an audience with the grand ſeignior; this favour he had more than a year been interceding to obtain, for till it was obtained he could not begin thoſe negotiations with which he had been charged with the grand vizir and the principal officers of the Divan. In the courſe of the work we ſhall ſee the various forms this nego-

tiation assumed, and shall have occasion to remark how little proper oriental nations are to pursue the principles of good and wholesome policy. This defect principally arises from their great ignorance of the interests of the monarchs of Europe, from the venality of the people, and from the vices of government, which subject every thing that relates to peace and war to the decisions of the muphti, without whose fetfa it is impossible to put the Ottoman troops in motion.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Campaign of 1758.

(February.) PRINCE Ferdinand of Brunſwick was the firſt who this year took the field. The taſk he had to perform was difficult. It was nothing leſs than to expel eighty thouſand French from Lower Saxony and Weſtphalia, with thirty thouſand Hanoverians, who three months before had been ready to lay down their arms and ſign a diſgraceful treaty. He detached a corps, on the Weſer, which took Verden; and another, under the hereditary prince, that marched on each ſide of the river, to gain Hoya, on which place by the efforts of valour and good conduct this young hero ſeized. Scarcely was St. Germain informed of the progreſs he had made before he evacuated Bremen, where he had a garriſon of twelve battalions, and, with fourteen others that had wintered in the vicinity, took the road to Weſtphalia.

(March.) While the hereditary prince ſeized on Hoya, the bridge of which over the Weſer was of importance to the allies, prince Ferdinand of Brunſwick paſſed the Aller with the main army.

army. Beuſt, who led the van-guard, ſurpriſed and took the regiment of Polereſky, in the vicinage of Hanover. This accident, added to the march of prince Henry who approached the town of Brunſwick through the diſtricts of Mansfeld and Hildeſheim, diſconcerted the French generals, and made the count de Clermont, who had taken the command inſtead of the duke de Richelieu, determine at once to evacuate Brunſwick, Wolfenbuttle, and Hanover. Prince Ferdinand marched immediately for Minden; where, having joined the detachments from the Weſer, he beſieged that place with the main army. The count de Clermont paſſed the Weſer at Hameln, and ſent de Broglio into the vicinage of Buckeburg, for the relief of Minden; but, finding no opportunity of attempting any thing againſt the allies, this general did but remain a ſpectator of the capture of the town, the garriſon of which ſurrendered priſoners of war.

After the capture of Minden, de Broglio turned toward Paderborn, to rejoin the prince of Clermont; and the army of the allies marched to Bielefeld. The French, confounded by this ſudden revolution in their affairs, evacuated Lippſtadt, Hamm, and Munſter. The count de Clermont, who had no longer any footing in Germany,

Germany, repaſſed the Rhine at Weſel, and cantoned his army on the oppoſite ſhore. Prince Ferdinand halted at Munſter (April) and ſent his troops into the environs that they might have time to recover from the fatigues they had ſuſtained, by continual operations in a ſeaſon ſo early and ſo ſevere. The allies took eleven thouſand French priſoners, during this ſhort expedition, which can only be compared to the famous campaign of marſhal de Turenne, when, penetrating through Thann and Befort, he ſurpriſed the Imperialiſts, who were ſcattered in their quarters in Alſatia, and obliged them to repaſs the Rhine.

On the 2d of June, prince Ferdinand croſſed this river with his army below Emmerich. He had bribed ſome Dutch boatmen, but who would not however engage to conſtruct a bridge, except on the territories of the republic. From thence he preſently advanced into the country of Cleves. Some French troops were ſurpriſed in their quarters, but moſt of them joined the army which had aſſembled near Crefeld. Prince Ferdinand occupied the town of Cleves. He left ſome troops under the command of Imhof, to cover his bridge of Emmerich; he then proceeded with the allied army up the left ſhore of the Rhine; and, on the 20th of the month,

came

came within a day's march of the count de Clermont. He had reſolved to attack the French army, in the hope that, ſhould he gain a complete victory, he might recover Weſel, and tranſport the theatre of the war beyond the Rhine. For this purpoſe the prince cauſed Wangenheim to join him, who had been toward Kaiſerſwerth; after the junction he marched for Cloſter camp. On his approach, St. Germain abandoned the town of Crefeld, and retired a mile in the rear, that he might draw near the count de Clermont, who then encamped at Nuys. He joined the count at Viſchern.

It was on the 23d of June that prince Ferdinand quitted his camp of Haſt and Kempen to attack de Clermont. He divided his army into three corps; one, under the command of Wangenheim, preſented itſelf in the front of the foe, to hold him in awe; while the main body of the allies, turning the left of the French, preſented itſelf on their flank, between Viſchern and Anrodt. In this part, behind a rivulet, there was a bulwark, or *Landwehr*, by which the French profited to take poſt; but, after a ſevere conflict, they were diſlodged by the infantry of the allies. The French carabineers haſtened to the ſupport of their infantry; and their leader, the count de Giſors, ardently at-

tacked the infantry of prince Ferdinand. The count was ſlain, and his diſcouraged troops took to flight. The prince of Holſtein then fell on, with the Pruſſian dragoons, and completed the rout. During this ſhock, the hereditary prince, with a part of the right of the allies, had gained upon the rear of the French. The manœuvre completely diſconcerted the count de Clermont; who, imagining himſelf on the point of being attacked in front by Wangenheim, while he was taken in flank by prince Ferdinand, and in momentary danger of being totally turned by the hereditary prince, abandoned the field of battle, and retired to Nuys, then to Weringhen, and afterward to Cologn.

That he might profit by victory, prince Ferdinand detached the hereditary prince, who took Ruremonde by capitulation, and ſent parties forward to the very gates of Bruſſels, while Wangenheim, who had been ordered to march with four battalions into the dutchy of Bergen, beſieged Duſſeldorf, in which there were eight battalions. The town ſurrendered, by capitulation, on the 8th of July. Here a conſiderable magazine appertaining to the French was found.

Prince Ferdinand however, being informed that the enemy was collecting forces to oppoſe him,

him, called in the corps of the hereditary prince to the convent of St. Nicholas, where he encamped. This commencement of de Clermont induced the court of Verſailles to recal him, and to ſend marſhal de Contades to take the command. The marſhal immediately ordered the army to advance, that it might recover its loſt confidence. M. de Chevert, in the mean time, being at Weſel, where the French had a numerous garriſon, left the place with a conſiderable corps to combat Imhof, who guarded the bridge of the allies, near Emmerich. Of this the general received information, and with his whole corps put himſelf in ambuſcade, on the road by which de Chevert was to paſs; beat the foe, and took many priſoners.

The ſucceſs of prince Ferdinand would have prevented the French from repaſſing the Rhine, and might have accompliſhed the capture of Weſel toward the cloſe of the campaign, had he not by a diverſion been obliged himſelf to paſs this river, that he might reinſtate the affairs of Heſſe and Lower Saxony. On the eleventh of July the prince de Soubiſe had put himſelf in motion; and had been joined at Hanau by fifteen thouſand of the troops of Wurtemberg. Prince Ferdinand had left the prince of Yſenburg in Heſſe, with about ſeven thouſand men.

This prince retired to Marbourg, at the approach of the French van-guard, commanded by de Broglio, and paſſed the Fulda. The French attacked him in the poſition he had taken, near Sangerhauſen, and after a combat of ſix hours he was obliged to cede to numbers. He retired to Eimbeck, and eſtabliſhed himſelf among the hills, confining his manœuvres to the preſerving of a communication with Hanover.

Finding no reſiſtance, the prince de Soubiſe then ſeized on Nordheim, Munden, and Göttingen. De Contades (Auguſt) who ſuppoſed the diverſion of de Soubiſe would ſoon oblige the allies to retreat, advanced in perſon, and even occupied the poſt of Brugen, which was on their left. But prince Ferdinand, who might not ſuffer this dangerous neighbourhood, ſent the hereditary prince to diſlodge the French. He afterward reſolved to retreat toward the Niers, that he might approach the ſuccour that was coming from England. The French made a ſimilar march, but were anticipated by the allies. Prince Ferdinand, who perceived the only means of maintaining himſelf beyond the Rhine was a victory over de Contades, made diſpoſitions for battle; but the marſhal did not think proper to riſk an action, and retired to Dalen. Prince Ferdinand then marched for

Wachtendonk,

Wachtendonk, from which the hereditary prince, who led the van-guard, drove the French, and the whole army croſſed the Niers.

Prince Ferdinand, incapable of longer maintaining himſelf and army beyond the Rhine, withdrew the garriſon from Ruremonde, which found means to eſcape at the very time that the place was ſummoned by the foe. The whole army paſſed the Rhine, over its bridge at Griethauſen, between the 8th and 10th of Auguſt. It was neceſſary to evacuate Duſſeldorf at the ſame time; and the governor Hardenberg diligently marched to Lippſtadt there to defend that important poſt. The French a few days after paſſed the Rhine, and extended as far as Dorſten, being covered by the Lippe.

On the 14th, prince Ferdinand was joined at Böckholt by twelve thouſand Engliſh, under the duke of Marlborough. Marſhal de Contades was, at the ſame time, reinforced in his camp of Halteren, by between five and ſix thouſand Saxons, whom the Auſtrians had aſſembled in Hungary, and who were commanded by prince Xavier, ſecond ſon of the king of Poland. Prince Ferdinand detached Imhof to Crefeld, and M. von Poſt to Dalmen; and farther, in conſequence of the motions of the enemy toward Lunen, the hereditary prince was

detached

detached to reinforce the corps at Dalmen. Prince Ferdinand quickly followed with the army, and the hereditary prince obliged the French to retreat to Halteren. Under theſe circumſtances it was thought proper to detach Oberg, with a corps of nine thouſand men, to paſs the Lippe, and march into the biſhoprick of Paderborn; as well to interrupt the communication of the two French armies, as to be ready, ſhould there be any neceſſity, to aid the prince of Yſenburg.

In the mean time, and while the prince of Yſenburg remained near Eimbeck, de Soubiſe had taken Caſſel, Göttingen, and ſome places on the Werra. He then formed the project of ſeizing on Hameln (September), but from this he was obliged to deſiſt, when he underſtood that prince Ferdinand had repaſſed the Rhine. He afterward evacuated Munden, Göttingen, and all the places he had occupied in the country of Hanover, that he might ſtrengthen himſelf on the Diemel. In this poſition he remained till the 5th of September; and, leaving only M. du Meſnil on the Diemel to oppoſe the corps under Oberg, he ſucceſſively advanced to Munden, Göttingen, and Nordheim. On the eleventh, the prince of Yſenburg was obliged to quit Eimbeck, at the approach of the French,

and retire to Coppenbrugge, where he was joined by ſome regiments from the army of the allies; after which he, in conjunction with Oberg, advanced on Holzmunden. This manœuvre made de Soubiſe, who was at Göttingen, apprehend he ſhould be cut off from Caſſel; and, immediately withdrawing his corps, he diligently returned into Heſſe. The allies and the French arrived nearly at the ſame time before Caſſel, where they encamped in preſence of each other.

All theſe motions had no influence on the operations of prince Ferdinand; he purſued his purpoſe, which was to obſerve the army of de Contades. The French, having vainly attempted to ſurpriſe the hereditary prince, at Halteren, and having been there repulſed with conſiderable loſs, turned their views elſewhere. De Contades detached M. de Chevert (October 1ſt) with twenty thouſand men, to join the prince de Soubiſe; and, by this reinforcement, to give him the ſuperiority neceſſary to overwhelm the prince of Yſenburg, and at the ſame time to occupy prince Ferdinand, ſo as to prevent him from ſending detachments into Heſſe. Contades himſelf inclined toward Hamm with his army, and ſent M. de Chevreuſe to Söſt.

Perceiving

Perceiving this, the allies fell back toward Munſter, whence the hereditary prince was detached (the 9th) to Warendorf on the Ems; and the prince of Holſtein to Telgade. Having been joined by his reinforcement, de Soubiſe loſt no time in putting himſelf in action. The prince of Yſenburg, informed of the arrival of de Chevert, croſſed the Fulda, and continued to retire before the enemy as far as Lutterberg, that he might not be cut off from Munden. Here he was attacked by the enemy with a force ſo ſuperior that he was obliged to yield the field of battle, with the loſs of ſixteen field pieces, and about two thouſand men. He retired by Dransfeld and Göttingen to Möringuen. This event obliged prince Ferdinand to quit Munſter, where he left a good garriſon, and on the 17th arrived with his army at Lippſtadt.

On the morrow, the hereditary prince marched to ſurpriſe de Chevreuſe, who was at Söſt; but this ſurpriſe did not take place, becauſe the French were informed of the march of the allies: though, after a ſhort combat, they retired and abandoned all the proviſions they had amaſſed at Söſt. Prince Ferdinand incontinently aſſumed his camp near that town, which induced de Chevert to change his route. He had quitted de Soubiſe, after the affair of Lutterberg,

and could only join de Contades by a circuitous march. When de Chevert had left the army of Heſſe, Oberg paſſed the Weſer, at Holzmunden; and, continuing his route, on the 21ſt of October, he joined the allied army at Söſt. The poſition of prince Ferdinand intercepted the communication of the two French armies; and, however ſuperior they might be in number to that of the allies, this did not prevent the prince de Soubiſe from ſuppoſing his poſition hazardous; conſequently he evacuated Caſſel (the 22d) and all Heſſe, and croſſed the Maine at Hanau, with his whole forces. Here the campaign would have ended, had not de Contades once more attempted to ſurpriſe Munſter. M. d'Armentieres had approached this place, at the head of fifteen thouſand French, near which he had choſen a camp that the trenches might be immediately opened. But on the 26th Imhof arrived at Warendorf, followed by the duke of Holſtein, at the ſame time that Wangenheim, with a large detachment, occupied the camp of Rheda. Theſe various manœuvres, which menaced to cut off d'Armentieres from Weſel, and the ſkirmiſh which happened with major Bulow, made him reſolve to renounce his project, and to croſs the Lippe, on the 2d of November. The French army ſoon took the road for Weſel,

to enter into winter quarters on the oppoſite ſhore of the Rhine. Marburg excepted, they had no longer any footing in Heſſe, and thither the hereditary prince was ſent, who employed but a few days in his expedition. After the capture of this place, being maſters of all Weſtphalia and Lower Saxony, the allies went into quarters.

During this excellent campaign of prince Ferdinand, the king did not remain idle in oppoſing the Auſtrians. He prepared to reap all poſſible advantage from the battle of Leuthen, and the conſequences which had reſulted from that battle. On the 9th of January, Werner had been detached into Upper Sileſia; and, however ſuperior the enemy might be to his corps, the former was obliged to retire into Moravia, and the Pruſſians then recovered Troppau and Jægerndorf. The king judged this early beginning neceſſary for the execution of his deſigns. The expedition of the month of January appeared to the foe but as the conſequence of the battle of Leuthen, and conduced to the clearing of all Sileſia from the troops of Auſtria.

In this ſtate affairs remained till the 14th of March, when the army began its motions for the commencement of the campaign. The

enemy was known not to be ſufficiently advanced in his arrangements to oppoſe the plans the king had formed; ſo that this time was judged the moſt proper to change the blockade of Schweidnitz into a regular ſiege. The king put himſelf at the head of the army of obſervation, and cantoned from Landſhut to Friedland. Prince Maurice had the command of the left, and continued the communication through Wuſtengierſdorf to Braunau. Fouquet commanded the corps which covered this defile of Sileſia. The king fixed his head quarters at Griſſau, which was the central poſition of the places occupied by his troops.

The main army of the enemy was ſtill in cantonments, in the environs of Königſgrætz and Jaromirs. Marſhal Daun had the ſole command, and had ordered the corps of Laudon to advance to Trautenau, and that of Beck to Nachod (April). Such was the poſition of the armies when Treſkow more nearly inveſted the town of Schweidnitz. The trenches were not opened till the night of the 1ſt of April: the attack was directed on the fortreſs of the potence, as the place leaſt fortified, and the moſt commodious for the bringing up of ammunition. Twenty-four cannon, twenty mortars, and ſixteen howitzers, were erected in battery; but, having

having often been deranged by the artillery of the beſieged, this battery was not entirely completed till the 8th; and on the 10th an arrow was ſeized on which the enemy was obliged to abandon. This arrow, which brought the Pruſſians within a hundred paces of the fort of the potence, gave occaſion to the coup de main which was attempted on the latter work, that the ſiege might be terminated with the greater promptitude. The artillery of the water fort and that of the potence having been diſmounted on the 15th, the aſſault was made after midnight. The potence was turned on the narrow part, and a thouſand grenadiers carried it with a loſs ſo inſignificant as not to merit being mentioned. The governor, diſconcerted by an action ſo vigorous, beat the chamade and ſurrendered himſelf and garriſon priſoners. The count von Thierhaimb evacuated the town on the 18th, and his men, to the amount of five thouſand, were diſperſed in the different fortreſſes of Sileſia and the electoral march.

The ſiege, thus fortunately and timely terminated, facilitated the execution of projects more great. The deſign of the king was to penetrate into Moravia, and to take Olmutz; not with an intention to preſerve the place, for the diverſion of the Ruſſians was foreſeen; they

having ſeized on Pruſſia, and prepared to enter Pomerania and the marches of Brandenbourg; but in order to amuſe the Auſtrians, during the whole campaign, in a country diſtant from the ſtates of the king, that he might have time and opportunity to oppoſe the Ruſſian army with the greater ſtrength. For the execution of this plan it was neceſſary to deceive marſhal Daun, and to gain ſome marches upon him, that there might be time ſufficient to ſecure the environs of Olmutz before his arrival. With this intent the army of the king left the mountains, and deſcended into the plains of Schweidnitz and of Reichenbach, under the pretence of relieving the troops after the fatigues of the ſiege, and of waiting for recruits by whom they were to be joined. Ziethen remained with a corps in the vicinity of Landſhut, whence he drew a line to Friedland; and Fouquet entered the county of Glatz, that he there might guard the paſſes. Theſe two corps had maſked the motions of the army behind the hills, and had been further of ſervice in preventing the Auſtrians from receiving ſuch intelligence as might teach them what were the intentions of the king.

(May.) While theſe diſpoſitions impoſed upon the enemy, the Pruſſian army marched to Neiſs, where it divided into two columns, one of which, commanded

commanded by the king, took the road of Troppau; and the other, under marſhal Keith, that of Jægerndorf. On the 3d of May theſe two columns entered the plains of Olmutz; the one by Gibau, the other through Sternberg. Fouquet followed them, as ſoon as he obſerved the foe had taken the alarm, and quitted the vicinity of Königſgrætz to incline toward Hohemaut. He took the road for Neiſs, whence he eſcorted the ammunition and proviſions, requiſite for the ſiege, as far as Olmutz. This was the 12th, and on the ſame day the army of obſervation paſſed the Morava at Littau. The king advanced to Holeſchau, where M. de Ville, encamped with ſeven regiments of cavalry, was attacked by the prince of Wurtemberg, and repulſed beyond Proſtnitz, toward Wiſchau. The prince encamped his corps at Proſtnitz, and remained there to obſerve the enemy on the ſide of Wiſchau and Brunn; having four regiments of dragoons, one of huſſars, and four battalions, under his command.

Keith, having inveſted Olmutz, opened the trenches on the 27th of May. The ten ſquadrons of Bareuth, five hundred huſſars, and ſome free battalions, were placed by him on the other ſide of the Morava, and they encamped near a village named Dolein. That the marſhal and

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the army might be in the greater ſafety during the ſiege, it was thought neceſſary to drive de Ville further. This general was near being ſurpriſed in his camp, and did not ſuppoſe himſelf in ſafety till he had approached the fortifications of Brunn.

The army of obſervation, in the mean time, occupied all the poſts which there was ſufficient leiſure to ſelect; in conſequence of this the margrave Charles aſſumed the camp of Neuſtadt; prince Maurice that of Littau; Wedel that of Namieſt; and the king occupied that part of the heights which extend between Proſtnitz and Holeſchau, from Namieſt to Studenitz.

On the 10th of June, Puttkammer and the convoy he eſcorted joined the army, without having been diſturbed in his route. Ziethen, who had been attacked at Griſſau by the enemy, repulſed the aſſailants; and, remarking that the whole force of Auſtria inclined toward Moravia, he quitted the hills and joined the royal army, almoſt at the ſame time with Puttkammer. As there were not ſufficient ammunition and proviſions for the ſiege, a new convoy was prepared in Sileſia, as well to carry on attacks as to reinforce the army. The ſiege would apparently have been more ſucceſsful, had not the trenches

been

been too diſtant, and the firſt batteries neceſſarily forſaken, becauſe they fired without effect, by which much ammunition was inefficaciouſly conſumed.

The van-guard of marſhal Daun entered Moravia, in the interim, under the command of Harſch; and encamped in preſence of prince Maurice, on the hills of Allerheiligen, not far from Littau. Harſch made an unſucceſsful attempt to ſurpriſe that town. Daun, who followed, had marched for Gewitſch, whence he detached a corps of ſix thouſand men, who took poſt at Prerau. This poſition obliged marſhal Keith to place his dragoons at Wiſternitz, and his free companies at Biſtrovann, and Koſutchan. The intentions of Daun were to throw ſuccours into the beſieged place, without expoſing himſelf to a battle, the loſs of which would have incurred the capture of Olmutz. He attacked the village of Koſutchan by night (the 8th) which was defended by a free battalion that was obliged to give ground. The dragoons of Bareuth, who had paſſed the night under arms, by the negligence of colonel Meyer, the commander, did not wait the return of the ſcouting parties before they unſaddled. The enemy came up impetuouſly, driving the patroles before him, and fell on the tents of the dragoons, which

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he did not give them time to quit. The regiment loſt three hundred men, and would have been totally ruined, had not the battalion of Nimſchewſky timely arrived, and obliged the aſſailants to haſten their retreat.

The ſucceſs of this gave the Auſtrians an inclination for nocturnal attempts. They three times attacked the regiment of Ziethen at Koſtelitz, and were three times repulſed with conſiderable loſs. The free battalions of le Noble and de Rapin were not equally fortunate. They had been ſent by the margrave Charles to Sternberg, whence they were to repair to Bahrn, to eſcort a convoy which arrived on the 10th. But they were very ill treated by the pandours, and loſt five hundred men.

Let us return to more conſiderable objects. The poſition of the Auſtrian army, and principally the corps it had detached to Prerau, required that the town of Olmutz ſhould be more cloſely inveſted, beyond the Morava. The corps of the margrave, at Neuſtadt, did not appear to be eſſentially neceſſary there; and, as there were not too many troops, the margrave took poſt in ſuch a manner that his left occupied a bridge the Pruſſians had at Commothau, over the Morava, while his left extended to the bridge of Holitz. However, while the Pruſſians changed

changed their poſition, the Auſtrian colonel Bulau had found means to glide into the town, and brought the governor, Marſhall, a reinforcement of twelve hundred men.

Marſhal Daun, a few days after, deſcended into the plain, and encamped at Prettlitz, between Proſtnitz and Wiſchau. Here he was informed the Pruſſians expected a grand convoy, on which the ſucceſs of the ſiege depended, becauſe that ammunition began to fail. This convoy was eſcorted by eight battalions, and four thouſand convaleſcents, horſe and foot, who had been formed into regiments to ſerve on the occaſion. It left Troppau on the 25th of June; and Daun, directing his views to the capture of it, ſent Janus to Bahrn, and Laudon to Liebe, that it might be intercepted. The king, to oppoſe him, detached Ziethen, with twenty ſquadrons and three battalions, who came up with the convoy near Gibau. On the morrow (the 28th) general Laudon attacked, and, after an action of five hours, was obliged to retreat. The convoy advanced very tardily, becauſe of the badneſs of the roads; and Daun employed the time to ſend a reinforcement of eight thouſand men to Janus and Laudon. On the 30th there was a new attack, between Bautſch and Domſtadt. Scarcely had a thou-

ſand

ſand horſe, four battalions, and four hundred waggons, began the march, and paſſed the defile of Domſtadt, before the enemy, with all his forces from Bahrn and Liebe, fell on the convoy; ſo that the two columns of the enemy, meeting, cut off the van-guard, which had paſſed the defile, from the corps that followed. Ziethen, who was with the main body, vigorouſly charged one wing of the foe, but numbers were too diſproportionate for him to ſucceed. After having bravely combated, he was conſtrained, with moſt of his men, to retire for Troppau. He here loſt general Puttkammer, and eight hundred men, without including the whole convoy and the army money, which fell into the hands of the enemy.

This misfortune occaſioned the ſiege to be raiſed. Had the convoy arrived, the town muſt have been taken in leſs than a fortnight; for the third parallel was finiſhed, and the beſiegers had begun to open the ſaps. But, however well founded theſe hopes might be, it was requiſite they ſhould be renounced, for the ſafety of the army; which, by prolonging its abode in Moravia, would have wanted ſubſiſtence.

There were two roads for retreat; the one leading into Upper Sileſia, by which the army had advanced, and the other which croſſes Bohemia,

mia, and leads into the county of Glatz; or through Braunau into Sileſia. The enemy prepared to render the firſt route difficult. Laudon, Janus, and St. Ignon, had remained there after the battle of the convoy, and marſhal Daun had marched with his army to Tobiſchau; ſo that it was to be feared, ſhould this road be taken, the army would have two corps on its flanks, and Daun who would inceſſantly haraſs the rear-guard. In a word the march muſt have been one perpetual battle, in which the army might have loſt the heavy artillery for the ſiege, its baggage, wounded, and ſick, and perhaps it might even have been totally ruined, at the paſſage of the Morava, which the enemy might have rendered fatal. Theſe conſiderations quickly determined the king to return through Bohemia; becauſe it was poſſible, the enemy not being prepared on that ſide, to gain two marches on him; which was matter of great importance for the ſafety of the artillery, and baggage, that encumbered the army.

On the night of the firſt of July, the king quitted his camp, and divided his troops into two columns. The corps of prince Maurice formed the van-guard, where the king was in perſon, and paſſed by Konitz, Tribau, and Zwittau, to Leitomiſchel; where it ſeized on a

magazine of the enemy. The ſecond, under the conduct of marſhal Keith, retreating from its trenches, only left four mortars, and one cannon, which were immoveable becauſe the carriages were broken. It took the road of Littau, Muglitz, and Tribau. The march thus far was not diſturbed by the foe, becauſe Daun, having made all his diſpoſitions relative to the roads of Upper Sileſia, could not withdraw his troops with ſufficient promptitude to act effectually on the ſide of Bohemia. Laſcy, nevertheleſs, who encamped at Gibau, wiſhed to aſſault the rear guard, which was obliged to paſs the defile of Krenau, to march to Zwittau. On this village he ſeized with his grenadiers, but he was quickly diſlodged by Wied, and the troops peaceably continued their march.

Marſhal Keith had divided his column into three corps; one of which, under Retzow, having paſſed Hohemaut, approaching the ſmall hills of Holitz, found them occupied by the enemy. The Pruſſians ſeized the chapel which is on the height, facing one held by the foe; a reciprocal cannonade was commenced; while Retzow continued to make his convoy and eſcort file off. At the ſame time St. Ignon, who commanded the Auſtrians, imagined this the moment for attack, and with eleven hundred

dred horſe fell on the regiment of Bredow cuiraſſiers, which he obliged to retreat. In the interim a lieutenant with fifty huſſars came up, who had been ſent by the king with diſpatches for Keith. This brave officer, named Kurzhagen, fell with his few men with ſuch timely effect on the flank of general St. Ignon that he recovered the cuiraſſiers. The Pruſſian cavalry haſtened up, and repulſed the Auſtrians; with the loſs of ſix officers, and three hundred men. Marſhal Keith and his column arrived preciſely when the enemy was routed, and took the Auſtrian infantry, which ſtill maintained itſelf on the heights, in the rear. This haſtened the flight of the foe through thick foreſts, by which his retreat was protected.

While Keith was thus employed with the enemy and his convoys, the king, having gained ground, had arrived on the 11th near Königſgrætz. Buccow covered that town with about ſeven thouſand men, whom he had encamped behind the Elbe, and in intrenchments which ſurrounded the ſuburbs. When the Pruſſians came up, ſome battalions were placed toward Hota, on the Adler, where a battery was erected to take the intrenchments of Buccow in the rear. Another corps, at the ſame time,

paſſed the Adler higher up; and this was to attack the intrenchment on the morrow at break of day. A heavy body of cavalry was intended to have been ſent over the Elbe, to cut off the retreat of the Auſtrians; but the bridges could not be completed till the morning of the 13th, and Buccow did not think proper to wait ſo long. He evacuated his intrenchment and the town on the ſame night, and retired toward Clumetz.

The king, having this day been informed that Retzow was attacked at Holitz, marched thither, with a corps of cavalry; but the affair was over, and marſhal Keith fortunately conducted the whole artillery employed at Olmutz, with fifteen hundred ſick and wounded, beſide ammunition and proviſions appertaining to the army, to Königſgrætz. As ſoon as the troops were aſſembled, they encamped at the confluence of the Adler and the Elbe (the 14th) having the town of Königſgrætz, occupied by ſix battalions, in their front.

The firſt care of the king was to diſencumber himſelf of the heavy baggage he had dragged from Olmutz to Königſgrætz; and Fouquet was commanded, with ſixteen battalions and as many ſquadrons, to conduct the artillery, the wounded, and the ſuperfluous waggons, to Glatz.

Glatz. The enemy had ſome deſign of haraſſing the Pruſſians in their march: Laudon, on the ſame day, took poſt with four thouſand men in the wood of Opotſchna. Intelligence was received of this, and the king, deſirous of ſecuring the march of Fouquet for Neuſtadt, ſelected ſome troops, and immediately marched to attack Laudon. The general was in danger of being ſurpriſed, but the wood favoured his retreat, and only a hundred Croats were taken. He retired toward Holitz, and the king held the poſt of Opotſchna till Fouquet had tranquilly eſcorted his convoy to Glatz. Immediately after his arrival (the 16th) he detached the elder Schenkendorf to Reinerz, Golze to the Hunulberg, and occupied the camp of Nachod himſelf, that he might cover the rear of the army.

The expedition uſed on this march had given time to effect the arrangements, before marſhal Daun could approach the Pruſſian army. He arrived on the 22d, and encamped on the heights of Clum and Libitſchau, beyond the Elbe, while the king was returning from Opotſchna, to rejoin the main army. Had the Auſtrians been his only foes, the campaign would have been ended without quitting Bohemia, except to take winter quarters; but the

invaſion with which the Ruſſians menaced Pomerania, and the new March, obliged the king to return with his troops into Sileſia, that he might be in readineſs to ſend aid wherever it ſhould be needful. Whatever might ſecure the frontiers of Sileſia conſtituted a part of this plan; conſequently all the forage and proviſions of the circle of Königſgrætz were carried off, that Daun might be impeded, for want of magazines, from acting on that ſide againſt Sileſia. This was in reality become impoſſible; for he had been obliged, at the commencement of the campaign, to ſend all his ſubſiſtence toward Brunn, and the Pruſſian army had afterward, on its march, ſeized on all the magazines he poſſeſſed in Bohemia; and finally had conſumed the forage of the circle of Königſgrætz.

The camp of Königſgrætz was quitted on the night of the 25th. The pandours attacked the ſuburbs at the time the troops were departing. General Saldern and colonel Blankenſee were killed there; ſeventy men were loſt. The army of the king retired by Caravalhotta for Rochonitz. Laudon, St. Ignon, and Laſcy followed the rear-guard, with about fifteen thouſand men; and though they attempted an attack they could not ſucceed, but were vigorouſly repulſed by the Puttkammer huſſars.

That

That the enemy might be robbed of his inclination to haraſs the rear-guard, an ambuſcade was prepared, on the morrow, at the paſſage of the Metau. A wood which lies on the road, and which runs from Jaromirs to the Metau, was occupied by ten battalions and twenty ſquadrons; after which the army began its march, and only preſented a feeble rear-guard of huſſars to the foe. Laudon, who was eaſily heated, determined on aſſault; and the cavalry, leaving its ambuſcade, fell upon him in every direction. He was very ill treated, and loſt three hundred men. After beſtowing this trifling correction, the royal army peaceably purſued its march, and encamped between Boruſlawitz and Geſſnitz.

Retzow was detached to cover the right of the army at the paſs of the mountains. (Auguſt) He diſlodged Janus from Studenitz, and the king occupied the camp of Skalitz. On the ground where the army encamped was a height, upon the right, the poſſeſſion of which was abſolutely neceſſary. Here the king placed the volunteers of le Noble, as a lure which he preſented to the enemy; while ſix battalions, encamped in a kind of ravin, had orders to ſupport this poſt, ſhould it be attacked. What had been foreſeen happened; Laudon came on the night of the ſecond to ſurpriſe le Noble,

but was received in a manner he did not expect, was put to flight, and, without enumerating the dead and wounded, loſt ſix officers and ſeventy men.

Marſhal Daun however had extended his army along the Elbe, ſo that it proceeded, from Königſgrætz to Jaromirs, toward Königſhof. The king, on the morrow, encamped at Wiſoka, and Retzow at Starkſtadt. The march was continued from Wiſoka to Politz and Wernerſdorf, without being followed by the foe. On the 8th all the troops reſumed the camp of Griſſau and Landſhut.

The expected diverſion on the part of the Ruſſians happened during this return through Bohemia. Fermor had advanced in ſeveral corps, from Pruſſia, on the frontiers of Pomerania and the newMarch. Platen had obſerved the enemy from Stolpe, where he had remained all winter, with a detachment. On receiving this advice, count Dohna had orders, in the month of June, to raiſe the blockade of Stralſund, and to approach the Oder, that he might oppoſe the Ruſſians, let them attempt on what ſide they would to enter the ſtates of the king. From Poſen, Fermor had advanced to Königſwald, Meſeritz, and Cloſter Paradies, where he encamped in three corps. Count Dohna had detached

tached Kanitz to Reppen, to obſerve the enemy; whence Malachowſky marched to Sternberg, from which he diſlodged the Ruſſians.

Dohna, who was not ſufficiently in force to make many detachments, called in Platen, and only endeavoured to diſpute the paſſage of the Oder with the enemy. To this effect he encamped at Frankfort. The match however was unequal; and, as the leaſt check ſuffered by the corps of Dohna might become prejudicial to the ſtate, and incur the total ruin of the electoral March, the king determined to repair thither in perſon, with a reinforcement ſufficiently conſiderable to give the Pruſſians a kind of equality with the foe. This reinforcement conſiſted of ſixteen battalions and twenty-eight ſquadrons. The greateſt part of the army remained, under the command of marſhal Keith and the margrave Charles, in the camp of Landſhut, to guard the frontiers of Sileſia.

The king directed his march through Ronſtock, Lignitz, Hinzendorf, Dakau, Wartenberg, Schertendorf, Croſſen and Ziebingen, to Frankfort; where he heard that Fermor, having advanced through Landſberg to Cammin and Tamſel, had bombarded the town of Kuſtrin (15th) which he had reduced to aſhes, after the town had rejected all the propoſitions of capitu-

lation that general Stoffel had ſent to Schack, who was the governor. Theſe attempts of the enemy had induced count Dohna to approach with his corps for the relief of the fortreſs. It was here, in the camp of Gorgaſt, on the 22d of Auguſt, that the king joined the count. The Ruſſians had drawn their parallels preciſely to the end of the cauſeway which leads from Kuſtrin to Tamſel, and their batteries were ſo conſtructed that the army could not attempt to relieve the place, without being expoſed to very conſiderable and ineffectual loſſes. The king notwithſtanding determined on attack: fight he muſt, in order to rid himſelf, for a time, of one enemy that he might turn his arms elſewhere. The king could only employ three weeks in this expedition; and how might he ſo ſhortly accompliſh his purpoſe without a battle? Daun, whom he had left at Jaromirs, might in this interval either march toward Sileſia or Saxony; and the power of returning to either of theſe places, as ſhould be found neceſſary, was requiſite. The king therefore thought it would be beſt to deceive the enemy by appearances. Batteries were conſtructed oppoſite Direwitz, and the mounds of the Oder were occupied as if there had been a real intention of paſſing the river in the vicinage. The king at the ſame time reinforced the garriſon

riſon of Kuſtrin with four battalions: Kanitz he had ſent to Wrietzen, to collect all the boats he could find on that part upon the Oder.

While on the night of the 23d the army marched up the Oder to Guſtebieſe, Kanitz, who there joined the king, had collected ſufficient boats for the conſtruction of the bridge; and this was laboured at ſo effectually that the whole army had paſſed the river by noon. The march was continued to the village of Cloſſow, where the king encamped, and by this poſition cut off the corps of Fermor from that of Romanzow, which was toward Schwedt, where it intended to paſs the Oder. On the 24th, the army encamped at Dermitzel, oppoſite Fermor, who, on the motions of the Pruſſians, had raiſed the ſiege of Kuſtrin, and had called in the detachment of Czernichef; with which and the main body he took a poſition between the villages of Quartſchen and Zicker, having a marſhy rivulet in his van. The Ruſſians encamped in a ſquare, according to the cuſtom introduced by marſhal Munich, when he made war in little Tartary againſt the Turks.

The very day that the Pruſſian army arrived, (the 25th) the king ſeized on the mill of Damm, and the bridge over the rivulet. His van-guard took poſſeſſion of the foreſt of Maſſin, which muſt

muſt be paſſed to turn the camp of the enemy. On the morrow the army deſcended into the plain, in four columns, near the village of Batzellow. The enemy had left their heavy baggage under a ſmall eſcort between this village and Cammin. Had the king been in leſs haſte he might have eaſily taken it, and have obliged the Ruſſians by ſome marches to quit the country: but deciſion was neceſſary and every thing was to be hoped, conſidering the ſtrange plan of battle the enemy had formed.

The army therefore continued its march for Zorndorf, where the king propoſed to attack the front oppoſite to that he had faced when he was at Dermitzel. The Coſſacks ſet fire to Zorndorf, which cauſed ſome embarraſſment; for the heavy artillery was to paſs the village to form batteries in oppoſition to thoſe of the enemy. The left, deſtined to make the firſt attack, was ſupported by a bottom which goes toward Wilkerſdorf. Manteufel commanded the firſt attack, which conſiſted of ten battalions. He was ſupported by the left of the firſt line, under the orders of Kanitz, and by the ſecond line of the army. Some ravins were employed, under the ſhelter of which the cavalry of the left was placed, protected from the artillery of the enemy, and where

where it remained ready to act, whenever action ſhould be found neceſſary. The king's commands were that the firſt attack, continually advancing, ſhould be ſupported at this ravin, which led directly on the right of the Ruſſians: but, from accident and miſconception, it happened that the troops departed from the ravin as they approached the enemy; ſo that Kanitz, who ought to have been on the rear of Manteufel, was on his right.

The attack was repulſed, and the infantry thrown into much confuſion; but, as the enemy was alſo in diſorder, the king ordered Seidlitz inſtantly to charge. He formed three columns which at the ſame time pierced the ſquare, and in leſs than a quarter of an hour the field of battle was cleared of foes. The troops that eſcaped of the Ruſſian army paſſed this bottom that it had on its right, and again began to form toward Quartſchen. The king then took the infantry of his right, with which he made a quarter wheel, and formed facing the bottom; which his troops were various times ſent to paſs, but from which they continued quickly to return, without the reaſon at firſt being underſtood. The military cheſt of the Ruſſians and all the baggage of their generals were in the bottom; and the troops, inſtead of

marching forward as they might have done, amuſed themſelves with the pillage, from which they returned as ſoon as they were well loaded. The cavalry could not act here becauſe of the marſhes which abounded in the bottom, and the Pruſſians were reduced to cannonade the enemy, which cannonade continued till the cloſe of night.

The battle began at nine in the morning, and did not end till half paſt eight in the evening. The Ruſſians retired into the wood of Tamſel, where their whole troops formed a platoon; the cavalry in the centre, ſurrounded by the infantry. They loſt, on this day, a hundred and three field-pieces, twenty-ſeven pair of colours and ſtandards, eighty-two officers, among whom were five generals, about two thouſand priſoners, and at the leaſt fifteen thouſand men left dead on the field, for the cavalry gave them no quarter.

The Pruſſian army here loſt general Ziethen, of the cuiraſſiers; ſixty officers dead or wounded, and about twelve hundred men, with twenty pieces of cannon. On the morrow, the army of the king took a poſition very near that of the Ruſſian army; they were within twelve hundred paces of each other. Had there been ſufficient ammunition another attack would have been made;

made; but it was neceſſary to remain ſatisfied with cannonading, and this was not ſo warm as might have been deſired, becauſe it was requiſite to huſband the powder. Neither of the armies erected their tents. The Ruſſian dragoons attempted an aſſault on the Pruſſian infantry, and were ardently repulſed by the regiment of Kreytzen.

During the battle and the ſucceeding day it was a dreadful ſpectacle to ſee all the neighbouring villages in flames, which the Coſſacks had ſet on fire, and who here brought with them every calamity with which the race of man can be afflicted. The Pruſſian artillery however played with ſucceſs, for it was almoſt impoſſible for the gunners to miſs the great maſs the enemy formed; while that of the Ruſſians fired without the leaſt effect.

Toward the evening, ſome little ammunition was received, which the batteries employed to good purpoſe; for, the ground then becoming inſupportable, it was quitted by the Ruſſians, during night, who marched and encamped at Cammin. The king followed: ſome hundreds of priſoners were taken from their rear-guard; and the Pruſſians encamped before Tamſel, near the enemy. The loſs of the battle obliged Romanzow haſtily to quit the vicinage

of

of the Oder and Stargard, to accelerate his junction with Fermor; who preſently retreated to Vietz, and afterward to Landſberg, where he aſſembled all his forces. The king purſued as far as Blumberg.

While the Pruſſian army was employed againſt the Ruſſians, Laudon traverſed Luſatia, intending to join the latter, which he would have accompliſhed, had he not met with prince Francis of Brunſwick on his road, whom the king had detached to Beeſko, from the camp of Tamſel. The prince, after having taken ſeveral parties, obliged the enemy to retire for Lubben. The ſtrongeſt reaſons obliged the king to deſiſt from further purſuit of the advantages he had gained againſt the Ruſſians. He was obliged to haſten into Saxony, to the aid of prince Henry; and Dohna, in conſequence of this new arrangement, remained to face the Ruſſians, while the king departed to join the prince his brother, with the ſame corps that he had led into the electorate.

The better to underſtand the chain of events, it is requiſite we ſhould give a ſuccinct narration of what had hitherto happened in Saxony. His royal highneſs had from the month of July occupied the camp of Tſchopa, to oppoſe the troops of the circles, under the prince de Deux-

ponts,

ponts, who had been joined by an Auſtrian corps commanded by Haddick. Prince Henry had driven a detachment of the enemy from the Baſberg; and, as the main body of the circles was not yet come up, a partiſan war only was carried on, in which the Pruſſians had the advantage of making priſoners, at different repriſals; one of the moſt conſiderable of whom was M. von Mitrowſky, an Auſtrian general.

(Auguſt 2d.) His highneſs having received news of the approach of a corps of the enemy, commanded by Dombale, that advanced on Zwickau, detached Finck to drive him out of Saxony; in which he was ſo ſucceſsful that the enemy was obliged to retreat for Reichenbach. The preſence of the prince ſoon after became neceſſary in the environs of Dreſden, becauſe that the prince de Deuxponts (the 6th) was taking the road of Töplitz, through Bohemia. The army marched by Chemnitz, and eſtabliſhed itſelf at Dippoldiſwalda, keeping Hulſen with a detachment at Freyberg, and Knobloch at Maxen. Another corps of the circles having in the interim (20th) taken poſt at Waldkirchen, it was attacked and beaten by Kleiſt. But, as Haddick advanced toward Cotta, prince Henry changed his poſition, aſſumed the camp of Sedelitz, near Pirna, and garniſhed the villages of

of Zehiſta and Zuſchendorf in his van. The army afterward took the camp of Gamig, which was more convenient.

The prince de Deuxponts preſently appeared, and occupied the heights of Struppen, keeping Haddick on his left, which extended from Rothwernſdorf to Cotta. He reſolved to take the Sonnenſtein, which incommoded his poſition. For this purpoſe he ordered ſome mortars to advance, and Grape, who commanded there, unſeaſonably ſurrendered himſelf a priſoner of war.

During this, marſhal Daun had advanced into Luſatia. He had left a detachment of twenty thouſand men, under generals Harſch and de Ville, who encamped between Jægerndorf and Troppau. The intention of the marſhal was to employ this corps in the ſiege of Neiſs, as ſoon as the diſtance of the Pruſſian army would permit him to undertake the ſiege. He had hoped the invaſion of the Ruſſians would have attracted the whole force of the king; and, as he found himſelf deceived in this hope, he advanced into Luſatia, to draw the Pruſſians thither, and give Harſch time to achieve the ſiege. He advanced to Königſbruck, where he heard of the defeat of the Ruſſians; on which, abandoning any deſigns he might have on Meiſſen or Torgau, he retreated for Stolpen. He preſently

ſent

ſent different detachments on the Elbe, with intent to paſs the river at Pilnitz, and come on the back of the Pruſſians at Gamig, while the prince de Deuxponts and Haddick ſhould attack them in front.

Prince Henry, having received information of theſe projects, ſent the intelligence to the king, which occaſioned the rapid march of the monarch to join his brother. Marſhal Keith and prince Charles had immediate orders to quit Sileſia, and repair to the royal army in Luſatia. Fouquet remained at Landſhut, to whom was committed the guard of the paſſes of Bohemia. The corps of the king departed from Blumberg on the ſecond, and, paſſing by Manchenau, Mulroſe, Trebatz, Lubben, Doberbek, and Elſterwerda, arrived on the 9th at Dobritz, near Groſſenhayn, where it was joined by marſhal Keith and the margrave, whoſe corps had paſſed by Hartmanſdorf, Priebus, Moſka, Spremberg, and Senftenberg. Werner and Möring, the one at Priebus and the other at Spremberg, had, on their road, beaten two Auſtrian detachments, and had taken above five hundred priſoners. The army encamped, on the 12th, between Bockſdorf and Reichenberg, where the king held a conference with his high-

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neſs, that they might take ſuch meaſures as were requiſite, under the preſent circumſtances. The army began its march, on the ſame evening, with intent to occupy the heights of Weiſſig before the enemy. The Auſtrians had a poſt at the White Stag, from which it was neceſſary they ſhould be diſlodged. Hither the king directly marched; and Wedel took the road which going from Radeberg would turn that poſition. The Auſtrians were forced to retire; and, as ſoon as the Pruſſian van had gained the heights of Weiſſig, it fell on the huſſars and dragoons that had repaired thither, to protect the encampment of marſhal Daun. Here he had come to trace out a camp for his troops. All theſe corps were repulſed, and the royal army aſſumed the camp of Schönfeld, facing the camp of Daun, which extended from Lohmen, through Stolpen, toward Biſchofswerder. The communication of the two Pruſſian armies was immediately ſecured by bridges over the Elbe. The army of the king arrived in good time; for Laſcy was commanded, with all the Auſtrian grenadiers, to conſtruct a bridge at Pilnitz; and it muſt be confeſſed that Daun might have found ſufficient time to execute this deſign before the arrival of the king, had acting with promptitude

promptitude and ardour been any part of his character.

On the day that the army assumed the position of Schönfeld, general Retzow was sent with a detachment to dislodge Laudon from Radeberg, whence he retired for Armsdorf and Fischbach. It was determined again to attack him here, and for this purpose prince Francis, with some battalions, presented himself in his front, while Retzow turned him on the right, and the king on the left. It is probable his corps must have been ruined had these manœuvres been all performed at once; but it generally happens that such projects do but succeed in part. Laudon however lost more than five hundred men; he escaped (27th) through the wood, and occupied the small hills of Harta, where he encamped under the protection of the cannon of marshal Daun.

These trifling advantages were entirely undecisive. One of the principal objects in the present circumstances of the king was to remove the Imperial army from the banks of the Elbe. This was difficult to effect, otherwise than by inspiring Daun with fears for the convoys which he drew from Zittau, and thus obliging him to make the wished-for motions. The king quitted his camp of Schönberg, and led his army to

Ramnau, by which the Pruſſians approached the flank of the foe; and, to occaſion him more inquietude, Retzow repaired to Bautzen, where he took poſt with his corps. Laudon ſtill occupied a height near Biſchofswerder, oppoſite to the Pruſſian left, which it was determined to take. To this effect the prince of Wurtemberg came on the back of the Auſtrians, while the king preſented himſelf in front. Laudon did not wait for action, but retreated, in great confuſion, beyond Biſchofswerder, while the Pruſſians occupied his camp and the town.

Daun feared, in his turn, that the poſition of the Pruſſians might do him an injury. He had now renounced the projects that had been formed againſt the army of prince Henry; he was obliged to approach his ſubſiſtence; and at the ſame time propoſed to chooſe a poſt by which he might cut off the Pruſſians from Sileſia, and give Harſch time to beſiege and take Neiſs. On the 5th of October, the marſhal forſook the vicinage of the Elbe, and, paſſing by Kruſe and Neukirch, encamped at Kitlitz, on the heights of Lobau, as far as the Stremberg. The prince of Durlach was poſted with his reſerve, from Reichenbach and Arnſdorf, toward Doberſchutz. On this motion of the enemy, Retzow was ſent to occupy the Weiſſenberg.

The

The army marched to Bautzen, whence Wedel was detached, with ſix battalions and ſome cavalry, to oppoſe the Swedes, who had advanced to Paſewalk. From Bautzen the royal army marched (the 10th) toward the enemy, and took a poſition between Hochkirchen and Kottitz: the head quarters were at Radewitz.

The army was at this time weakened by the departure of the detachment under Wedel, and of the large garriſon neceſſary for Bautzen, to protect the bread againſt the enterpriſes of the foe. The king's intention was, by taking the camp of Hochkirchen, to conceal his real deſign from the Auſtrians; which was to join Retzow, poſted on the Pruſſian flank, and, after the junction, to fall upon the prince of Durlach, on the ſide of Debitſch, which could not be executed ſooner than the night of the 14th, becauſe that ſubſiſtence for the army could not be ſooner provided and arranged. A part of the convoy however came up on the 12th; marſhal Keith, who was with it, was attacked on the road by Laudon, who was repulſed with the loſs of eighty men. The prince of Lichtenſtein, lieutenant-colonel in the Löwenſtein regiment, was among the priſoners. After this affair, Laudon, having aſſembled his diſperſed troops, took poſt in a wood which was a long quarter of a league,

German meaſure, beyond the Pruſſian right, facing the village of Hochkirchen: a marſhy bottom ſeparated the flank of the king from theſe heights.

The battle, of which we ſhall immediately ſpeak, obliges us to enter into a circumſtantial deſcription of the ground, occupied by the two armies. The village of Hochkirchen, where the right of the king was ſupported, ſtands on an eminence. A church-yard, with a thick ſtone wall, capable of containing a battalion, overlooks the whole country. The village extending in length formed a natural flank for the army, and was garniſhed with ſix battalions. A battery of fifteen pieces was erected at the angle of the front and the flank. Before the van of the line ran a rivulet between rocky banks: below the height of Hochkirchen was a windmill and ſome cottages, where a free battalion had been placed to defend the paſſage, which was the more certain becauſe it was under the protection of the Pruſſian artillery of the head quarters, toward Radewitz. A part of the camp paſſed the rivulet, becauſe of the heights which it was neceſſary to occupy, and of the communication with the corps of Retzow, which was ſecured and the road abridged, by this poſition.

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The right of marſhal Daun, as we have ſaid, was ſupported on the Stremberg; his centre was on impregnable heights; his left inclined toward Jauernick and Sornitz. Daun ſecretly prepared roads for four columns, that led to the wood of which Laudon had taken poſſeſſion. His intention was to attack the Pruſſian army in four parts at once; that is to ſay, from the poſt of Laudon; at the mill occupied by the free battalion; from that part toward Kottitz which lay beyond the rivulet; and the fourth attack was to be made, by the prince of Durlach, on the poſt of the Weiſſenberg, where Retzow commanded.

It was on the night of the 13th of October that the marſhal executed his plan. The attack of the mill and the free battalion was the firſt, which the enemy carried without any great difficulty. Laudon, having at the ſame time found means to glide with his pandours on the back of the army, ſet fire to the village of Hochkirchen, which obliged it to be abandoned by the Pruſſian battalions. Amid this confuſion, the enemy ſeized on the battery which was at the angle of the village, while the brave major Lange, with a battalion of the margrave Charles, threw himſelf into the church-yard of Hochkirchen. The men had only time to run to

arms, and not ſufficient to ſtrike their tents. The king heard the firing of artillery, and, though he received no intelligence, immediately took three brigades from the centre, with which he marched to the right. The darkneſs was ſo great that it was impoſſible to ſee a ſtep in advance. It was ſoon perceived that the enemy was maſter of the Pruſſian grand battery, becauſe the cannon balls flew into the camp, and this would have been impoſſible from the Auſtrian batteries. The glare of light from the flames of Hochkirchen aided the Pruſſian diſpoſitions. The king came on the rear of his camp to turn this village. On his march, the men fell in with a corps of Auſtrian grenadiers, three hundred of whom were taken; but, in the confuſion of the battle, not having men enough to guard them, moſt of them eſcaped. The Pruſſian infantry turned Hochkirchen, and began to repulſe the Auſtrians, when it was itſelf repulſed by ſome ſquadrons of the foe, that could not be diſtinguiſhed in the dark. The gendarmes and the regiment of Vaſold made a vigorous charge; all whom they encountered gave way: but, unable to guide themſelves amid the darkneſs, they fell upon the infantry poſted at the wood which Laudon had occupied the day before. Here was the whole artillery of the Auſtrians, with

with the infantry, well and advantageouſly eſtabliſhed. The cannon firing caſe-ſhot forced the Pruſſian cavalry to retire to the infantry.

Marſhal Keith and prince Maurice of Anhalt, on the other ſide, endeavoured to recover the battery that was loſt. They put themſelves at the head of ſome battalions to traverſe the village of Hochkirchen, the road through which is narrow; ſeven men can ſcarcely march a-breaſt there; and as they left it they found themſelves ſo conſiderably out-winged, by the Auſtrians, that they could neither form nor lead their troops to the charge, but were ſoon obliged to retreat. Marſhal Keith was killed, general Geiſt mortally wounded, and prince Maurice dangerouſly. Though different attempts were made to paſs the village, there were no means of ſucceeding, the conflagration was ſo great, and the battle was loſt.

In order to cover the retreat, the king ſent Retzow orders to join him inceſſantly. This general had thrice repulſed the prince of Durlach. As the latter could not attack him but by marching through a defile, Retzow ſuffered as many enemies to come up as he pleaſed, after which he charged and overthrew them, with conſiderable loſs, at the place where they left the defile. This manœuvre had been three times

times repeated when he received orders to join the king. He arrived ſeaſonably for the left of the Pruſſians, which the king had been obliged to diſgarniſh that he might ſuccour the right, but not ſoon enough to prevent the battalion of Kleiſt being ſurrounded by the enemy, and conſtrained to lay down their arms. The right of the army was ſupported, in deſpite of the efforts of the foe to paſs the village of Hochkirchen.

The battle had begun at four o'clock; at ten the church-yard was carried; the village and the battery already were loſt; the enemy was too well eſtabliſhed to be diſlodged; the heavy corps of cavalry came on the back of the army; and Retzow had abandoned the Weiſſenberg. Under theſe circumſtances the poſition of the army might no longer be maintained, and nothing remained but retreat. The cavalry firſt deſcended into the plains, to cover the march of the infantry, and the infantry then took the road for Doberſchutz, where the camp was marked out, and the corps of Retzow conſtituted the rear-guard of the army. The Auſtrian cavalry ſeveral times attacked the Pruſſians, but was vigorouſly repulſed by Seidlitz, and the prince of Wurtemberg. The camp the army aſſumed was good, near Bautzen, ſurrounded by

by a double marſhy ditch, and was upon hills which were not overlooked on any ſide. Marſhal Daun, the ſame day, returned into his former camp, and did not appear to have obtained a victory.

We have already ſaid the Pruſſians loſt perſons highly worthy to be regretted, becauſe of their great merit. Such were marſhal Keith, prince Francis of Brunſwick, and general Geiſt. Moſt of the generals were either hurt or wounded; as were the king, the margrave Charles, and many others whom it would be too tedious to name. The army was deprived of three thouſand men, chiefly infantry, and of the priſoners it had taken. Only one general, named Vitteleſchi, and ſeven hundred men remained.

While theſe events paſſed in Luſatia, generals de Ville and Harſch kept Neiſs cloſely blockaded. Information was received that a train of a hundred pieces of artillery and forty mortars were to leave Olmutz for Sileſia. Combining theſe preparations with the effect which the battle gained muſt produce on the minds of the Auſtrians, it was eaſy to predict the ſiege of Neiſs would be the reſult. The place was too important for the king not to employ all imaginable means for its ſalvation. The ſiege however could not be raiſed except by marching an army

army into Silesia. It was difficult to avoid deranging affairs in one country, while endeavouring to re-establish them in another. At length, intelligence being obtained that the Russians had abandoned Stargard, and directed their march through Reez and Calies for Poland, the king took the following measures. He sent for his brother, with ten battalions and some artillery, to replace that which had been lost. Count Dohna received orders to march into Saxony, and only to leave a corps in Pomerania, under the command of Platen, to succour Colberg, which was besieged by fifteen thousand Russians, under Palmbach. He was commanded to direct his march for Torgau, that he might thence turn on whichever side his presence should be most necessary. Finck took the command of the remainder of the corps of prince Henry which held the camp of Gamig.

While these orders were dispatched, Daun advanced, and encamped near the army of the king. A detachment covered his flank at Buchwald; his right was supported at Cannewitz, whence the line extended by Belgern, Wurchen, and Dressa, in a semicircular form, through Grubschutz and Strela. The reserve was posted at Hochkirchen. However formidable might be the aspect of these troops, the Prussians had

the leſs to fear becauſe that ſcarcely had the Auſtrians aſſumed this poſition before they intrenched themſelves to the very teeth. The two points which merited moſt ſerious attention were the preſervation of Bautzen, where the ſubſiſtence and ovens of the army were, and the mill of Malſchwitz, which was on a height, and which the enemy muſt not be ſuffered to poſſeſs.

The king guarded the town of Bautzen, againſt the attempts of the Auſtrians, by an intermediate corps, which he placed between that town and his right; but to the mill, at the extremity of the left, he only ſent ſome huſſars, that the enemy might not perceive how important this poſt was to the Pruſſians. The reaſon of acting thus was that the mill was a quarter of a mile from the left, ſo that keeping the poſition of the army it could not be maintained, becauſe of its diſtance; and the reaſon of its importance was that, on the meditated march of the king, he could not gain Görlitz before Daun, if his columns did not paſs at the foot of this mill, where if the enemy had placed any troops he muſt have croſſed the Spree behind his camp, and re-paſſed it lower down, by which his army muſt have made a circuit of two miles. Marſhal Daun, in the

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mean time imagined that the king, when he ſhould hear of the ſiege of Neiſs, could find no other expedient to gain Sileſia than that of attacking him; and this was the reaſon of his aſſuming the poſition of Cannewitz and Wurchen, and of his intrenching himſelf. That ſo it was is apparent from the letter he wrote to Harſch, in which he ſays, "continue your ſiege in tran-"quillity; I ſhall detain the king; he is cut "off from Sileſia; and, ſhould he attack me, "you will hear a good account of him." It happened very different to the ſuppoſitions of the marſhal.

Prince Henry with his detachment departed from Gamig, paſſed through Marienſchein, and on the 21ſt arrived at the royal army, without encountering any foe on his route. Every preparation for the march could not be made ſooner than the 24th, and the ſame evening the army was in motion. The garriſon of Bautzen ſerved as an eſcort to the army proviſions. This corps began its march on the preceding night, and paſſed through Kumerau, Neudorf, Trauben, and Culmen. The army proceeded in two columns. The rear-guard formed on the right of the windmill, whence it took the road for Leichnau and Iſchmitz, entirely turning the right of the enemy. It afterward inclined

toward Weyerſdorf, and from thence for Ullerſdorf, where the army encamped. Möring, who led the van-guard of the baggage, ſurpriſed three hundred Auſtrian horſe, near Ullerſdorf, few of whom eſcaped; and the column of the king having, near Weyerſdorf, (the 25th) fell in with a battalion of pandours, who did not ſuppoſe any enemy near, this battalion was totally deſtroyed.

On the morrow (the 26th) the army was in motion before break of day, that it might gain Görlitz ſooner than marſhal Daun. The van-guard of huſſars and dragoons arrived here firſt, and found a corps of cavalry behind a defile, on the ſide of Rauchertſwalde, which, in a ſituation ſo advantageous, it was impoſſible to attack. Every attempt was made by ſkirmiſhing to engage it to combat, but ineffectually. Information was brought by a deſerter that this was a corps of carabineers and horſe-grenadiers, commanded by a Spaniſh general named Ayaſſas; and on hearing this it was reſolved to inſult his Spaniſh pride, that he might be engaged to paſs the defile, and ſuffer himſelf to be beaten. To this effect he was provoked by the huſſars; and the Spaniard paſſed the defile in a fury, and fell upon thoſe whom he ſuppoſed had treated him with

with contempt. The dragoons immediately charged and drove his troops back into the very defile he had ſo imprudently paſſed. He loſt eight hundred men, whom the Pruſſians took, and eſcaped under the hill of Landſkron, where the prince of Durlach had lately come up with the reſerve under his command. The infantry of the Pruſſian van-guard arrived at the ſame time, and was employed to ſeize on Görlitz, which ſurrendered without any great difficulty. The army of the king here ſupported its left; its right extended to Girbieſdorf and Eberſbach. The flank was covered by a muddy rivulet which runs in a valley; the ſide of which oppoſite the Pruſſians was ſteep.

The Auſtrians arrived in the afternoon. Daun extended his army behind the Landſkron, from Oſſeg toward Marckerſdorf. The king was obliged to keep his camp, that he might employ ſome days in the arrangement of ſubſiſtence, ſo that the army was not again in motion before the 30th. The troops decamped by night to paſs the Neiſſe, before intelligence ſhould be gained by the enemy. Laudon was found in ambuſh in the wood of Schönberg. This was a light march to the Pruſſians, becauſe the baggage and proviſions had taken the route of Naum-

Naumburg-am-Queis. The rear-guard was attacked near Schönberg, and the whole route was one battle. Laudon was encouraged by a reinforcement of twelve thouſand men, that had been ſent him by Daun. Prince Henry, who commanded the rear, made ſuch excellent diſpoſitions, by reciprocally ſupporting the brigades, and timely replacing them, in order to receive thoſe that retired to continue their march, that time only was loſt. Lieutenant-general Bulow and about two hundred ſoldiers were indeed wounded; but there were not at the moſt above fifteen men killed.

It was neceſſary to throw bridges over the Queis, at Lauban, which occaſioned the loſs of the day. On the 1ſt of November the army took the road for Sileſia. Preparations were particularly made to give the enemy a good reception on the rear; for his force was ſufficient to merit this attention. The two wings of the Pruſſian camp were on the ſummits of two mountains, each of which ended toward the Queis. The more Lauban was approached the more theſe heights commanded that of the camp. A ſeparate rear-guard was formed on each of them. The king was on the hill of the right,

the margrave on that of the left; the huſſars were placed in the bottom between theſe two corps of infantry, to act as occaſion ſhould require. Behind theſe, brigades of infantry and artillery, in gradation, occupied the prevailing heights, that each corps, as it retired, might march under the protection of another.

On the firſt motion of retreat made by the Pruſſians, Laudon ardently haſtened to fall on the rear-guard, and was nearly taken by the huſſars. He was deſirous of being the firſt to occupy the ground the king had quitted, and here his artillery was brought. But the heavy fire from the Pruſſian batteries diſmounted his guns, put his infantry into diſorder, and obliged him to fly. He three times endeavoured to renew this manœuvre, but always without effect; a reception ſimilar to the firſt afforded ſimilar obſtacles, till at length the huſſars of Puttkammer, in ambuſcade, left the wood, fell upon his troops, and for that day diſguſted him with diſturbing the march of the Pruſſians.

His highneſs, who had taken poſt on the oppoſite ſhore of the Queis, there received the rear-guard; after which he parted with the king his brother. The monarch marched through Löwenberg, Pombſen, Jauernick, and Girelſdorf,

dorf, to Noſſen; and prince Henry to Landſhut, on the 6th, where he relieved general Fouquet, who joined the king on his route to Neiſs.

The ſiege of Neiſs had been begun by Harſch on the 20th of October. He had directed his attack on the fort of Pruſſia, lying toward Heiderſdorf. The ſecond parallel that was finiſhed was at the diſtance of thirty fathoms from the covered way, and the batteries were all mounted. Although Daun had ſent him ſuccours by the way of Silberberg, the Auſtrians raiſed the ſiege on the rumour of the approach of the king. Treſkow, the governor of Neiſs, profited by the moment, and made a ſally, on which occaſion the enemy loſt eight hundred men. Harſch and de Ville haſtily retired, paſſed the Neiſſe, and retreated through Ziegenhals to Jægerndorf, leaving a conſiderable quantity of ammunition in the environs of Neiſs, which they wanted time to remove.

Fouquet followed the enemy into upper Sileſia, and took poſt at Neuſtadt, where he could obſerve them the beſt. Scarcely had the troops arrived in the vicinage of Neiſs before the king undertook a new expedition. After the Pruſſians had left Luſatia, marſhal Daun, on the 4th of October, had taken the road of

the Elbe; which river he paſſed on the 7th, and encamped at Pirna. Finck, who had remained at Gemich (Gamig) during the abſence of prince Henry, was unable to maintain this poſt againſt an enemy ſo ſuperior in numbers. He retreated to the Windberg, and thence for Keſſelſdorf; while Daun detached the troops of the circles toward Eulenburg, Torgau, and Leipſic. Count Dohna was on his march in theſe parts. The Ruſſians as we have ſaid had taken the road for Poland, general Palmbach excepted, who, with a detachment of ſome thouſands of men, had laid ſiege to Colberg. This Ruſſian general had been active on the 26th and 27th of October. He gave ſucceſſive aſſaults on the covered way, and was each time vigorouſly repulſed. A new attack was prepared for the 29th, and the Ruſſians had even placed boats, by means of which they hoped to paſs the great moat, and take the place by ſtorm. Count Dohna having ſent Platen to the ſuccour of Colberg, this general beat a corps of obſervation placed by the Ruſſians near Greiffenberg; after which he advanced to Treptow. His arrival made Palmbach conceive a diſlike to ſieges and aſſaults; and he retired, by Cöfflin and Bublitz, into Poland. The trenches were opened on the 3d, and the

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town was relieved on the 29th of October. The governor, Heyden, diſtinguiſhed himſelf during the ſiege by his good order, vigilance, and fortitude.

Count Dohna called in Wedel to his army, who had acted againſt the Swedes, had beaten them at Fehrbellin, had driven them through Ruppin, beyond Prenzlow, had taken an entire detachment of Heſſenſtein in the lordſhip of M. von Arnim, and had been every where attended by victory. He was relieved by Manteufel, who had fewer troops; and during the march into Saxony, Wedel conducted the van-guard of Dohna.

When Haddick arrived near Torgau, on the 12th, the Pruſſian van-guard appeared there at the ſame time. Haddick retreated through the wood for Eulenburg. (15th) Wedel followed his footſteps, and, though the bridges of the Elſter were broken down, the Pruſſian cavalry forded the river, and fell ſo ſeaſonably on the foe that Haddick loſt two hundred men, and three field pieces. Count Dohna followed Wedel from Eulenburg, and advanced on Leipſic, which the army of the circles had inveſted. The prince de Deuxponts, intimidated by the check Haddick had ſuſtained, did not wait the approach of the Pruſſians, but

raiſed the ſiege, and haſtily retired for Colditz. He thence turned toward Plauen, and went to take quarters in the empire, on the ſide of Hof and Bareuth.

While the prince de Deuxponts and Haddick fled to gain the empire, marſhal Daun approached Dreſden. The Pruſſian corps, too much expoſed at Keſſelſdorf, paſſed the Elbe and encamped in the ſuburb of new Dreſden, between the Fiſchhaus and the Scheunens. Schmettau, the governor of Dreſden, perceiving the Auſtrians were preparing to ſeize on the ſuburb of Pirna, ſet it on fire. Daun was careful of the royal children, who were in the city, otherwiſe it is to be preſumed he would have been more enterprizing; the moats of the place however were good.

The king had quitted Sileſia; his van-guard was at the Weiſſenberg; ſo that the governor might ſafely expect the arrival of aid. The return of the king deranged the projects of marſhal Daun. Count Dohna had expelled the army of the circles, the ſeaſon was advanced, and the royal army might in three days be at the gates of Dreſden. Theſe various conſiderations inſpired Daun with the wiſh to retreat. He decamped, on the 15th, for Grunau and Leibnitz, and returned into Bohemia,

Bohemia, where he ſent his troops into winter quarters.

On the news of his departure the margrave Charles, who was with the main army, at Görlitz, received orders to return with the troops into Sileſia. The king, who was at the Weiſſenberg, advanced to Dreſden; where arrangements were taken for winter quarters. Count Dohna returned into Pomerania and Mecklenbourg. Hulſen took poſt at Freyberg, on the frontiers of Bohemia. Itzenplitz commanded at Zwickau, and a line was drawn in Sileſia along the Bohemian frontiers, from Greiffenberg to Glatz. Fouquet occupied Jægerndorf, Leobſchutz, Neuſtadt, and the environs.

We have but ſlightly noticed the campaign of the Swedes, to whom only detachments from the garriſon of Stettin had been oppoſed, till the time that the king ſent the corps under Wedel, from the camp of Ramnau in Luſatia. The proweſs of the Swedes conſiſted in penetrating into the open country, when and where they found no oppoſition. A feeble detachment reduced them to the defenſive; and, far from making conqueſts, they thought themſelves exceedingly happy to find they were

permitted during the winter to canton in the vicinity of Stralſund.

We have in like manner ſilently paſſed over ſome detachments ſent by his royal highneſs, at the beginning of the ſpring, toward Bareuth and Bamberg. Drieſen and Meyer headed theſe petty expeditions, the end of which was to retard the operations of the army of the circles, and to ſpread terror among ſuch of the princes of Germany as had declared againſt the king.

If we take a ſummary view of this campaign, we ſhall find that it is diſtinguiſhed from other campaigns by the number of the ſieges that were raiſed. There were but two places taken; Schweidnitz by the Pruſſians, and the Sonnenſtein by the troops of the empire. The king raiſed the ſiege of Olmutz; the Ruſſians the ſieges of Kuſtrin and of Colberg; the Auſtrians thoſe of Neiſs and of Dreſden; and the troops of the circles thoſe of Torgau and of Leipſic.

After the cloſe of this long and fatiguing campaign, the king, having cauſed the works of the Sonnenſtein to be raſed, returned into Sileſia, and fixed his head quarters at Breſlau.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

The Winter of 1758 *to* 1759.

THE royal family this year loſt two illuſtrious perſons; the one was the prince of Pruſſia, who fell into a decline, and was carried off, at the beginning of June, by a ſuffocating catarrh, at the time that the Pruſſians beſieged Olmutz. The goodneſs of his heart and intelligent mind ſpoke a future mild and happy government, and made him regretted.

The margraveſs of Bareuth was the ſecond; a princeſs of uncommon merit, with a cultivated underſtanding, a mind adorned with very ſuperior knowledge, a genius apt at all things, and a ſingular talent for the arts. Theſe happy gifts of nature form, however, the leaſt part of her eulogy. Her excellent qualities, her generous and benevolent inclinations, her noble elevation of ſoul, the gentleneſs of her character, all united in her the brilliant advantages of wit to the unſhaken virtues of the heart; virtues which ſhe never falſified. She often ſuffered ingratitude from thoſe on whom ſhe had heaped wealth and favours; but there is no

example of her having deceived any perſon. The king and this worthy ſiſter were in habits of the moſt tender and conſtant friendſhip, from love that was formed in early infancy, that had been ſtrengthened by the ſame education, the ſame feelings, and which fidelity unſhaken rendered indiſſoluble. This princeſs, whoſe health was feeble, was ſo highly affected by the dangers that threatened her family, that grief completed the ruin of her conſtitution. Her diſeaſe ſoon became evident; the phyſicians knew it to be a confirmed dropſy. Their remedies were ineffectual; they could not aid her. She died, on the 14th of October 1758, with a courage and fortitude of ſoul worthy the higheſt philoſophy; and on the very day on which the king was beaten at Hochkirchen by the Auſtrians.

The Romans would not have failed to have attributed ſome fatality to this day, thus marked by two of misfortune's ſtrokes, that at once fell ſo heavy on the king. In this enlightened age men have recovered from ſuch ſtupid errors as would induce us to believe one day can be more or leſs fortunate than another. The life of man hangs but by a hair; the gain or loſs of a batle depends but on a trifle. Our deſtinies are one continued chain of ſecond cauſes, which,

which, in the multitude of events that they lead to, muſt neceſſarily produce good and evil fortune.

In this year terminated the pontificate of pope Benedict, the leaſt ſuperſtitious, and the beſt informed, of any of the pontiffs who long had ſat on the epiſcopal throne. The French, Spaniſh, and Auſtrian factions elected Rezzonico, the Venetian, to be his ſucceſſor; who took the name of Clement XIII. The difference of the genius of theſe two popes was the more evident to the public becauſe Clement, though he might be a good prieſt, wanted the talents neceſſary to the ſovereigns of Rome, by which they ſhould govern their ſtates and the catholic church. The firſt ſteps of his pontifical government were all falſe. He ſent marſhal Daun a conſecrated toqua,* and a ſanctified ſword, for having beaten the Pruſſians at Hochkirchen; though ſuch preſents, according to the cuſtom of the Roman court, are made only to generals who have vanquiſhed pagan nations, or have civilized barbarians. His conduct, therefore, neceſſarily embroiled him with the king of Pruſſia, to whom he ought to have paid reſpect, becauſe of the great number of catholic ſub-

* A kind of cap. T.

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jects that were ſettled in the ſtates under his domain.

This pope had more important diſputes with the king of Portugal, relative to the Jeſuits, who had made war on the Spaniards and Portugueſe in Paraguay, and had even beaten them. After the quarrel, the king of Portugal no longer thought proper to confide the ſecrets of his conſcience, and of his government, to the members of a ſociety that had acted as the enemy of his kingdom. He diſmiſſed the Jeſuit who had been his ghoſtly father, and choſe a confeſſor from another order. The Jeſuits, to revenge this affront, which was to them a matter of the more conſequence becauſe the conduct of the king might be imitated by other monarchs, caballed in the ſtate, and excited all the grandees of the kingdom, over whom they had any influence, againſt the government. Father Malagrida, animated by a more ardent zeal, a more theological hatred, than his brethren, accompliſhed a conſpiracy, by his intrigues, againſt the life of the king, of the members of which the duke d'Aveiros declared himſelf the chief.

This duke, knowing the king was to take an airing in his coach, concealed the conſpirators on the road where the monarch was to paſs.

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The coachman was killed at the firſt fire, and at the ſecond the king had his arm broken. The ſecret of the conſpiracy was long after diſcovered by letters, which the chiefs of the party had written to Brazil, there to raiſe an inſurrection. The duke d'Aveiros and his accomplices were arreſted; they unanimouſly depoſed that the crime had been ſuggeſted to them by the Jeſuits, who were the inſtigators of all that had happened.

The king wiſhed to inflict an exemplary puniſhment on the authors of this abominable plot. His juſt reſentment, armed by the laws, and ſuſtained by the tribunals of the realm, was ready to burſt forth againſt the Jeſuits. The pope undertook their defence, and openly oppoſed the courſe of juſtice. Theſe fathers were however baniſhed the kingdom, and went to Rome, where they were received, not as rebels and traitors, but as martyrs heroically ſuffering for the faith. Never did the court of Rome give ſuch cauſe of ſcandal. However vicious the pontiffs had been, whom preceding ages had deteſted, not one of them had openly declared himſelf the protector of crimes and murderers.

The ill-judged conduct of the pope appeared to influence the whole clergy. The holy toqua

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that he had ſent to marſhal Daun excited a capricious zeal among the eccleſiaſtical princes of Germany. The elector of Cologn, among others, iſſued an edict in his ſtates, by which he forbade his proteſtant ſubjects, under ſevere puniſhment, to rejoice for the advantages which the Pruſſians or their allies might gain over their enemies. The fact, which of itſelf is deſerving of little notice, merits to be cited, becauſe that it characteriſes the abſurdity of manners in an age in which reaſon has, in other reſpects, made ſo great a progreſs. But theſe farces, which were acted by petty courts, were attended with no conſequences except the hiſſes of the public; whereas the paſſions that agitated the great courts of Europe produced ſcenes more fatally tragical.

We have ſeen that not long ſince the abbé de Bernis became miniſter for foreign affairs at Verſailles, and was ſoon created a cardinal, for having ſigned the treaty of Vienna. So long as his own fortune was in queſtion, all ways for the accompliſhment of this were equal to him; but, when he ſaw himſelf eſtabliſhed, he endeavoured to maintain himſelf in his employment by conduct and principles leſs variable, and in greater conformity to the permanent intereſts of the ſtate. His views all were turned to the

procuring of peace, in order to terminate a war from which he could foreſee nothing but diſadvantage; and, on the other part, to releaſe his nation from a forced alliance, the burthen of which was borne by France, and the fruits and utility of which were all gathered and enjoyed by the houſe of Auſtria. Addreſſing himſelf to England, by clandeſtine and ſecret means, he there began a negotiation for peace; but the marchioneſs de Pompadour was of a contrary opinion, and he immediately ſaw himſelf arreſted in his career. By his acts of imprudence he had raiſed himſelf; by his ſage views he was ruined. He was diſgraced for having ſpoken of peace; and ſent an exile into the biſhopric of Aix.

The duke de Choiſeul, a native of Lorraine, ambaſſador from France to the court of Vienna, ſon of M. de Stainville, ambaſſador from the emperor at Paris, became the miniſter for foreign affairs, in lieu of the diſgraced cardinal. He ſignalized his entrance into the miniſtry by a new treaty of alliance, which he concluded with the court of Vienna; a copy of which we have given at the end of the chapter, that we might not interrupt the connexion of the narrative. Whoever reads it will perceive the aſcendency which the court of Vienna had acquired over that of Verſailles, and which as it proceeded did but

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increaſe. Not ſatisfied with the diſadvantageous treaty that he had concluded with the empreſs queen, the duke de Choiſeul commanded the *Académie des Inſcriptions*, in the name of the king, to ſtrike a medal which ſhould eternize the memory of that event.

The two courts ſtopped not here: they employed their common credit at the court of Peterſburg, to inflame the hatred of the empreſs, Elizabeth, againſt the king of Pruſſia. They remonſtrated to her that it became her to waſh out the ſtain her honour had received at Zorndorf, by ſending an army more numerous into the field, on the approaching ſpring. Her favourite inceſſantly repeated that, in order to change the contempt of the Pruſſians for the Ruſſians into terror, it was neceſſary ſhe ſhould command her generals to act with greater vigour, and to follow on all occaſions the advice they ſhould receive from the allied powers. Theſe inſinuations were conducive to the purpoſe which the court of Vienna had in view; that is, to make her allies encounter all the perils of war, and to huſband all its advantages for herſelf.

The king of Poland was a party in all theſe intrigues. He not only embittered the court of Peterſburg againſt that of Berlin but, wiſhing likewiſe

likewiſe to gain from the friendſhip of the empreſs Elizabeth advantages in favour of his family, he ſolicited her aid for the procuring of the dutchy of Courland, in favour of his third ſon, prince Charles. The empreſs, deſirous of obliging the Saxons, gave her conſent; and Auguſtus II. inveſted his ſon with this duchy. The new duke repaired to Peterſburg, to return the empreſs thanks for the grant. But this prince, reſtleſs and ardent, took part in all the cabals of the court: his proceedings embroiled him with the grand duke and dutcheſs, whoſe hatred he incurred, and which finally occaſioned his ruin.

While the empreſs of Ruſſia beſtowed duchies and appropriated kingdoms, ſhe herſelf was not without apprehenſions. She dreaded leſt the Engliſh, the allies of Pruſſia, diſſatisfied with the conduct the Ruſſians had held toward them from the commencement of the war, ſhould ſend a fleet into the Baltic, and burn the port of Cronſchlott. To prevent any ſuch attempts, her miniſters negotiated a treaty of aſſociation with the crowns of Sweden and Denmark, in order to interdict the paſſage of the Sound to foreign fleets. This convention, in which the Swedes found their advantage, and to which

the ſubſidies of France obliged the Danes to conſent, was haſtily concluded between the three powers.

England troubled herſelf little concerning the meaſures the powers of the north were taking, to forbid her ſquadrons an entrance into the Baltic. She ruled over the ocean, and in every other ſea was miſtreſs; without diſturbing herſelf either concerning the Baltic or the Sound. Admiral Boſcawen and general Amherſt had taken Cape Breton; Keppel had conquered the iſland of Goree on the coaſt of Africa. The Indies preſented ſpoils far different from any to be found on the ſhores of Denmark, Sweden, or Ruſſia.

This great progreſs of the Engliſh did not eaſe the king of the load under which he laboured, nor ſecure his crown from impending perils. He had in vain requeſted a ſquadron of the Engliſh, to cover his ports in the Baltic, menaced by the fleets of Ruſſia and of Sweden. His ambaſſador Rexin, at the Porte, was continually traverſed in his negotiation by Mr. Porter, the ambaſſador of Great Britain. The new emperor of the Turks was deſtitute of education, ignorant of buſineſs, and timid to an extreme; as well from the dread of being dethroned as from that of the ill ſucceſs of his arms, ſhould he engage

engage in a war with the houſe of Auſtria. How great ſoever the ſums were that were ſent to this court, whatever mode of corruption was attempted, affairs were but little advanced thereby, for the Auſtrians and French ſcattered their money and made their preſents with the ſame profuſion; and the Turks found it more to their intereſt to receive rewards for remaining quiet than for becoming active.

The ineffectual efforts which the king had made, at the Porte, progreſſively confirmed him that he had nothing to expect from foreign aid, and that he muſt recur to his own proper reſources. His whole attention was turned toward his army. All the men that could be obtained were raiſed; arms and horſes were diſtributed, and the troops were proviſioned, in order, during the enſuing campaign, to oppoſe the multifarious foes, whom Pruſſia had to combat, by a well conditioned and numerous army.

Extract from the Treaty of Alliance concluded at Verſailles, on the 30th of December, 1758, between the Empreſs Queen and the King of France.

This treaty appears to have been concluded in oppoſition to the convention of ſubſidy, which had been ſigned on the 11th of April, the ſame year, between the courts of Pruſſia and England. Mention of this is even made in the preamble, and it is there ſaid in ſo many words,

That, as the tranquillity of Germany muſt not hope for re-eſtabliſhment, except by enfeebling the pernicious power of the king of Pruſſia, the moſt chriſtian king and the empreſs queen had thought proper to ſtrengthen the ties of their union by a treaty, confirming the treaty of Verſailles of the 1ſt of May 1756; that they might concert meaſures the moſt proper to oblige the aggreſſor to give ſatisfaction to the injured, and ſecurity for the future, and that they might permanently eſtabliſh the repoſe of Germany, by reducing the king of Pruſſia within ſuch bounds as no longer ſhould permit him, at the will of his ambition, and of that of England, to trouble the general tranquillity, as well as the tranquillity of his neighbours.

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They then proceed to the treaty itſelf, which contains the following articles:

ART. I. The two parties confirm the treaty of Verſailles, of the 1ſt of May 1756, which they make the baſis of the preſent convention.

II. The king of France promiſes, during the whole courſe of the preſent war, to furniſh the empreſs queen with a ſuccour of eighteen thouſand foot and ſix thouſand horſe, either in men or money, which ſhall be at the choice of the empreſs queen.

III. The ſuccour in money is fixed at three millions four hundred and fifty-ſix thouſand florins per annum.

IV. The king of France ſingly undertakes to pay the ſubſidy of Sweden.

V. He promiſes to maintain the corps of Saxon troops; and that it ſhall be at the diſpoſal of the empreſs queen, whenever ſhe ſhall make the demand.

VI. The two parties engage to procure the king of Poland, elector of Saxony, not only reſtitution of his eſtates but alſo a proportionate indemnification.

VII. The king of France promiſes to employ a hundred thouſand men in Germany, to cover the Auſtrian low countries and the ſtates of the empire.

VIII. The

VIII. The ſafety of the coaſts of Flanders rendering it neceſſary that the towns of Oſtend and Nieuport ſhould be ſecured from all inſult, and the moſt chriſtian king being deſirous of undertaking the defence of theſe two places, they ſhall remain confided to the guard of his troops, ſo long as the preſent war between France and England ſhall continue; but this arrangement, which is ſolely relative to the ſecurity of the aforeſaid places, is not to be any way prejudicial to the right of ſovereignty of the empreſs queen.

IX. The king of France however promiſes to give up the towns of Nieuport and Oſtend, even before he makes peace with England, if it ſhall ſo be ultimately agreed.

X. The countries conquered from the king of Pruſſia ſhall be governed and adminiſtered in the name, and by the commiſſaries, of the empreſs queen; but the revenues ſhall appertain to the moſt chriſtian king, with the exception of forty thouſand florins, to be deducted for the expences of adminiſtration.

XI. The two parties engage to terminate any individual diſcuſſion they may have, in an amicable manner.

XII. The moſt chriſtian king promiſes to make every effort during the war, and to employ

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in the conferences for peace his moſt efficacious good offices, in order that, in the treaty to be concluded between the empreſs queen and the king of Pruſſia, the duchy of Sileſia, and the county of Glatz, ſhall be ceded and aſcertained to the houſe of Auſtria; and he previouſly undertakes to guarantee all that ſhall be ſtipulated on that head, between the empreſs queen and the king of Pruſſia.

XIII. The two parties engage to conclude neither peace nor truce with their common enemies, except in perfect concert. The king of France promiſes to conclude neither peace nor truce with the king of England, without ſtipulating with him that he ſhall employ all his efforts to engage the king of Pruſſia to grant her Imperial majeſty juſt and honourable conditions; or at leaſt, not without obliging the king o England to promiſe he will afford no further aid to the king of Pruſſia; and the empreſs queen engages to make neither peace nor truce with the king of Pruſſia but on the ſame conditions.

XIV. For the ſecurity of the proteſtant ſtates, the treaty of Weſtphalia is confirmed; and it is agreed to invite the crown of Sweden to accede to the preſent treaty.

XV. The empreſs queen renounces her right of reverſion to the duchies of Parma, Placentia,

centia, and Guaſtalla, in favour of the male deſcendants of the infant don Philip.

XVI. The two parties engage to act in concert with the duke of Parma and the court of the king of the two Sicilies, to fix the order of ſucceſſion in the kingdom of the Sicilies.

XVII. In return for the renunciation made in the XVth article, the moſt chriſtian king promiſes to employ his good offices to induce the king of Naples to cede to the emperor his pretenſions on the allodial property of the houſes of Medicis and Farneſe.

XVIII. The infant duke of Parma renounces his pretenſions on the allodial property of the houſes of Medicis and Farneſe, as well as on the towns of Bozzolo and Sabionetta.

XIX. The moſt chriſtian king promiſes to concur, by his good offices, in promoting the election of the archduke, Joſeph, to be king of the Romans, in a manner conformable to the conſtitutions of the empire.

XX. The two parties agree to take no meaſures relative to the future election of a king of Poland but by common conſent; and, their purpoſes being only to maintain the liberties of the Poliſh nation, they declare, from this time, ſhould the free choice of the republic happen to

fall

fall on a prince of the houſe of Saxony, they will afford it their beſt ſupport.

XXI. The empreſs queen having, with the duke of Modena, agreed on the marriage of the archduke Leopold with the princeſs of Modena, and wiſhing to requeſt from the emperor and the empire the reverſion of the feudal ſucceſſion of Modena, in favour of the archduke Leopold, on condition that the ſtates of Modena never ſhall be united to the collective ſtates of the houſe of Auſtria, the king of France promiſes to promote the marriage, by his good offices.

XXII. The emperor, the empreſs of Ruſſia, and the kings of Sweden and Poland, ſhall be invited to accede to this treaty.

The two, laſt as well as the three ſeparate articles, contain nothing but ſimple formalities.

END OF PART I.